Download or read book Simultaneous Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection with Risk Averse Agents written by Bernd Theilen and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Screening Risk Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard written by Bruno Jullien and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Contracts Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection written by Jaeyoung Sung and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In spite of the importance of optimal contracting problems under moral hazard and adverse selection, current literature offers no optimal solutions to contracting problems under moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents. The agent's risk aversion, however, appears to be critical for understanding managerial compensation problems. We present a continuous-time agency model with a risk-averse agent and a risk-neutral principal to show that moral hazard and adverse selection can be optimally resolved with a menu of linear contracts. In application, we discuss a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions, and show that a flat-wage contract is sometimes optimal.
Download or read book Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard written by and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article presents a continuous-time agency model in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard with a risk-averse agent and a risk-neutral principal. Under the model setup, we show that the optimal controls are constant over time, and thus the optimal menu consists of contracts that are linear in the final outcome. We also show that when a moral hazard problem adds to an adverse selection problem, the monotonicity condition well known in the pure adverse selection literature needs to be modified to ensure the incentive compatibility for information revelation. The model is applied to a few managerial compensation problems involving managerial project selection and capital budgeting decisions. We argue that in the third-best world, the relationship between the volatility of the outcome and the sensitivity of the contract depends on interactions between the managerial cost and the firm`s production functions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, sometimes the higher the volatility, the higher the sensitivity of the contract. The firm receiving good news sometimes chooses safer projects or invests less than it does with bad news. We also examine the effects of the observability of the volatility on corporate investment decisions.
Download or read book The Trade Off Between Incentives and Endogenous Risk written by Aloisio Araujo and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents supply more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contracts; thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.
Download or read book Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Risk neutral Agent written by and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard with Risk neutral Agent written by Roger Guesnerie and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Simple Contracts with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard written by Daniel Gottlieb and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study a principal-agent model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We obtain conditions under which the optimal mechanism offers a single contract to all types. These conditions are always satisfied, for example, if output is binary or if the distribution of outputs is multiplicatively separable and ordered by FOSD (if it is not ordered, the optimal mechanism offers at most two contracts). If, in addition, the marginal distribution satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, this single contract is a debt contract. Our model suggests that offering a single contract may be optimal in environments with adverse selection and moral hazard, where offering flexible menus of contracts provides gaming opportunities to the agent.
Download or read book Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Contract Law written by Nicole Petrick and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2009 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Essay aus dem Jahr 2005 im Fachbereich BWL - Recht, Note: 1,7, Higher School of Economics Moscow, Russia, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Legal and economical interpretations of contract, contract law and contract theory, asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard. Paper explains negative effects of adverse selection and moral hazard for the case of transaction costs and incomplete contracts and describes incentives to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard, such as signaling and deductibles as well as indemnity contracts and valued contracts.
Download or read book Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection Moral Hazard and Type Dependent Reservation Utilities written by Natalie Packham and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 7 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a continuous-time setting where a risk-averse agent controls the drift of an output process driven by a Brownian motion, optimal contracts are linear in the terminal output; this result is well-known in a setting with moral hazard and - under stronger assumptions - adverse selection. Using techniques from stochastic control theory, we show that this result continues to hold when in addition reservation utilities are type-dependent. This type of problem occurs in the study of optimal compensation problems involving competing principals.
Download or read book Dealing with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection Simultaneously written by Georges Dionne and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets written by Dionne, Georges and published by Montréal : Centre for Research on Transportation = Centre de recherche sur les transports (C.R.T.). This book was released on 2000 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Moral Hazard with Discrete Soft Information written by Guillaume Roger and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I study a model of moral hazard with soft information. The risk-averse agent takes an action and she alone observes the stochastic outcome; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection as well. With limited instruments, the principal cannot solve these two problems independently. To elicit ex post information revelation, he must use an audit mechanism and distort the transfer schedule, as compared to the standard moral hazard problem. This is socially costly in that these transfer distortions imply effort distortions. These results are robust and suggest high-power contracts may have to be revisited when information is soft.
Download or read book Computational Complexity written by Robert A. Meyers and published by Springer. This book was released on 2011-10-19 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Complex systems are systems that comprise many interacting parts with the ability to generate a new quality of collective behavior through self-organization, e.g. the spontaneous formation of temporal, spatial or functional structures. These systems are often characterized by extreme sensitivity to initial conditions as well as emergent behavior that are not readily predictable or even completely deterministic. The recognition that the collective behavior of the whole system cannot be simply inferred from an understanding of the behavior of the individual components has led to the development of numerous sophisticated new computational and modeling tools with applications to a wide range of scientific, engineering, and societal phenomena. Computational Complexity: Theory, Techniques and Applications presents a detailed and integrated view of the theoretical basis, computational methods, and state-of-the-art approaches to investigating and modeling of inherently difficult problems whose solution requires extensive resources approaching the practical limits of present-day computer systems. This comprehensive and authoritative reference examines key components of computational complexity, including cellular automata, graph theory, data mining, granular computing, soft computing, wavelets, and more.
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Download or read book Foundations of Insurance Economics written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 1992 with total page 748 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.
Download or read book Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis written by Michael Ralph Caputo and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2005-01-17 with total page 596 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Foundations of Dynamic Economic Analysis presents a modern and thorough exposition of the fundamental mathematical formalism used to study optimal control theory, i.e., continuous time dynamic economic processes, and to interpret dynamic economic behavior. The style of presentation, with its continual emphasis on the economic interpretation of mathematics and models, distinguishes it from several other excellent texts on the subject. This approach is aided dramatically by introducing the dynamic envelope theorem and the method of comparative dynamics early in the exposition. Accordingly, motivated and economically revealing proofs of the transversality conditions come about by use of the dynamic envelope theorem. Furthermore, such sequencing of the material naturally leads to the development of the primal-dual method of comparative dynamics and dynamic duality theory, two modern approaches used to tease out the empirical content of optimal control models. The stylistic approach ultimately draws attention to the empirical richness of optimal control theory, a feature missing in virtually all other textbooks of this type.
