Download or read book Robust Mechanism Design The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2012-03-22 with total page 471 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Download or read book Advances in Economics and Econometrics Volume 1 written by Bo Honoré and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-11-02 with total page 350 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the first of two volumes containing papers and commentaries presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in Montreal, Canada in August 2015. These papers provide state-of-the-art guides to the most important recent research in economics. The book includes surveys and interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics, and discussion of future directions for a wide variety of topics, covering both theory and application. These volumes provide a unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline, written by leading specialists in their fields. The first volume includes theoretical and applied papers addressing topics such as dynamic mechanism design, agency problems, and networks.
Download or read book Models of Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design written by Jacob Glazer and published by World Scientific Publishing Company. This book was released on 2016-08-22 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory. All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer's (principal's) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an element which conflicts with the standard notion of full rationality, demonstrating how such elements can dramatically change the mechanism design problem. Although all of the models presented in this volume touch on mechanism design issues, it is the formal modeling of bounded rationality that the authors are most interested in. A model of bounded rationality signifies a model that contains a procedural element of reasoning that is not consistent with full rationality. Rather than looking for a canonical model of bounded rationality, the articles introduce a variety of modeling devices that will capture procedural elements not previously considered, and which alter the analysis of the model. The book is a journey into the modeling of bounded rationality. It is a collection of modeling ideas rather than a general alternative theory of implementation.
Download or read book Climate Health Risks in Megacities written by Cesar Marolla and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 2016-12-01 with total page 370 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Includes universal frameworks and processes to provide a structured approach to cope with climate change impacts in megacities Features detail-oriented research and analysis of climate change health risks Discusses seven megacities' case studies in developed and developing countries Uses a risk management system approach that deals with climate variability and its impacts before and after the severe weather event hits the city Helps readers understand the actual policies and adopt them more speedily and efficiently as climate change impacts on health become more evident
Download or read book Advances in Economics and Econometrics Volume 1 written by Econometric Society. World Congress and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2006-08-14 with total page 431 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Publisher description
Download or read book Essays on Prior Free Mechanism Design written by Pavel Andreyanov and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 169 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: My dissertation contributes to the literature on prior-free (robust) mechanism design. Prior-freeness can be interpreted differently, but a common feature is that certain mechanisms can be ranked above the others without the exact knowledge of distributions and/or utilities. According to the Wilson critique, the knowledge of fine details of the setting such as distributions and utilities is an unrealistic assumption and, moreover, optimal mechanisms in the classic (Bayesian) sense are often too complex to be implemented in reality. In the first chapter I study a scoring auction and the welfare implications of switching between the two leading designs of the scoring rule: linear (``weighted bid'') and log-linear (``adjusted bid''), when the designer's preferences for quality and money are unknown. Motivated by the empirical application, I formulate a new model of scoring auctions, with two key elements: exogenous quality and a reserve price, and characterize the equilibrium for a rich set of scoring rules. The data is drawn from the Russian public procurement sector in which the linear scoring rule was applied from 2011 to 2013. I estimate the underlying distribution of firms' types nonparametrically and simulate the equilibria for both scoring rules with different weights. The empirical results show that for any log-linear scoring rule, there exists a linear one, yielding a higher expected quality and rebate. Hence, at least with risk-neutral preferences, the linear design is superior to the log-linear. In the second chapter (Co-authored with Jernej Copic and Byeong-hyeon Jeong, UCLA) I study robust allocation of a divisible public good among n agents with quasi-linear utilities, when the budget is exactly balanced. Under several additional assumptions, we prove that such mechanism is equivalent to a distribution over simple posted prices. A robustly optimal mechanism minimizes expected welfare loss among robust divisible ones. For any prior belief, I show that a simple posted prices is robustly optimal. This justifies a restriction to binary allocations commonly found in the mechanism design literature. Robustness comes at a high cost. For certain beliefs, we show that the expected welfare loss of an optimal posted price is as big as 1/2 of the expected welfare in the corresponding optimal Bayesian mechanism, independently of the size of the economy. This bound is tight for the special case of two agents. In the third chapter (Co-authored with Tomasz Sadzik, UCLA) I provide mechanisms for exchange economies with private information and interdependent values, which are ex-post individually rational, incentive compatible, generate budget surplus and are ex-post nearly efficient, when there are many agents. Our framework is entirely prior-free, and I make no symmetry restrictions. The mechanisms can be implemented using a novel discriminatory conditional double auction, without knowledge of information structure or utility functions. I also show that no other mechanism satisfying the constraints can generate inefficiency of smaller order.
