Download or read book The Allocation of Incentives in Multi layered Organizations written by Erika Deserranno and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 89 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A classic problem faced by organizations is to decide how to distribute incentives among their different layers. By means of a field experiment with a large public-health organization in Sierra Leone, we show that financial incentives maximize output when they are equally shared between frontline health workers and their supervisor. The impact of this intervention on completed health visits is 61% larger than the impact of incentive schemes that target exclusively the worker or the supervisor. Also, the shared incentives uniquely improve overall health-service provision and health outcomes. We use these experimental results to structurally estimate a model of service provision and find that shared incentives are effective because worker and supervisor effort are strong strategic complements, and because side payments across layers are limited. Through the use of counterfactual model experiments, we highlight the importance of effort complementarities across the different layers of an organization for optimal policy design.

Download or read book The Allocation of Incentives in Multi layered Organizations written by Erika Deserranno and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Does the allocation of incentives across the hierarchy of an organization matter for its performance? In a field experiment with a large public-health organization in Sierra Leone, we find that healthcare provision is highly affected by how incentives are allocated between frontline workers and their supervisors. Sharing incentives equally between these two layers raises completed health visits by 61% compared to the unilateral allocations that are typical in public-health organizations. Also, the shared incentives uniquely improve overall health service provision and health outcomes. We provide reduced form and structural evidence that these results are driven by a combination of effort complementarities and contractual frictions, and we explore the implications of these forces for the optimal design of incentive policies in multi-layered organizations.

Download or read book Managing Through Incentives written by Richard B. McKenzie and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 1998 with total page 348 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This text explains how firms can improve the performance of the people on whom they depend - workers, customers, suppliers, stockholders - by managing the incentives system better. The author argues that incentives are not just a matter of money, but a range of factors which provide a set of rewards that encourage people to work towards a common goal of organizational success.

Download or read book Role of Financial Incentives and Social Incentives in Multi Task Settings written by Alexander Brueggen and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we investigate the role of financial incentives and social incentives in multi-task settings where the agent makes an effort level choice and an effort allocation choice. We focus on a setting where these choices are not independent and an active trade-off between effort level and effort allocation exists. Social incentives play a crucial role in this trade-off. While financial incentives increase the effort level, social incentives congruent with the principal's interest mitigate the distortions in effort allocation associated with financial incentives, which improves the effectiveness of financial incentives. In a 2×2 experiment, we find that participants who receive distorting financial incentives provide significantly more total effort than participants who receive a fixed wage, but they allocate effort significantly less congruently. However, the effort allocation distortion caused by distorting financial incentives is significantly reduced by congruent social incentives. We further find that the level of effort on the unmeasured task is not significantly different between fixed wages and financial incentives, which implies that distortions in effort allocation are driven by doing more of the measured task instead of doing less of the unmeasured task. Our findings have important implications for both theory building and organizational practices.

Download or read book Human Relations in the Workplace written by Julio Rotemberg and published by Andesite Press. This book was released on 2017-08-24 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

Download or read book Design Elements and Requirements of Incentive Systems in Organizations written by Manuel Jacoby and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2021-02-09 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Academic Paper from the year 2018 in the subject Leadership and Human Resources - Employee Motivation, grade: 1,3, International University of Applied Sciences, language: English, abstract: If you look for any specific definitions, you will find a huge variation considering the term incentive systems. Weber paraphrases incentive systems as having the aim to encourage employees positively through their performance, with benefits for the organization to reach its stated goals and objectives. In turn, Bartscher identifies incentive systems as the sum of all created working conditions, directly or indirectly to impact the motivation and thus work performance of employees, evoking a certain desired behavior. Coherently, incentive systems aim to control behavior of employees. But they do not only support a certain behavior, such systems additionally are designed to avoid unwanted behavior. Think of any internal regulations which intent to avoid behavior patterns by providing rules and/or punishments. Furthermore, as an example, a low performance might result in a curtailed income and loss of personal reputation.

