Download or read book Pure Strategies in Games with Private Information written by Ali Khan and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Private information in large games written by Ehud Kalai and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book On Private Information Games Without Pure Strategy Equilibria written by Ali Khan and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory written by Robert Gibbons and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper offers an introduction to game theory for applied economists. I try to give simple definitions and intuitive examples of the basic kinds of games and their solution concepts. There are four kinds of games: static or dynamic, and complete or incomplete information. ( Complete information means there is no private information.) The corresponding solution concepts are: Nash equilibrium in static games of complete information; backwards induction (or subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium) in dynamic games of complete information; Bayesian Nash equilibrium in static games with incomplete information; and perfect Bayesian (or sequential) equilibrium in dynamic games with incomplete information. The main theme of the paper is that these solution concepts are closely linked. As we consider progressively richer games, we progressively strengthen the solution concept, to rule out implausible equilibria in the richer games that would survive if we applied solution concepts available for simpler games. In each case, the stronger solution concept differs from the weaker concept only for the richer games, not for the simpler games.
Download or read book Pure Strategy Epsilon Equilibria of Private Information Games written by Hiroshi Tateishi and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The paper is concerned with the existence and the approximation property of pure strategy epsilon-equilibria of private information games. The results obtained so far assumed the compactness of strategy sets as well as the continuity of utility functions. Whereas, we assume that the strategy sets are metrizable Souslin spaces. This assumption allows the embedding of strategy sets in some compact metric spaces and deduce the existence and the approximation property of epsilon-equilibria of private information games.
Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization Volume I written by Luis C. Corchón and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2018-02-23 with total page 567 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Daniel Shore and published by Freegulls Publishing House. This book was released on with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Here are some fundamental concepts and terms in game theory and economics: Game Theory: A branch of mathematics and economics that studies how people make decisions in strategic situations, where the outcome of one person's decision depends on the decisions of others. Players: Individuals, groups, or entities making decisions in a game. Each player typically has a set of possible actions they can take. Strategy: A plan of action for a player that specifies what they will do in each possible situation or contingency in the game. Payoff: The outcome or result that a player receives as a consequence of their actions and the actions of others in the game. Payoffs are often represented in terms of utility, profits, or some other measurable outcome. Nash Equilibrium: A concept in game theory where no player has an incentive to unilaterally change their strategy, given the strategies chosen by the other players. In other words, each player's strategy is optimal given the strategies chosen by the other players.
Download or read book Pure Strategy written by Everett Dolman and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2012-11-12 with total page 238 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A stimulating new inquiry into the fundamental truth of strategy - its purpose, place, utility, and value. This new study is animated by a startling realization: the concept of strategic victory must be summarily discarded. This is not to say that victory has no place in strategy or strategic planning. The outcome of battles and campaigns are variables within the strategist's plan, but victory is a concept that has no meaning there. To the tactical and operational planner, wars are indeed won and lost, and the difference is plain. Success is measurable; failure is obvious. In contrast, the pure strategist understands that war is but one aspect of social and political competition, an ongoing interaction that has no finality. Strategy therefore connects the conduct of war with the intent of politics. It shapes and guides military means in anticipation of a panoply of possible coming events. In the process, strategy changes the context within which events will happen. In this new book we see clearly that the goal of strategy is not to culminate events, to establish finality in the discourse between states, but to continue them; to influence state discourse in such a way that it will go forward on favorable terms. For continue it will. This book will provoke debate and stimulate new thinking across the field and strategic studies.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Steve Tadelis and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2013-01-06 with total page 416 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The definitive introduction to game theory This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students
Download or read book Rational Decisions written by Ken Binmore and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2008-12-29 with total page 214 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use Bayesian decision theory--and when does it need to be modified? Using a minimum of mathematics, Rational Decisions clearly explains the foundations of Bayesian decision theory and shows why Savage restricted the theory's application to small worlds. The book is a wide-ranging exploration of standard theories of choice and belief under risk and uncertainty. Ken Binmore discusses the various philosophical attitudes related to the nature of probability and offers resolutions to paradoxes believed to hinder further progress. In arguing that the Bayesian approach to knowledge is inadequate in a large world, Binmore proposes an extension to Bayesian decision theory--allowing the idea of a mixed strategy in game theory to be expanded to a larger set of what Binmore refers to as "muddled" strategies. Written by one of the world's leading game theorists, Rational Decisions is the touchstone for anyone needing a concise, accessible, and expert view on Bayesian decision making.
Download or read book Strategy and Game Theory written by Felix Munoz-Garcia and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-08-10 with total page 362 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook presents worked-out exercises on game theory with detailed step-by-step explanations. While most textbooks on game theory focus on theoretical results, this book focuses on providing practical examples in which students can learn to systematically apply theoretical solution concepts to different fields of economics and business. The text initially presents games that are required in most courses at the undergraduate level and gradually advances to more challenging games appropriate for masters level courses. The first six chapters cover complete-information games, separately analyzing simultaneous-move and sequential-move games, with applications in industrial economics, law, and regulation. Subsequent chapters dedicate special attention to incomplete information games, such as signaling games, cheap talk games, and equilibrium refinements, emphasizing common steps and including graphical illustrations to focus students’ attention on the most relevant payoff comparisons at each point of the analysis. In addition, exercises are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise number. This allows students to pace their studies and instructors to structure their classes accordingly. By providing detailed worked-out examples, this text gives students at various levels the tools they need to apply the tenets of game theory in many fields of business and economics. This text is appropriate for introductory-to-intermediate courses in game theory at the upper undergraduate and master’s level.
