Download or read book Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers written by Kevin J. Murphy and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Measured individual performance often depends on random factors which also affect the performances of other workers in the same firm, industry, or market. In these cases, relative performance evaluation (RPE) can provide incentives while partially insulating workers from the common uncertainty. Basing pay on relative performance, however, generates incentives to sabotage the measured performance of co-workers, to collude with co-workers and shirk, and to apply for jobs with inept co-workers. RPE contracts also are less desirable when the output of co-workers is expensive to measure or in the presence of production externalities, as in the case of team production. The purpose of this paper is to review the benefits and costs of RPE and to test for the presence of RPE in one occupation where the benefits plausibly exceed the costs: chief executive officers (CEOs). In contrast to previous research, our empirical evidence strongly supports the RPE hypothesis-CEO pay revisions and retention probabilities are positively and significantly related to firm performance, but are negatively and significantly related to industry and market performance, ceteris paribus. Our results also suggest that CEO performance is more likely to be evaluated relative to aggregate market movements than relative to industry movements.
Download or read book Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers written by Robert Gibbons and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Measured individual performance often depends on random factors which also affect the performances of other workers in the same firm, industry, or market. In these cases, relative performance evaluation (RPE) can provide incentives while partially insulating workers from the common uncertainty. Basing pay on relative performance, however, generates incentives to sabotage the measured performance of co-workers, to collude with co-workers and shirk, and to apply for jobs with inept co-workers. RPE contracts also are less desirable when the output of co-workers is expensive to measure or in the presence of production externalities, as in the case of team production. The purpose of this paper is to review the benefits and costs of RPE and to test for the presence of RPE in one occupation where the benefits plausibly exceed the costs: chief executive officers (CEOs). In contrast to previous research, our empirical evidence strongly supports the RPE hypothesis-CEO pay revisions and retention probabilities are positively and significantly related to firm performance, but are negatively and significantly related to industry and market performance, ceteris paribus. Our results also suggest that CEO performance is more likely to be evaluated relative to aggregate market movements than relative to industry movements.
Download or read book Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers written by and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers written by Robert Gibbons and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book CEO Power and Relative Performance Evaluation written by Shane S. Dikolli and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We model relative performance evaluation (RPE) when a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has the power to opportunistically influence the design of RPE by choosing the weight on an index-based peer group or by customizing the selection of peers comprising a peer group. A powerful CEO compares the benefits of reducing common risk affecting his compensation with the benefits of receiving a higher bonus by economizing on expected peer-group performance. The Board of Directors (BoD) is less likely to use RPE if a powerful CEO can influence RPE design. Our analytical model yields hypotheses predicting that powerful CEOs choose to reduce common risk only partially and that BoDs choose to not implement RPE if expected peer performance is sufficiently high. Our model has further empirical implications in (1) providing new interpretations of tests for detecting strong-form and weak-form RPE in the presence of powerful CEOs, and (2) suggesting a new empirical measure of CEO power with a focus on the delegation of RPE decision rights.
Download or read book Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation written by David De Angelis and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO compensation can be used as a commitment device to pay CEOs for their revealed relative talent. We find evidence consistent with the talent-retention hypothesis, using two different approaches. First, we examine the RPE terms in compensation contracts and document features that are consistent with retention motives. Second, using a novel empirical specification for detecting RPE, we find RPE is less prevalent when CEO talent is less transferrable: among specialist CEOs, founder CEOs, and retirement-age CEOs, as well as in industries and states where the market for CEO talent is more restrictive.
Download or read book Executive Compensation written by Kevin J. Murphy and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 91 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper summarizes the empirical and theoretical research on executive compensation and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date description of pay practices (and trends in pay practices) for chief executive officers (CEOs). Topics discussed include the level and structure of CEO pay (including detailed analyses of annual bonus plans, executive stock options, and option valuation), international pay differences, the pay-setting process, the relation between CEO pay and firm performance (quot;pay-performance sensitivitiesquot;), the relation between sensitivities and subsequent firm performance, relative performance evaluation, executive turnover, and the politics of CEO pay.
Download or read book Limits to Relative Performance Evaluation written by Irina Barakova and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Performance Evaluation of Chief Executive Officers Boards and Directors written by NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on Performance Evaluation of Chief Executive Officers, Boards and Directors and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Passing the Baton written by Richard F. Vancil and published by Harvard Business Review Press. This book was released on 1987 with total page 352 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation written by Dirk Jenter and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book CEO Performance Evaluation written by Stanley D. Truskie and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book An Empirical Investigation of Relative Performance Evaluation in UK Chief Executive Compensation written by Mark A. Farmer and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2017-09-18 with total page 762 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Download or read book Globalized Water written by Graciela Schneier-Madanes and published by Springer Science & Business. This book was released on 2014-05-01 with total page 303 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Globalized Water presents a compilation of voices that forms a unique scientific exploration of contemporary water management models and governance issues. The book describes the water paradox—how a local resource has become a global product—and the implications of this in how we identify challenges and make policy in the water sector. Over the last 20 years, the foundations of local and national water systems have been rocked by a wave of changes. The authors in this book, experts in a wide range of disciplines, address the resulting debates and issues: water as a commodity and patrimony, technological rent, liberalization and privatization, the continuing evolution of water management and policy at the European level, decision making and stakeholder participation, conflict and consensus, and the inevitable growth of counterpowers at the local and international levels, promoted by the advocates of sustainable development. The selected case studies are from Europe (primarily France but also Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Portugal), Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia), the United States, Lebanon, and India. From this diverse collection of comparative perspectives and research methods, Globalized Water seeks to advance interdisciplinary research, contributing to a new and dynamic role for social sciences and governance on water.
Download or read book An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives written by Rick Antle and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Other Side of the Tradeoff written by Andrew Samwick and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The principal-agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and corporate governance, yet the existing empirical evidence supporting it is quite weak. The key predication of the model is that the executive's pay-performance sensitivity is decreasing in the variance of the firm's performance. We demonstrate strong empirical confirmation of this prediction using a comprehensive sample of executives at large corporations. In general, the pay-performance sensitivity for executives at firms with the least volatile stock prices is an order of magnitude greater than the pay-performance sensitivity for executives at firms with the most volatile stock prices. This result holds for both chief executive officers and for other highly compensated executives. We further show that estimates of the pay-performance sensitivity that do not explicitly account for the effect of the variance of firm performance are biased toward zero. We also test for relative performance evaluation of executives against the performance of other firms. We find little support for the relative performance evaluation model. Our findings suggest that executive compensation contracts incorporate the benefits of risk-sharing but do not incorporate the potential informational advantages of relative performance evaluation