Download or read book Organization wide Broad based Incentives written by Janet Hillirie Marler and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentives and Information in Multiagent Settings written by Omar Ahmed Nayeem and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 334 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation comprises three papers, each of which analyzes a mechanism design issue that arises in a setting with multiple agents that need to either acquire or aggregate information for use in a decision. The decision affects all agents as well as a principal, who also plays the role of mechanism designer. The theoretical models that I develop in these papers can be applied to a wide range of diverse settings, but I emphasize applications in the areas of organizational economics and political economics. The first paper, titled ``The Value of `Useless' Bosses, '' presents a novel view of the role of middle managers in organizations. Conventional wisdom regarding middle management suggests that a principal that can administer her organization independently has no reason to hire a manager, and that a principal that can benefit from a manager's services should hire one with aligned interests. The paper highlights a channel through which virtually any principal can benefit from the services of a manager, particularly of one whose interests differ. Specifically, when a principal relies on a worker to acquire information for an organizational decision, she can strengthen the worker's incentives by delegating the decision to a ``biased'' manager. Although casual observation of the game suggests that the manager's position is redundant, delegation benefits the principal. Thus, the paper helps to reconcile the prevalence of middle management with its widespread lamentation. It also illustrates how discord between a manager and a worker can improve an organization's performance. The results are consistent with outcomes from various knowledge-based organizations. The second paper, titled ``Communication and Preference (Mis)alignment in Organizations, '' conveys insights that are similar to the ones from ``The Value of `Useless' Bosses.'' Like the previous paper, this one explains the benefits of biased agents (both workers and managers) in organizations. However, unlike the previous paper, this one assumes that an organization's principal--whose time, technical expertise, and attention are limited--relies upon division managers to produce reports, which summarize information acquired by workers, to inform her decisions. Given this assumption, a pressing question for the principal is not whether to appoint a manager, but rather which type of manager to appoint. Note that two types of agency problems can arise in the setting described above. First, workers that bear private costs for their information acquisition efforts may not exert as much effort as the principal would like. Second, managers that do not share the principal's preferences over decisions can produce false reports. The paper shows that, although preference alignment within the organization may be expected to minimize the principal's losses from agency, the principal may benefit from intraorganizational conflict. In particular, the principal can use a manager's bias to strengthen a worker's incentives to acquire information. Since a manager's incentive to mislead the principal vanishes if the acquired information is of sufficiently high quality, the principal realizes an unambiguous welfare gain by hiring a biased manager. The principal can further enhance her welfare by also hiring a biased worker, whose bias clashes with the manager's. The third paper, titled ``Efficient Electorates, '' analyzes a social choice setting with pure common values, private noisy information about an unobservable payoff-relevant state of the world, and costless voting. In such a setting, an economic argument in favor of direct democracy is essentially one about information aggregation: if all citizens vote according to their private information--which, on average, is correct--then, in large majority-rule elections, the probability that the welfare-maximizing outcome is implemented is close to one. This argument, formalized first by the Marquis de Condorcet in his celebrated ``jury theorem'' and later extended to cover more general environments, is an asymptotic result that requires voters' information to be sufficiently uncorrelated. The paper shows that, for a fixed number of sincere voters with shared information sources, direct democracy is often suboptimal. It then considers the problem of appointing an optimal electorate given the allocation of information. In special cases of this framework, the problem can be viewed as the choice of an electorate from a set of individuals that communicate with each other via a social network before the election. It provides a characterization of the optimal electorate for certain classes of networks. Because the optimal electorate is often a proper subset of the full set of agents, representative democracy--even in the absence of voting costs--is often more efficient than direct democracy. As the paper illustrates through various examples, though, the solution to the problem of optimal elector appointment is unstable, and so a general characterization of the optimal electorate is elusive.

Download or read book A Multi level Incentive Program for a Service Organization written by Richard G. Allgeier and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 240 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentives and Performance written by Isabell M. Welpe and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-11-07 with total page 493 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: ​This book contributes to the current discussion in society, politics and higher education on innovation capacity and the financial and non-financial incentives for researchers. The expert contributions in the book deal with implementation of incentive systems at higher education institutions in order to foster innovation. On the other hand, the book also discusses the extent to which governance structures from economy can be transferred to universities and how scientific performance can be measured and evaluated. This book is essential for decision-makers in knowledge-intensive organizations and higher-educational institutions dealing with the topic of performance management.

