Download or read book Provincial Bank Privatization in Argentina written by George R. G. Clarke and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1999 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: August 1999 Argentina's recently privatized provincial banks generate much of their income through service contracts with the provinces, and the transition to commercial banking has been challenging. Available evidence suggests improvements in post-privatization performance, but it is uncertain whether these are sustainable. At the very least, however, a fiscal burden has been lifted from the provinces. Argentina's provinces offer a unique opportunity to study bank privatization because so many transactions took place there in so short a period in the 1990s (1994-98). As the decade started, every province owned at least one bank, performance in publicly owned provincial banks was substantially worse than in private banks, and the losses incurred imposed substantial fiscal costs on the provinces. Politicians whose provinces were in dire fiscal straits, their banks losing money at a fast rate, were most willing to seize opportunities to privatize, even though overstaffed provincial banks were harder to privatize. Deposit loss and liquidity problems associated with the Tequila crisis made privatization more likely. The right political situation is necessary but not sufficient to ensure good privati-zations. First, one must find a buyer, and Argentina's provincial banks were the least attractive in the banking sector. So the provinces settled for purchasers that were not first-tier banks. Many of them were small wholesale banks that had to make the difficult transition to retail banking. Three important concessions were made to purchasers: contracts to provide post-privati-zation services to the provinces, portfolio guarantees, and the assumption of only good assets. In return, provincial politicians were granted restrictions on branch closings and layoffs of bank employees. Both types of accommodation were costly to the purchasers and the provinces. These transactions probably could not have been completed without long-term loans from the Fondo Fiduciario. Were the Fondo Fiduciario loan funds put to good use? Did privatization leave provincial banking on a sounder footing? Initial indications are that the situation has improved in most provinces. And the provinces experiencing post-privatization difficulties tend not to have participated fully in the Fondo Fiduciario privatization program. But the privatized banks rely on their service contracts with provinces to generate a big share of their income and are having trouble making the transition to commercial banking. It is uncertain whether the newly created banks are sustainable. But at least a fiscal burden has been lifted from the provinces. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy and Finance, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the determinants of structural change in developing countries' banking sectors. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].
Download or read book Provincial Bank Privatization in Argentina written by George R. G. Clarke and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Political Economy of Privatization written by George R. G. Clarke and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1998 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Political incentives appear to affect the likelihood of privatization. Provinces in Argentina whose governors belonged to a fiscally conservative party were more likely to privatize, and fiscal and economic crises increased the likelihood of privatization. Clarke and Cull study the political economy of bank privatization in Argentina. The results of their study strongly support the hypothesis that political incentives affect the likelihood of privatization. They find that: * Provinces whose governors belonged to the fiscally conservative Partido Justicialista were more likely to privatize. * Fiscal and economic crises increased the likelihood of privatization. * Poorly performing banks were more likely to be privatized. They tested the hypotheses for a specific industry in a specific country, making it possible to control for enterprise performance and institutional characteristics. It seems reasonable to expect that similar results might hold in other industries and countries. This paper-a product of the Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to investigate the determinants of structural change in development countries' banking sectors. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].
Download or read book Bank Privatization in Argentina written by George R. G. Clarke and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In describing outcomes, the literature on privatization has paid little attention to politicians' incentives, perhaps because it lacked the kinds of evidence needed to do so. Evidence from the privatization of provincial Argentine banks in the 1990s indicates that transaction contract features vary systematically with proxies for politicians' incentives. Will variation in transaction features have implications for post-privatization performance?
Download or read book Argentina Provincial Bank Privatization Loan President s Memorandum and Recommendation written by World Bank and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Why Privatize written by George R. G. Clarke and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bank Privatization in Argentina A Model of Political Constraints and Differential Outcomes written by Robert Cull and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: July 2001 In describing outcomes, the literature on privatization has paid little attention to politicians' incentives, perhaps because it lacked the kinds of evidence needed to do so. Evidence from the privatization of provincial Argentine banks in the 1990s indicates that transaction contract features vary systematically with proxies for politicians' incentives. Will variation in transaction features have implications for post-privatization performance? Based on results from country case studies, many researchers have claimed that political constraints affect bank privatization transactions, which in turn affect the post-privatization performance of the banking sector. But no study has either econometrically tested how political constraints affect bank privatization transactions or theoretically modeled the privatization transaction. Clarke and Cull present a simple theoretical framework that models the inherent tradeoffs faced by governments and potential buyers in privatization transactions involving banks. The potential buyer is concerned about the probability that the bank will remain solvent, about the profits it will earn after privatization, and about the price paid for the assets and liabilities. The government is concerned about the price received for the assets, about layoffs, and about service coverage after privatization. The evidence from bank privatization transactions in Argentina in the 1990s supports several of their theoretical predictions. In particular, provinces with high fiscal deficits were willing to accept layoffs and to guarantee a larger part of the privatized bank's portfolio in return for a higher price. The tequila crisis (Mexico's economic crisis in 1994-95) meant that politicians could protect fewer jobs and had to assume a greater share of their public banks' assets. Evidence of better performance at banks privatized after Mexico's crisis suggests that, by tying politicians' hands, the crisis may have brought unforeseen benefits. This conjecture awaits further empirical validation, but Clarke and Cull hope that by explicitly incorporating the incentives politicians face, analysis can begin to address the question of why some privatizations succeed more than others. This paper--a joint product of Regulation and Competition Policy and Finance, Development Research Group--is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the causes and consequences of bank privatization. The authors may be contacted at [email protected] or [email protected].
