Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

Download or read book Selection on moral hazard in health insurance written by Liran Einav and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: In this paper we explore the possibility that individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral response to the insurance contract. Such "selection on moral hazard" can have important implications for attempts to combat either selection or moral hazard. We explore these issues using individual-level panel data from a single firm, which contain information about health insurance options, choices, and subsequent claims. To identify the behavioral response to health insurance coverage and the heterogeneity in it, we take advantage of a change in the health insurance options offered to some, but not all of the firm's employees. We begin with descriptive evidence that is suggestive of both heterogeneous moral hazard as well as selection on it, with individuals who select more coverage also appearing to exhibit greater behavioral response to that coverage. To formalize this analysis and explore its implications, we develop and estimate a model of plan choice and medical utilization. The results from the modeling exercise echo the descriptive evidence, and allow for further explorations of the interaction between selection and moral hazard. For example, one implication of our estimates is that abstracting from selection on moral hazard could lead one to substantially over-estimate the spending reduction associated with introducing a high deductible health insurance option

Download or read book Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance written by Olesya Kazantseva and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2014-07-18 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 2014 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: Within the discussion about the increasing expenditures in health insurance, the overutilization of medical care is often attributed to the existence of a moral hazard problem. Since moral hazard has a great impact on health insurance policies, there is a growing interest in the economic literature to identify and to measure its effects. Although the problem of overconsumption of medical care does not mean moral hazard per se, the determination of the latter may reduce its scope and help to mitigate the problem of overutilization. The main objective of this paper is an empirical evidence of the moral hazard phenomenon. By analysing the economic literature on moral hazard in health insurance this paper seeks for examples of its empirical evidence, whereby the emphasis lies on distinguishing between the demand-oriented (especially ex-post) and the supply-oriented (external) moral hazard.

Download or read book Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance written by David Powell and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Moral hazard and adverse selection create inefficiencies in private health insurance markets. The authors use claims data from a large firm to study the independent roles of both moral hazard and adverse selection. Previous studies have attempted to estimate moral hazard in private health insurance by assuming that individuals respond only to the spot price, end-of-year price, average price, or a related metric. There is little economic justification for such assumptions and, in fact, economic intuition suggests that the nonlinear budget constraints generated by health insurance plans make these assumptions especially poor. They study the differential impact of the health insurance plans offered by the firm on the entire distribution of medical expenditures without parameterizing the plans by a specific metric. They use a new instrumental variable quantile estimation technique introduced in Powell (2013b) that provides the quantile treatment effects for each plan, while conditioning on a set of covariates for identification purposes. This technique allows us to map the resulting estimated medical expenditure distributions to the nonlinear budget sets generated by each plan. Their method also allows them to separate moral hazard from adverse selection and estimate their relative importance. They estimate that 77% of the additional medical spending observed in the most generous plan in their data relative to the least generous is due to adverse selection. The remainder can be attributed to moral hazard. A policy which resulted in each person enrolling in the least generous plan would cause the annual premium of that plan to rise by over $1,500.

Download or read book Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance written by and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Moral hazard and adverse selection create inefficiencies in private health insurance markets and understanding the relative importance of each factor is critical for policy. We use claims data from a large firm to isolate moral hazard from plan selection. Previous studies have attempted to estimate moral hazard in private health insurance by assuming that individuals respond only to the spot price, end-of-year price, expected price, or a related metric. The nonlinear budget constraints generated by health insurance plans make these assumptions especially poor and we statistically reject their appropriateness. We study the differential impact of the health insurance plans offered by the firm on the entire distribution of medical expenditures without assuming that individuals only respond to a parameterized price. Our empirical strategy exploits the introduction of new plans during the sample period as a shock to plan generosity, and we account for sample attrition over time. We use an instrumental variable quantile estimation technique that provides quantile treatment effects for each plan, while conditioning on a set of covariates for identification purposes. This technique allows us to map the resulting estimated medical expenditure distributions to the nonlinear budget sets generated by each plan. We estimate that 53% of the additional medical spending observed in the most generous plan in our data relative to the least generous is due to moral hazard. The remainder can be attributed to adverse selection. A policy which resulted in each person enrolling in the least generous plan would cause the annual premium of that plan to rise by $1,000.

Download or read book Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard written by Gwen Peters Burchett and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 144 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Care Without Coverage written by Institute of Medicine and published by National Academies Press. This book was released on 2002-06-20 with total page 213 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Many Americans believe that people who lack health insurance somehow get the care they really need. Care Without Coverage examines the real consequences for adults who lack health insurance. The study presents findings in the areas of prevention and screening, cancer, chronic illness, hospital-based care, and general health status. The committee looked at the consequences of being uninsured for people suffering from cancer, diabetes, HIV infection and AIDS, heart and kidney disease, mental illness, traumatic injuries, and heart attacks. It focused on the roughly 30 million-one in seven-working-age Americans without health insurance. This group does not include the population over 65 that is covered by Medicare or the nearly 10 million children who are uninsured in this country. The main findings of the report are that working-age Americans without health insurance are more likely to receive too little medical care and receive it too late; be sicker and die sooner; and receive poorer care when they are in the hospital, even for acute situations like a motor vehicle crash.

