Download or read book Right Sizing Spectrum Auction Licenses written by William Lehr and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The wireless sector is a key contributor to economic activity and growth. Over the next several years, wireless service providers are expected to invest $25 to $53 billion upgrading and expanding their networks to deploy 4G mobile broadband across the nation. All told, wireless broadband investment and the services and innovation supported by such investment are expected to add between $259 and $355 billion to US GDP each year through 2017. The Federal Communications Commission ("Commission" or "FCC") is currently designing several spectrum auctions including the largest ever auction of terrestrial wireless spectrum, currently planned for 2015 (the "Incentive Auction"). The purpose of the Incentive Auction is to free up to 120 MHz of prime spectrum in the 600 MHz band, currently licensed to over-the-air TV broadcasting, to be repurposed for licensing for mobile broadband and other higher value wireless services. To accomplish this goal, the FCC proposes to use a two-part auction process in which broadcast television license holders submit bids for relinquishing their licenses ("Reverse Auction"); and commercial broadband providers bid to acquire licenses to the spectrum freed up ("Forward Auction"). The FCC is currently evaluating various auction design elements to promote competition in the auction. To best ensure this important goal, the FCC is considering a number of auction design features, including spectrum aggregation limits, constraints on the types of bidding allowed, and the appropriate framework to use for the license territories to be used in the Forward Auction. This paper focuses solely on this last issue. We explain here how adopting appropriately small-sized geographic territories is necessary to promote competition and other important economic and social goals, while noting that right-sizing the license territories may not by itself be sufficient to ensure adequate competition and participation in the Forward Auction. For example, the Commission could adopt smaller license sizes and still end with an auction where the two largest wireless carriers aggregate all of the offered spectrum. Such an outcome would be inconsistent with the goal of promoting competition in wireless services. The territory size used for spectrum licenses is as important for valuing spectrum as the parcel size is to real estate value. If all plots were 50 acres, parcels in Manhattan would be too expensive and too large for most; this might compel buyers interested in a small parcel in Manhattan or a parcel in New Jersey adjacent to Manhattan to bid for land they don't want. Alternatively, otherwise qualified buyers might be prevented from buying land altogether. Analogously, wrong-sizing spectrum license territories to be used in future spectrum auctions, and in particular the Incentive Auction, is likely to result in significant and unnecessary inefficiencies in the allocation of scarce radio frequency spectrum resources. For carriers who are compelled to bid for wrong-sized spectrum license packages, the added cost may be sufficient to discourage their participation; or if they do participate, they are less likely to offer successful bids; or if they are successful, they will have fewer resources available to deploy services using the spectrum. In each case, the efficiency of the auction and the larger goals of the process suffer. This paper explains why sufficiently small geographic areas, such as Cellular Market Areas ("CMAs"), are a more appropriates license territory framework to use to ensure that licenses are right-sized in the Forward Auction. Industry participants and the FCC have successfully used smaller geographic license sizes to auction spectrum in the past, and doing so in the Forward Auction offers important advantages. Using smaller territories is better than using the larger Economic Areas ("EAs") or even intermediate-size Partial Economic Areas ("PEAs") because smaller areas efficiently match the needs of bidders to the spectrum they seek. Their use ensures that the planned auction will reallocate spectrum resources efficiently while promoting competition, economic growth, and universal broadband service. Smaller license areas are better than EAs because smaller areas will help to maximize the amount of spectrum that is repurposed for the Forward Auction. Specifically, smaller areas should increase the ability to allow for market variation in areas where limited amounts of spectrum are procured through the Reverse Auction, while reducing the amount of spectrum lost due to international border coordination with Canada and Mexico or other encumbrances. Smaller geographic license sizes should also maximize opportunities for efficient participation by both large and small wireless service providers, and promote efficient build out of spectrum acquired through the Forward Auction. Looking at past auctions, evidence suggests that auction proceeds would be optimized through the use of smaller areas as opposed to EAs. Moreover, using smaller territories is more consistent with the long-term direction of efficient spectrum management reform and future wireless markets, including access to spectrum through secondary market transactions. Finally, this paper rebuts some of the arguments made to date against the use of smaller geographic license areas. Interested parties, particularly the Competitive Carriers Association ("CCA") and their members, have pressed the FCC to license the Forward Auction licenses using smaller territory sizes. These efforts, which included sponsoring an earlier draft of this paper, resulted in a compromise, intermediate solution. The FCC has moved from recommending that the Forward Auction be licensed using Economic Area territories to a compromise territory size based on Partial Economic Areas ("PEAs"). Nonetheless, the debate over the appropriate territory size for FCC licenses continues. As the future of spectrum management is trending toward more granular management of spectrum resources (in space and time), moving toward smaller area regulatory licenses is consistent with this trend; however, the debate continues. We emphasize that while the geographic area of the license is important, there are many other features that must also be considered holistically in order to design an appropriate spectrum auction or management framework, and as such, are likely to vary by band. The focus of the analysis here, while applicable more generally, is on the design of the upcoming Broadcast Incentive Auctions.