Download or read book Why Privatize The Case of Argentina s Public Provincial Banks written by Robert Cull and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Political and Economic Determinants of the Likelihood of Privatizing Argentine Public Banks written by Robert Cull and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the political economy of bank privatization in Argentina following institutional changes related to the implementation of the Convertibility plan and the Tequila Crisis. The empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that political incentives affect the likelihood of privatization. We find: (i) poorly performing banks were more likely to be privatized; (ii) overstaffing tended to reduce the probability of privatization; (iii) large banks were less likely to be privatized; and (iv) higher provincial unemployment and higher shares of public employees reduced the probability of privatization. Although the hypotheses were tested for a specific industry in a specific country, making it possible to control for enterprise performance and institutional characteristics, it seems reasonable that similar results might hold in other industries and countries.
Download or read book Privatization of Public Enterprises and Services in Argentina written by and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Argentina written by International Monetary Fund and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 1995-12-01 with total page 110 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper describes economic developments in Argentina during the 1990s. Since the implementation of the Convertibility Plan in early 1991, real GDP grew by more than 7 percent a year (or by a cumulative 35 percent over the years 1991–94), after stagnating for more than a decade. At the same time, consumer price inflation, which had peaked at 3,000 percent in 1989, declined to 4 percent (average) in 1994. Gross fixed investment recovered to nearly 20 percent of GDP by 1994, reflecting a real growth rate of 22 percent a year during the period.
Download or read book Evolution and Revolution in the Argentine Banking System Under Convertibility written by Lee J. Alston and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We provide an analytical narrative of the political and economic causes and consequences of institutional changes in the Argentine banking system. We devote most of our attention to the privatization of the provincial banks. Our story differs from the prevailing wisdom in its stress on the key roles played by convertibility and an independent Central Bank rather than the Fondo Fiduciario.
Download or read book The Effect of Foreign Entry on Argentina s Domestic Banking Sector written by and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1999 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Corporate Governance and Bank Performance written by and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2005 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: "The authors jointly analyze the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank performance. They argue that it is important to include indicators of all the relevant governance effects in the same model. "Nonrobustness" checks (which purposely exclude some indicators) support this argument. Using data from Argentina in the 1990s, their strongest and most robust results concern state ownership. State-owned banks have poor long-term performance (static effect), those undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance beforehand (selection effect), and these banks dramatically improved following privatization (dynamic effect. However, much of the measured improvement is likely due to placing nonperforming loans into residual entities, leaving "good" privatized banks."--World Bank web site.
Download or read book Argentina s Privatization Program written by Myrna Alexander and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 1993 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Foreign and Domestic Investment in Argentina written by Alison E. Post and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2014-04-17 with total page 265 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Political economy scholarship suggests that private sector investment, and thus economic growth, is more likely to occur when formal institutions allow states to provide investors with credible commitments to protect property rights. This book argues that this maxim does not hold for infrastructure privatization programs. Rather, differences in firm organizational structure better explain the viability of privatization contracts in weak institutional environments. Domestic investors - or, if contracts are granted subnationally, domestic investors with diverse holdings in their contract jurisdiction - work most effectively in the volatile economic and political environments of the developing world. They are able to negotiate mutually beneficial adaptations to their contracts with host governments because cross-sector diversification provides them with informal contractual supports. The book finds strong empirical support for this argument through an analysis of fourteen water and sanitation privatization contracts in Argentina and a statistical analysis of sector trends in developing countries.
Download or read book Argentina s Privatization Program written by Myrna Alexander and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