Download or read book Adverse Selection in Health Insurance written by David M. Cutler and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals being allocated to the wrong plans; risk sharing losses since premium variability is increased; and losses from insurers distorting their policies to improve their mix of insureds. We discuss the potential for these losses, and present empirical evidence on adverse selection in two groups of employees: Harvard University, and the Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts (serving state and local employees). In both groups, adverse selection is a significant concern. At Harvard, the University's decision to contribute an equal amount to all insurance plans led to the disappearance of the most generous policy within 3 years. At the GIC, adverse selection has been contained by subsidizing premiums on a proportional basis and managing the most generous policy very tightly. A combination of prospective or retrospective risk adjustment, coupled with reinsurance for high cost cases, seems promising as a way to provide appropriate incentives for enrollees and to reduce losses from adverse selection.

Download or read book Health Insurance written by Michael A. Morrisey and published by Asociation of University Programs in Health Administration/Health Administration Press. This book was released on 2020 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: History of Health Insurance in the United States -- The Affordable Care Act -- A Summary of Insurance Coverage -- The Demand for Insurance -- Adverse Selection -- Underwriting and Rate Making -- Risk Adjustment -- Moral Hazard and Prices -- Utilization Management -- Managed Care, Selective Contracting, and the Insurance Industry -- Provider Consolidation, Monopsony Power, and the Managed Care Backlash -- Insurance Market Structure, Conduct, and Performance -- Premium Sensitivity and Health Insurance -- Compensating Differentials -- Taxes and Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance -- Employers as Agents -- Health Savings Accounts and Consumer-Directed Health Plans -- The Small-Group Market -- The Individual Insurance Market -- Health Insurance Regulation -- High-Risk Pools -- An Overview of Medicare -- Retiree Coverage -- Medicaid, Crowd-Out, and Long-Term Care Insurance.

Download or read book Agricultural Productivity and Producer Behavior written by Wolfram Schlenker and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2019-11-13 with total page 316 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Agricultural yields have increased steadily in the last half century, particularly since the Green Revolution. At the same time, inflation-adjusted agricultural commodity prices have been trending downward as increases in supply outpace the growth of demand. Recent severe weather events, biofuel mandates, and a switch toward a more meat-heavy diet in emerging economies have nevertheless boosted commodity prices. Whether this is a temporary jump or the beginning of a longer-term trend is an open question. Agricultural Productivity and Producer Behavior examines the factors contributing to the remarkably steady increase in global yields and assesses whether yield growth can continue. This research also considers whether agricultural productivity growth has been, and will be, associated with significant environmental externalities. Among the topics studied are genetically modified crops; changing climatic factors; farm production responses to government regulations including crop insurance, transport subsidies, and electricity subsidies for groundwater extraction; and the role of specific farm practices such as crop diversification, disease management, and water-saving methods. This research provides new evidence that technological as well as policy choices influence agricultural productivity.

Download or read book Selection and Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Erik Grönqvist and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 104 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance written by John A. Nyman and published by Stanford University Press. This book was released on 2003 with total page 228 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Why do people buy health insurance? Conventional theory holds that people purchase insurance because they prefer the certainty of paying a small premium to the risk of getting sick and paying a large medical bill. This book presents a new theory of consumer demand for health insurance. It holds that people purchase insurance to obtain additional "income" when they become ill.

Download or read book Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Health Insurance in Vietnam written by Won Hee Park and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 100 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book How Health Insurance Affects Health Care Demand A Structural Analysis of Behavioral Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection written by Yingying Dong and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Individuals with health insurance use more health care. One reason is that health care is cheaper for the insured. Additionally, having insurance can encourage unhealthy behavior via moral hazard. Previous work studying the effect of health insurance on medical utilization has mostly ignored behavioral changes due to having health insurance, and how that in turn affects medical utilization. This paper investigates the structural causal relationships among health insurance status, health behavior, and medical utilization theoretically and empirically, and separates price effects from behavioral moral hazard effects. Also distinguished are the extensive versus intensive margins of insurance effects on behavior.

Download or read book Handbook of Health Economics written by Mark V. Pauly and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2012-01-05 with total page 1149 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "As a relatively new subdiscipline of economics, health economics has made many contributions to areas of the main discipline, such as insurance economics. This volume provides a survey of the burgeoning literature on the subject of health economics." {source : site de l'éditeur].

Download or read book The Theory of Social Health Insurance written by Peter Zweifel and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2007 with total page 104 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Theory of Social Health Insurance develops the theory of social health insurance also known as public health insurance. While a good deal is known about the demand and supply of private insurance, the theoretical basis of social health insurance is much more fragile. The Theory of Social Health Insurance examines questions including why does social health insurance exist and even dominate private health insurance in most developed countries? What are the objectives and constraints of social health insurance managers? What is the likely outcome or "performance" of social health insurance? The Theory of Social Health Insurance reviews the conventional theory of demand for insurance and health insurance, the supply of health insurance in general and social health insurance in particular, the properties of the optimal health insurance contract, and whether there are factors limiting the growth of social health insurance.

Download or read book Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance written by Jan Boone and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market. Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered by basic insurance.