Download or read book Team incentives evidence from a firm level experiment written by Iwan Barankay and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Handbook of Organizational Economics written by Robert S. Gibbons and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2013 with total page 1248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: (E-book available via MyiLibrary) In even the most market-oriented economies, most economic transactions occur not in markets but inside managed organizations, particularly business firms. Organizational economics seeks to understand the nature and workings of such organizations and their impact on economic performance. The Handbook of Organizational Economics surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field. It displays the breadth of topics in organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.

Download or read book Incentives Organization and Public Economics written by Peter Hammond and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2000-12-21 with total page 370 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This collection celebrates the career of Sir James Mirrlees, who received the 1996 Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on income taxation and its extension to information and incentive problems. His contributions have proved fundamental to the development of a wide range of areas in economics. The 17 papers contained in this volume focus on themes that are representative of Mirrlees' work, including the economics of information, welfare, taxation, project appraisal, and industrial organization. All the contributors have spent time working closely with Mirrlees - either as his co-author or his student - and all are recognized authorities in their fields. The significant new contributions that this collection offers will have wide-ranging appeal, and should prove particularly interesting to scholars working in the areas of microeconomics, microeconomic theory, mathematical economics, and welfare economics.

Download or read book Understanding High powered Incentives in Organizations written by Shuo Zheng (S.M.) and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I study how the compensation structure of top managers from US public companies changes in recent years and the effect of these incentives on firm performance. I first explore the trend of executive compensation structure and performance metrics used in executive compensation over the years. I also examine systematic differences across industries and different firm sizes. Then I analyze the relationship between compensation structure and firm performance. My results suggest that a higher level of incentive-based compensation correlates with higher growth in total shareholder return; particularly for small firms, a higher level of incentive-based compensation correlates with significantly higher total asset growth, sales growth and employment growth as well. To explore whether the level of incentive-based compensation has influence on firm performance, I use propensity score matching to reduce selection bias. My results suggest that the level of incentive-based compensation has no significant influence on firm performance.

Download or read book Non monetary Incentives in Organizations written by Yining Li and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Intrinsic motives and non-monetary incentives are important drivers of worker satisfaction, particularly in the modern knowledge economy. Recent empirical work has established, for example, that various forms of non-monetary incentives can make workers more satisfied, more likely to stay at the firm, and more productive (e.g., Cassar and Meier, 2018). However, little theoretical work is done to understand the role of general non-monetary incentives in organizations. Hence, this thesis intends to fill that gap by developing a sequence of four models based on Bakers multi-task framework (2002) to capture the effects of non-monetary incentives on employee behavior and wage design. I argue that non-monetary incentives can complement traditional monetary compensation to motivate effort. Such incentives can serve as a more efficient alternative to wages and solve many incentive problems caused by the limitations of a purely financial incentive contract, including adverse selection problems, moral hazard problems, and coordination failures.

Download or read book The Microstructure of Organizations written by Phanish Puranam and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2018-06-12 with total page 206 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book synthesizes a decade of research by the author into fundamental issues in organization design. The result is a novel micro-structural perspective on organizations, which aims to both expand and narrow current thinking. The new perspective takes an expansive view on the kinds of phenomena that can be studied in terms of organization design- such as cross-functional teams, strategic partnerships, buyer-supplier relations, alliance networks, mega-projects, post-merger integration, business groups, open source communities, and crowdsourcing, besides traditional concerns with bureaucratic organizations. At the same time, this approach narrows focus by abstracting away from the variety and complexity of organizations to a few fundamental and universal problems of organizing (that relate to how they aggregate their members' efforts), as well as a few reusable building blocks microstructures (which capture common patterns of interaction between members of an organization). The microstructural approach to organizations will be of interest to researchers and PhD students in management, organization science, and strategy.

Download or read book Changing Incentives in a Multi Task Environment written by James A. Brickley and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study focuses on changes in incentives at the William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration in the early 1990s to redirect effort from academic research to classroom teaching. We find a substantial and almost immediate jump in teaching ratings following the changes in incentives. Longer-run learning and turnover effects are present. Evidence also suggests that research output fell. This case illustrates the power of organizational incentives to redirect effort in a multi-task environment, even in the presence of apparent human-capital constraints.