Download or read book Reconsidering Central Bank Independence written by Stan Du Plessis and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2024-05-02 with total page 362 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Central bank independence has become one of the most widely accepted tenets of modern monetary policy. According to this view, the main role of independent central banks is to maintain price stability through the adjustment of short-term interest rates. Reconsidering Central Bank Independence argues that the global financial crisis has undermined confidence in this view as central banks increasingly have to address concerns other than price stability, such as financial stability, the need for output recovery and other broader policy goals. Large balance-sheet expansion by central banks followed the global financial crisis, which overlapped considerably with the financial policy of their respective governments. Exploring the consequences of this shift to a more diverse set of policy challenges, this book calls for a return to the consensus role for central banks and analyses what this might mean for their future independence.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence written by International Monetary Fund and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1991-06-01 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: There has been growing interest recently in the scope for promoting monetary stability through the establishment of independent central banks. This paper reviews the issues involved in central bank independence against the background of arrangements in nine countries. The analysis suggests that detailed institutional arrangements would need to be carefully designed if the potential benefits of central bank independence are to be delivered. Particularly important are the nature of arrangements to resolve various types of conflicts involving monetary policy, and arrangements to promote accountability and public monitoring of monetary policy performance.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence and Monetary Stability written by Otmar Issing and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Central bank independence is now a major issue in debates about institutional reforms designed to improve economic performance. Professor Issing's paper is notable for its scholarly discussion of the meaning of 'independence' and his analysis of its effects. Moreover, because of his position inside the Bundesbank which is among the most independent of central banks and which provides a model for the constitution of the proposed European Central Bank he writes with a degree of expertise not available to most authors. Interest in central bank independence arose from the world-wide acceleration of inflation in the 1 970s which stimulated interest in means of 'anchoring' anti-inflation policy. Germany was in advance of other countries in recognising the importance of price stability and es-tablishing an institution to produce it, making the Bundesbank independent in 1957. Professor Issing argues that when independence is coupled with a price stability objective, economic performance appears to improve. Not only is inflation lower, but there is evidence that real growth is higher. In his view, central bank independence comes 'top of the list' of institutional arrangements designed to safeguard the stability of money.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence Targets and Credibility written by Francesco Lippi and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 1999-01-27 with total page 180 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence written by Geoffrey E. Wood and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: CONTENTS: Introduction; The Meaning of Independence; Why Independence?; The Data & its Analysis; Conclusions.
Download or read book Central Bank Strategy Credibility and Independence written by Alex Cukierman and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1992 with total page 532 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with recent developments in the political economy of monetary policy.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence written by Ignacio Mas and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1994 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Central Bank Independence and Macro Prudential Regulation written by Mr.Kenichi Ueda and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2012-04-01 with total page 27 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence Regulations and Monetary Policy written by Ranajoy Ray Chaudhuri and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-10-29 with total page 400 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines the linkage between central bank structure, central bank autonomy—with respect to setting its monetary policy goals, choosing its policy mechanisms, legal independence, and financial independence—and monetary policy, both in select benchmark countries and at a broader theoretical level. Country-specific chapters on the US, UK, Germany, Greece, Russia, India, China, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa focus on the history, administrative structure, and independence of the central monetary authority in these countries. The chapters go on to explore the countries’ conduct of monetary policy, their interplay with political forces and the wider economy, their currency, and their macroeconomic outcomes. The book will appeal to researchers, students of economics, finance and business, as well as general readers with an interest in the subject.
Download or read book Banking on Reform written by William T. Bernhard and published by University of Michigan Press. This book was released on 2009-12-22 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Banking on Reform examines the political determinants of recent reforms to monetary policy institutions in the industrial democracies. With these reforms, political parties have sought to draw on the political credibility of an independent central bank to cope with electoral consequences of economic internalization and deindustrialization. New Zealand and Italy made the initial efforts to grant their central banks independence. More recently, France, Spain, Britain, and Sweden have reformed their central banks' independence. Additionally, members of the European Union have implemented a single currency, with an independent European central bank to administer monetary policy. Banking on Reform stresses the politics surrounding the choice of these institutions, specifically the motivations of political parties. Where intraparty conflicts have threatened the party's ability to hold office, politicians have adopted an independent central bank. Where political parties have been secluded from the political consequences of economic change, reform has been thwarted or delayed. The drive toward a single currency also reflects these political concerns. By delegating monetary policy to the European level, politicians in the member states removed a potentially divisive issue from the domestic political agenda, allowing parties to rebuild their support constructed on the basis of other issues. William T. Bernhard provides a variety of evidence to support his argument, such as in-depth case accounts of recent central bank reforms in Italy and Britain, the role of the German Bundesbank in the policy process, and the adoption of the single currency in Europe. Additionally, he utilizes quantitative and statistical tests to enhance his argument. This book will appeal to political scientists, economists, and other social scientists interested in the political and institutional consequences of economic globalization. William T. Bernhard is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.
Download or read book A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank Independence written by Mr.Eric Le Borgne and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2003-07-01 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not.
Download or read book The Bundesbank Myth written by J. Leaman and published by Springer. This book was released on 2000-12-18 with total page 280 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Until recently, central bank independence was confined to just two major capitalist countries: the USA and Germany. As a result of stagflation and the voguish espousal of neo-liberalism in the 1980s, the institution has been adopted in most OECD and in many other countries. This book questions the principle of autonomy, examining the Bundesbank in historical context and exposing the flaws in both the technical and the political case for the wholesale adoption of the Bundesbank model by other states.
Download or read book The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence written by Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 82 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Institutions and Monetary Policy written by Eric Schaling and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 1995 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Central bank independence is a key issue for political and monetary authorities in many countries. In this text, the author looks at the impact of different central banks on price stability and macroeconomic performance, and their optimal degree of legislative independence.
Download or read book Central Bank Independence written by Guy Debelle and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1996 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper extends the analysis of central bank independence to a model in which there is more than one policymaker. It shows that the degree of central bank independence as generally defined in the existing theoretical literature is only one of the influences on macroeconomic performance. The objectives of the fiscal authority, the commitment mechanisms available to the authorities and the nature of the policy game play a key role in determining the inflation rate and output in the economy. Furthermore, the model can be solved for the optimal degree of inflation aversion of the central bank. , a Working Paper and the authors) would welcome any comments on the present text Citations should refer to a Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, mentioning the authors), and the date of issuance. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the Fund.
Download or read book Measuring Central Bank Independence and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes written by Alex Cukierman and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 76 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Should We Have Faith in Central Banks written by Otmar Issing and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 70 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Central bank independence is now in vogue because of previous experience of politicisation of monetary policy. But can the central bankers be trusted more than the politicians? In this Occasional Paper, Professor Otmar Issing, the leading monetary economist and one of Europe's most influential central bankers, argues that price stability is a 'common good' and that it is better in the hands of an independent central bank with a clear price stability mandate. The independent central bank with such a manadate, in effect, represents a set of rules which impose constraints on the abuse of power either by politicians or by central bankers. Central bankers operate best in institutions which have a clear objective and are held accountable to the public. Professor Geoffrey Wood adds a commentary which puts Issing's paper in the context of the 'rules versus discretion' debate and deals with three related issues: the meaning of 'price stability', the importance of stable money to the functioning of a market economy and the central bank's role in maintaining financial stability.