Download or read book Spectrum Sharing written by Constantinos B. Papadias and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2020-03-13 with total page 456 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Combines the latest trends in spectrum sharing, both from a research and a standards/regulation/experimental standpoint Written by noted professionals from academia, industry, and research labs, this unique book provides a comprehensive treatment of the principles and architectures for spectrum sharing in order to help with the existing and future spectrum crunch issues. It presents readers with the most current standardization trends, including CEPT / CEE, eLSA, CBRS, MulteFire, LTE-Unlicensed (LTE-U), LTE WLAN integration with Internet Protocol security tunnel (LWIP), and LTE/Wi-Fi aggregation (LWA), and offers substantial trials and experimental results, as well as system-level performance evaluation results. The book also includes a chapter focusing on spectrum policy reinforcement and another on the economics of spectrum sharing. Beginning with the historic form of cognitive radio, Spectrum Sharing: The Next Frontier in Wireless Networks continues with current standardized forms of spectrum sharing, and reviews all of the technical ingredients that may arise in spectrum sharing approaches. It also looks at policy and implementation aspects and ponders the future of the field. White spaces and data base-assisted spectrum sharing are discussed, as well as the licensed shared access approach and cooperative communication techniques. The book also covers reciprocity-based beam forming techniques for spectrum sharing in MIMO networks; resource allocation for shared spectrum networks; large scale wireless spectrum monitoring; and much more. Contains all the latest standardization trends, such as CEPT / ECC, eLSA, CBRS, MulteFire, LTE-Unlicensed (LTE-U), LTE WLAN integration with Internet Protocol security tunnel (LWIP) and LTE/Wi-Fi aggregation (LWA) Presents a number of emerging technologies for future spectrum sharing (collaborative sensing, cooperative communication, reciprocity-based beamforming, etc.), as well as novel spectrum sharing paradigms (e.g. in full duplex and radar systems) Includes substantial trials and experimental results, as well as system-level performance evaluation results Contains a dedicated chapter on spectrum policy reinforcement and one on the economics of spectrum sharing Edited by experts in the field, and featuring contributions by respected professionals in the field world wide Spectrum Sharing: The Next Frontier in Wireless Networks is highly recommended for graduate students and researchers working in the areas of wireless communications and signal processing engineering. It would also benefit radio communications engineers and practitioners.

Download or read book Crafting a Successful Incentive Auction written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 128 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Auctioning Radio Spectrum Licenses written by and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Where Do We Go from Here written by and published by Congressional Budget Office. This book was released on 1997 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal Comm Ent written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book License Complementarity and Package Bidding written by Mo Xiao and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Where Do We Go from Here written by Coleman Bazelon and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 1997-07 with total page 101 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auctions of licenses to use the radio spectrum conducted by the FCC from 1994-98 will yield $27 billion in receipts to the U.S. treasury. The initial success has generated interest in the use of auctions to raise additional receipts and enhance the value of the spectrum to society. This study examines the results of the initial FCC auctions, the general outlook for future auctions, and the applicability of auctions to the intro. of digital broadcast TV. It also considers the prospects for using auctions and other market mechanisms not only in assigning licenses to specific users, but also in allocating frequencies to different uses. Charts and tables.

