Download or read book Contract renegotiation under asymmetric information written by Sönje Reiche and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation written by Birger Wernerfelt and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The parties to a contract typically make a lot of decisions during the time it is in force, and the paper is based on the premise that it takes time to be involved in any one of these decisions. Attempts to economize on decision-making time then imply that the parties may write a contract in which each cedes some decision rights to the other. The cost of the arrangement is that the information and preferences of the uninvolved party are neglected. We find that decisions are more likely to be left out of contracts if only one player attaches significant weight to them and simultaneously is well informed. While the direct effect of this may be small, it is dramatically amplified if the decision-maker can be disciplined by the threat of renegotiation. We identify a set of conditions under which the possibility of renegotiation allows the parties to leave all non-price decisions out of the contract. By thus arguing that the threat of renegotiation allows contractual incompleteness, the paper reverses the direction of causality stressed by the literature.
Download or read book Renegotiating Incomplete Contracts written by Eduardo Saavedra and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation written by Oliver D. Hart and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 76 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Concession Contract Renegotiations written by Antonio Estache and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2001 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator, indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of renegotiation.
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Formation written by Sonje Kerrin Reiche and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics written by Philippe Aghion and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-12-22 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.
Download or read book Unverifiable Information Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation written by Georg Nöldeke and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Allocation Information and Markets written by John Eatwell and published by Springer. This book was released on 1989-09-21 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Download or read book Renegotiating Incomplete Contracts written by Eduardo Saavedra Parra and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation in Long term Trade Relationships written by Christoph Lülfesmann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Contract Remedies Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation written by Tai-yeong Chung and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incomplete Contracting Renegotiation and Expectation Based Loss Aversion written by Fabian Herweg and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a simple trading relationship between an expectation-based loss-averse buyer and a profit-maximizing seller. When writing a long-term contract the parties have to rely on renegotiation in order to ensure materially efficient trade ex post. If the buyer expects renegotiation always to take place, the parties are always able to implement the materially efficient good ex post. Expecting materially efficient trade, however, is often not in the buyer's interest, because ex post the seller can opportunistically exploit the buyer's attachment to the expected outcome of renegotiation. In other words, incomplete contracts create a new type of hold-up problem if the buyer is expectation-based loss averse. If credible, the buyer prefers to expect not to renegotiate, which gives rise to ex post inefficiencies. The optimal contract trades off maximizing standard efficiency and minimizing variations in the default outcome and thereby also minimizing the ex ante expected losses.
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation Under Asymetric Information on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts written by and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Beyond the Regulatory Polity written by Philipp Genschel and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2014 with total page 305 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume explores the involvement of the European Union in the exercise of core state powers such as foreign and defense policy, public finance, public administration, and the maintenance of law and order.
Download or read book More is Less written by Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2024-05-23 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on 'contracts as reference points'. Including a contingency of the form, 'The buyer will require a good in event E', has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that if E occurs there is less to argue about; the cost is that the additional reference point provided by the outcome in E can hinder (re)negotiation in states outside E. We show that if parties agree about a reasonable division of surplus, an incomplete contract is strictly superior to a contingent contract. If parties have different views about the division of surplus, an incomplete contract can be superior if including a contingency would lead to divergent reference points.
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts in a Complete Contract World written by Scott Baker and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper considers the role that contract doctrine should play in facilitating optimal investment in contractual relationships. All contracts are incomplete in the sense that they do not specify the optimal actions for the buyer and seller in every future contingency. This incompleteness can lead to both under and over-investment in resources specifically targeted to the needs of the other contracting party. To solve these investment problems, economists and legal scholars have looked to complicated contractual solutions and the ownership of assets. This Article offers another solution: contract doctrine. Specifically, we propose a contractual default rule applicable to all contract interpretation, gap-filling, and good faith inquiries (a relationship-specific investment, or RSI default) that accounts for the renegotiation position of contracting parties. Because contractual default rules form the backdrop against which parties renegotiate, the RSI default allocates bargaining power to one party or the other in much the same manner as does ownership. The RSI default favors the contracting party making an RSI, while at the same time minimizing potential problems of over-investment through a notice requirement. We also offer some preliminary thoughts on the problem of two-sided RSIs.