Download or read book Game Theory Alive written by Anna R. Karlin and published by American Mathematical Soc.. This book was released on 2017-04-27 with total page 400 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.
Download or read book Playing for Real written by K. G. Binmore and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2007-03-29 with total page 652 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Ken Binmore's previous game theory textbook, Fun and Games (D.C. Heath, 1991), carved out a significant niche in the advanced undergraduate market; it was intellectually serious and more up-to-date than its competitors, but also accessibly written. Its central thesis was that game theory allows us to understand many kinds of interactions between people, a point that Binmore amply demonstrated through a rich range of examples and applications. This replacement for the now out-of-date 1991 textbook retains the entertaining examples, but changes the organization to match how game theory courses are actually taught, making Playing for Real a more versatile text that almost all possible course designs will find easier to use, with less jumping about than before. In addition, the problem sections, already used as a reference by many teachers, have become even more clever and varied, without becoming too technical. Playing for Real will sell into advanced undergraduate courses in game theory, primarily those in economics, but also courses in the social sciences, and serve as a reference for economists.
Download or read book Game Theory for Cyber Deception written by Jeffrey Pawlick and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-01-30 with total page 192 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book introduces game theory as a means to conceptualize, model, and analyze cyber deception. Drawing upon a collection of deception research from the past 10 years, the authors develop a taxonomy of six species of defensive cyber deception. Three of these six species are highlighted in the context of emerging problems such as privacy against ubiquitous tracking in the Internet of things (IoT), dynamic honeynets for the observation of advanced persistent threats (APTs), and active defense against physical denial-of-service (PDoS) attacks. Because of its uniquely thorough treatment of cyber deception, this book will serve as a timely contribution and valuable resource in this active field. The opening chapters introduce both cybersecurity in a manner suitable for game theorists and game theory as appropriate for cybersecurity professionals. Chapter Four then guides readers through the specific field of defensive cyber deception. A key feature of the remaining chapters is the development of a signaling game model for the species of leaky deception featured in honeypots and honeyfiles. This model is expanded to study interactions between multiple agents with varying abilities to detect deception. Game Theory for Cyber Deception will appeal to advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and researchers interested in applying game theory to cybersecurity. It will also be of value to researchers and professionals working on cybersecurity who seek an introduction to game theory.
Download or read book Modeling Strategic Behavior A Graduate Introduction To Game Theory And Mechanism Design written by George J Mailath and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2018-12-18 with total page 364 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.
Download or read book Collected Papers written by Robert J. Aumann and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2000 with total page 806 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Robert Aumann's career in game theory has spanned over research - from his doctoral dissertation in 1956 to papers as recent as January 1995. Threaded through all of Aumann's work (symbolized in his thesis on knots) is the study of relationships between different ideas, between different phenomena, and between ideas and phenomena. When you look closely at one scientific idea, writes Aumann, you find it hitched to all others. It is these hitches that I have tried to study.
Download or read book Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information written by Susan Athey and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper derives sufficient conditions for a class of games of incomplete information, such as first price auctions, to have pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). The paper treats games between two or more heterogeneous agents, each with private information about his own type (for example, a bidder's value for an object of a firm's marginal cost of production), and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution which potentially allows for correlation between types. Agents' utility may depend directly on the realizations of other agents' types, as in Milgrom and Weber's (1982) formulation of the "mineral rights" auction. The restriction we consider is that each player's expected payoffs satisfy the following single crossing condition: whenever each opponent uses a nondecreasing strategy (that is, an opponent who has a higher type chooses a higher action), then a player's best response strategy is also nondecreasing in her type. The paper has two main results. The first result shows that, when players are restricted to choose among a finite set of actions (for example, bidding or pricing where the smallest unit is a penny), games where players' objective functions satisfy this single crossing condition will have PSNE. The second result demonstrates that when players' utility functions are continuous, as well as in mineral rights auction games and other games where "winning" creates a discontinuity in payoffs, the existence result can be extended to the case where players choose from a continuum of actions. The paper then applies the theory to several classes of games, providing conditions on utility functions and joint distributions over types under which each class of games satisfies the single crossing condition. In particular, the single crossing condition is shown to hold in all first-price, private value auctions with potentially heterogeneous, risk-averse bidders, with either independent or affiliated values, and with reserve prices which may differ across bidders; mineral rights auctions with two heterogeneous bidders and affiliated values; a class of pricing games with incomplete information about costs; a class of all-pay auction games; and a class of noisy signaling games. Finally, the formulation of the problem introduced in this paper suggests a straightforward algorithm for numerically computing equilibrium bidding strategies in games such as first price auctions, and we present numerical analyses of several auctions under alternative assumptions about the joint distribution of types.