Download or read book Assigning Spectrum Fairly written by Brett Shaw and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A new method is proposed to divide upcoming spectrum band allocations into two different spectrum licence / management right types. The first, a spectrum license, would allow successful auction bidders to roll out mobile radio networks on a long-term nationwide scale as normal. The second is a new concept called a licensed spectrum park (LSP) and would allow smaller operators to roll out specialized mobile radio networks on a short-term local site by site basis. LSPs would be assigned by applying for a license based on a site specific, fixed base station location for a short timeframe that could be renewed periodically. It has been noted that the key purpose of spectrum management is to maximize the value that society gains from the radio spectrum by allowing as many efficient users as possible while ensuring that the interference between different users remains manageable. The creation of LSPs means there is a net social benefit or a fair allocation of spectrum for two reasons. The first is that the use of LSPs allows specialist networks to be formed, effectively opening up the spectrum to more users and to potentially create more competition in the mobile radio market. The second is the fact that an LSP is licensed which creates a method to control interference between different users and allows interference to be managed. A regulator faces the issue of whether to allocate a fixed amount of spectrum for LSP use before auctioning the remaining spectrum, or alternatively auctioning the total spectrum and allocating any unsold spectrum to LSPs, if any is available. An operator's strategy when bidding in the spectrum auction in response to these two alternative strategies are analysed using non-cooperative game models. The equilibria from both strategies are compared and it is shown that in the case where spectrum for LSP use is assigned post auction, if any is available, then all bidders face a collective action problem in that they may find it attractive to exhaust the pool of offered spectrum in the action leaving none for LSPs. To demonstrate how this theory could work in practice, we discuss how LSP creation could have worked in recent 700 MHz spectrum auctions. In particular we look at the 700 MHz auction in New Zealand as an illustrative example, by describing the auction process and the hypothetical effect if spectrum was assigned for LSP use. In addition we propose how the LSP spectrum could be priced. The price considers the population covered by the proposed base station, the amount of spectrum requested and length of the management right, against the normalised cost of the spectrum, for a given population and bandwidth, under the spectrum license auctions. Our analysis offers an important contribution for both spectrum regulators and private spectrum managers, and provides the framework for spectrum allocation to new market entrants enabling more competition in the mobile radio market.

Download or read book Spectrum Use and Management written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 88 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book FCC Record written by United States. Federal Communications Commission and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 776 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Spectrum Auctions written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Obtaining the best from Regulation and Competition written by Michael A. Crew and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2004-11-02 with total page 254 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Deregulation has introduced competition into traditionally monopolistic markets, particularly telecommunications and electric utilities. This book brings together ten essays that were presented at the Center for Research in Regulated Industries at Rutgers University and funded by several regulated companies. The authors, who include young scholars as well as established and highly regarded consultants and researchers, address some of the major issues now facing network industries and regulators - deregulation, competition, stranded assets, diversification, pricing, and mergers and acquisitions.

Download or read book Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications written by Gerhard Illing and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2003-12-23 with total page 332 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Leading experts in industrial organization and auction theory examine the recent European telecommunication license auction experience. In 2000 and 2001, several European countries carried out auctions for third generation technologies or universal mobile telephone services (UMTS) communication licenses. These "spectrum auctions" inaugurated yet another era in an industry that has already been transformed by a combination of staggering technological innovation and substantial regulatory change. Because of their spectacular but often puzzling outcomes, these spectrum auctions attracted enormous attention and invited new research on the interplay of auctions, industry dynamics, and regulation. This book collects essays on this topic by leading analysts of telecommunications and the European auction experience, all but one presented at a November 2001 CESifo conference; comments and responses are included as well, to preserve some of the controversy and atmosphere of give-and-take at the conference.The essays show the interconnectedness of two important and productive areas of modern economics, auction theory and industrial organization. Because spectrum auctions are embedded in a dynamic interaction of consumers, firms, legislation, and regulation, a multidimensional approach yields important insights. The first essays discuss strategies of stimulating new competition and the complex interplay of the political process, regulation, and competition. The later essays focus on specific spectrum auctions. Combining the empirical data these auctions provide with recent advances in microeconomic theory, they examine questions of auction design and efficiency and convincingly explain the enormous variation of revenues in different auctions.

Download or read book FCC Auction written by United States. Federal Communications Commission and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 386 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Download or read book Beware the Winner s Curse written by G. Anandalingam and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2004-11-04 with total page 257 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: 'Beware the Winner's Curse' shows how hubris and badly aligned financial incentives lead managers to aggressively pursue victories, and end up worse off as a result. It explores recent disasters in business, sports, and entertainment, and offers concrete steps that managers can take to avoid encountering the curse.