Download or read book An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design written by Tilman Borgers and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-05-01 with total page 263 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Download or read book Risky Strategy written by Jamie MacAlister and published by Bloomsbury Publishing. This book was released on 2016-08-25 with total page 225 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What is risk? Is it a real danger or just an opportunity in disguise? Can it be out-manoeuvred or is it something to be embraced and worked with? When companies are developing their business strategies, risk may be mentioned in passing (and even then, frequently misunderstood) but is rarely seen as a key component of the strategic decision-making process. This can lead to unforeseen complications – strategy is all about making decisions that concern an uncertain future and so risk should play a significant role in that process. The handling or understanding of risk is often delegated to specialists and much of what is written about risk is, due to its complexity, inaccessible to the majority of senior managers. Risky Strategy aims to make the consideration of risk more accessible and understandable and, in doing so, develop a common language and understanding for recognising and handling it. Based on research carried out by Ashridge Business School, as well as case studies of the strategic decision-making process in action, Jamie MacAlister takes the subject out of the textbooks and brings it engagingly to life. Drawing on lessons from Apple to Procter & Gamble, from Napoleon to Nelson, from Roger Federer to Sir Alex Ferguson, and from Pythagorus to Sir Isaac Newton, Risky Strategy provides a new and dynamic perspective on risk, demonstrating how and when to take the right risk, and knowing how to recognise the common risks that can derail even the most well-planned projects.
Download or read book Essays on Information in Dynamic Games and Mechanism Design written by Daehyun Kim and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 153 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation studies how asymmetric information between economic agents interacts with their incentive in dynamic games and mechanism design. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study this in mechanism design, especially focusing on robustness of mechanisms when a mechanism designer's knowledge on agents' belief and higher order beliefs is not perfect. In Chapter 1 we introduce a novel robustness notion into mechanism design, which we term confident implementation; and characterize confidently implementable social choice correspondences. In Chapter 2, we introduce another robust notion, p-dominant implementation where p [0, 1]N and N N is the number of agents, and fully characterize p-dominant implementable allocations in the quasilinear environment. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are related in the following way: for some range of p, a p-dominant implementable social choice correspondence is confidently implementable. In Chapter 3, we study information disclosure problem to manage reputation. To study this, we consider a repeated game in which there are a long-run player and a stream of short-run players; and the long-run player has private information about her type, which is either commitment or normal. We assume that the shot-run player only can observe the past K N periods of information disclosed by the long-run player. In this environment, we characterize the information disclosure behavior of the long-run player and also equilibrium dynamics whose shape critically depends on the prior.
Download or read book The Mechanism Design Approach to Optimality in Repeated Games with Private Information written by David Aaron Miller and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book The Debt Trap in Nigeria written by Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala and published by Africa World Press. This book was released on 2003 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first major study to put the debt question in perspective, this book is the outcome of a historic conference held in May 2001 to debate Nigeria's future in the context of the debt overhang. The book captures the highlights of all presentations, and presents the recommendations and consensus reached concerning reducing the debt burden, strengthening the institutional framework for debt and resource management, and resuming sustainable development, ultimately demanding that Nigeria and the international community refocus their resources on fighting poverty.
Download or read book Robustness written by Lars Peter Hansen and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2016-06-28 with total page 453 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The standard theory of decision making under uncertainty advises the decision maker to form a statistical model linking outcomes to decisions and then to choose the optimal distribution of outcomes. This assumes that the decision maker trusts the model completely. But what should a decision maker do if the model cannot be trusted? Lars Hansen and Thomas Sargent, two leading macroeconomists, push the field forward as they set about answering this question. They adapt robust control techniques and apply them to economics. By using this theory to let decision makers acknowledge misspecification in economic modeling, the authors develop applications to a variety of problems in dynamic macroeconomics. Technical, rigorous, and self-contained, this book will be useful for macroeconomists who seek to improve the robustness of decision-making processes.
Download or read book Accounting Theory written by Thomas G. Evans and published by South Western Educational Publishing. This book was released on 2003 with total page 392 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This easy-to-read accounting theory text contains two distinct, but integrated parts. Part One focuses on two interwoven topics: accounting theory formulation and standard setting in a chronological format. This section analyzes the major historical efforts attempted in the development of an accounting theory. The Conceptual Framework project is studied, and the FASB and how it influences current standard setting is examined. Part Two covers contemporary financial reporting issues as they relate to the FASB's Conceptual Framework. Controversial accounting areas, such as cash flows, accounting for pensions, post-employment benefits and stock options, are studied within the context of the definitions of assets and liabilities provided by the Conceptual Framework. Interesting and challenging cases provide the reader with practical experience in applying accounting theory.
Download or read book Alternative Risk Strategies written by Morton Lane and published by Bharat Book Bureau. This book was released on 2002 with total page 684 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A ground-breaking volume that fully exposes the relatively new area of risk financing from traditional methods of insurance and provides analysis of the intersection of insurance and finance. \r\nKulp-Wright Book Award winner 2002 - Nominated "Runner-Up" by the American Risk and Insurance Association (ARIA)
Download or read book The Future of Economic Design written by Jean-François Laslier and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2019-11-15 with total page 507 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This collection of essays represents responses by over eighty scholars to an unusual request: give your high level assessment of the field of economic design, as broadly construed. Where do we come from? Where do we go from here? The book editors invited short, informal reflections expressing deeply felt but hard to demonstrate opinions, unsupported speculation, and controversial views of a kind one might not normally risk submitting for review. The contributors – both senior researchers who have shaped the field and promising, younger researchers – responded with a diverse collection of provocative pieces, including: retrospective assessments or surveys of the field; opinion papers; reflections on critical points for the development of the discipline; proposals for the immediate future; "science fiction"; and many more. The readers should have fun reading these unusual pieces – as much as the contributors enjoyed writing them.
Download or read book The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design written by Zvika Neeman and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
