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Book Monotone Games

    Book Details:
  • Author : Tarun Sabarwal
  • Publisher : Springer Nature
  • Release : 2020-10-26
  • ISBN : 3030455130
  • Pages : 176 pages

Download or read book Monotone Games written by Tarun Sabarwal and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-10-26 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Palgrave Pivot examines monotone games and studies incentives and outcomes when there are multiple players, and how the decision of each player affects the well-being of others in particular ways. Games with strategic complements exhibit codirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the same direction as other players. Games with strategic substitutes exhibit contradirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the direction opposite to other players. Monotone games include both types of players: some players have incentives to move in the same direction as other players and some players have incentives to move in the direction opposite to other players. This book develops the theory of monotone games in a new and unified manner and presents many applications. Incentives and outcomes studied in monotone games occur in a variety of disciplines, including biology, business, computer science, economics, mathematics, medicine, philosophy, political science, and psychology, among others. The book identifies unifying threads across different cases, showing how newer results are similar to or different from previous results, and how readers may better understand them under the umbrella of monotone games.

Book Strategic Complements and Substitutes

Download or read book Strategic Complements and Substitutes written by Eric Van Den Steen and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Strategic Complements and Substitutes  and Potential Games

Download or read book Strategic Complements and Substitutes and Potential Games written by Pradeep Dubey and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes

Download or read book Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes written by Andrew J. Monaco and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Repeated Games and Reputations

Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.

Book Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes

Download or read book Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes written by Jan Potters and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Global Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes

Download or read book Global Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes written by Eric Hoffmann and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Strategic Substitutes  Complements and Ambiguity

Download or read book Strategic Substitutes Complements and Ambiguity written by Sara le Roux and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We report the results from a set of experiments conducted to test the effect of ambiguity on individual behaviour in games of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. We test whether subjects' perception of ambiguity differs when faced by a local opponent as opposed to a foreign one. Interestingly, though subjects often choose an ambiguity safe strategy (not part of a Nash equilibrium), we do not find much difference in the ambiguity levels when faced by foreign subjects.

Book Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes

Download or read book Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes written by Andrew Monaco and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies games with both strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and more generally, games with strategic heterogeneity (GSH). Such games may behave differently from either games with strategic complements or games with strategic substitutes. Under mild assumptions (on one or two players only), the equilibrium set in a GSH is totally unordered (no two equilibria are comparable in the standard product order). Moreover, under mild assumptions (on one player only), parameterized GSH do not allow decreasing equilibrium selections. In general, this cannot be strengthened to conclude increasing selections. Monotone comparative statics results are presented for games in which some players exhibit strategic substitutes and others exhibit strategic complements. For two-player games with linearly ordered strategy spaces, there is a characterization. More generally, there are sufficient conditions. The conditions apply only to players exhibiting strategic substitutes; no additional conditions are needed for players with strategic complements. Several examples highlight the results.

Book Information Complements  Substitutes  and Strategic Product Design

Download or read book Information Complements Substitutes and Strategic Product Design written by Geoffrey Parker and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Competitive maneuvering in the information economy has raised a pressing question: how can firms raise profits by giving away products for free? This paper provides a possible answer and articulates a strategy space for information product design. Free strategic complements can raise a firm's own profits while free strategic substitutes can lower profits for competitors. We introduce a formal model of two-sided market externalities based in textbook economics -- a mix of Katz & Shapiro network effects, price discrimination, and product differentiation -- that leads to novel strategies such as an eagerness to enter into Bertrand price competition. This combination helps to explain many recent firm strategies such as those of Microsoft, Netscape (AOL), Sun, Adobe, and ID. The model presented here argues for three simple and intuitive results. First, a firm can rationally invest in a product it intends to give away into perpetuity even in the absence of competition. Second, we identify distinct markets for content-providers and end-consumers and show that either can be a candidate for the free good. Third, a firm can use strategic product design to penetrate a market that becomes competitive post-entry. The model therefore helps to explain several interesting market behaviors such as free goods, upgrade paths, split versioning, and strategic information substitutes.

Book Strategic Complements and Substitutes in Bilateral Oligopolies

Download or read book Strategic Complements and Substitutes in Bilateral Oligopolies written by Francis Bloch and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 9 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Oligopoly Pricing

Download or read book Oligopoly Pricing written by Xavier Vives and published by MIT Press (MA). This book was released on 1999 with total page 446 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.

Book Information Complements  Sustitutes  and Strategic Product Design

Download or read book Information Complements Sustitutes and Strategic Product Design written by Geoffrey G. Parker and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements

Download or read book A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements written by Larry Karp and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Embedding Games with Strategic Complements Into Games with Strategic Substitutes

Download or read book Embedding Games with Strategic Complements Into Games with Strategic Substitutes written by Zhigang Cao and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Games with strategic substitutes (GSS) are generally less tractable than games with strategic complements (GSC). This paper revisits the GSC versus GSS comparison by establishing a novel connection between them. We show through a network perspective that, when the strategy set of each player is the product of some linearly ordered sets that are order isomorphic to subsets of the real space, every GSC can be embedded into a GSS, such that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the former is a projection of that of the latter. In comparison, no GSS with multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria can be embedded into any GSC. In this sense, the class of GSS is broader than the class of GSC.