Download or read book Performance Incentives in Tournaments written by Michael Leonard Bognanno and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 302 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Effects of Tournament Incentive Contracts and Relative Performance Feedback on Task Effort Learning Effort and Performance written by George Lee and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When employees work hard, they exert more effort on job tasks (task effort); and when employees learn hard, they exert more effort to learn (learning effort). Task effort and learning effort are important causes of improved performance. This thesis investigates whether the use of tournament schemes motivates employees to work harder and learn harder, and also whether providing performance feedback in tournament schemes has any impact on task effort and learning effort.This thesis has three goals. The first is to investigate the relationship between incentives, learning, and performance. The literature on whether learning interacts with incentives to improve performance is inconclusive, because no prior research has provided a good test of this question (as noted by Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Bailey and Fessler 2011; Bailey et al. 1998, and as remains true today). The second goal is to investigate the motivational effect of tournament schemes on effort. The literature suggests that effort is difficult to observe directly or to quantify; as a result, it is hard to verify whether tournament schemes motivate employees' task effort and learning effort. This thesis uses an eye-tracking device to measure effort, by measuring eye position, eye movements, and pupil size. The third goal is to investigate the effect of performance feedback on task effort, learning effort, and performance in the tournament setting.I posit and show evidence that both task effort and learning effort are higher in multiple-winner schemes than in either winner-takes-all schemes or piece-rate schemes. Task effort is directly positively associated with performance, while learning effort causes learning transfer to a job task, also yielding a positive effect on performance. I find that providing relative performance feedback in the tournament setting has no significant impact on task effort or learning effort.These findings have practical value for many corporations, which are constantly re-evaluating the effectiveness of their incentive schemes and reporting systems while investing in learning initiatives to help employees transfer learned skills to job tasks. Organizations may use the insights of this thesis to help them design learning initiatives and motivate employees to transfer learned skills to their job tasks.
Download or read book Rank Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment written by Jayant R. Kale and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this article, we study the effectiveness of promotion-based tournament incentives. We simultaneously investigate tournament incentives for the VP and performance- or equity- based (alignment) incentives for the VP and the CEO. We find that tournament incentives, as measured by the pay differential between the CEO and VPs, relate positively to firm performance. We show that the effect of tournament incentives on firm performance is weaker when the firm has a new CEO and more so when the new CEO is an outsider, and when the firm belongs to a homogeneous industry. On the other hand, tournament effects are stronger when the CEO is close to retirement. Our analysis is robust to corrections for endogeneity of all our incentive measures as well for several alternate measures of tournament incentives and firm performance.
Download or read book Settings Incentives written by Volker Meier and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Performance pay and Incentive Effects in Tournaments written by Joachim Prinz and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 105 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Subjectivity in Tournaments written by Wei Cai and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study explores the effects of subjective adjustments of objective performance rankings in a tournament incentive contract including both rewards and penalties. While prior research focuses predominantly on ex-ante incentive effects of tournament systems, we explore the consequences of awarding rewards and penalties subjectively. We extend the literature on the tradeoffs associated with subjectivity in performance evaluations by describing the effects of implicit penalties (rewards), whereby workers ranked at the top (bottom) of objective performance rankings fail to receive the reward (penalty) due to management’s subjective performance evaluations. Using data from a field setting where incentive contracts are structured as a repeated tournament with no carry-over of performance across periods, we predict and find that workers subject to implicit rewards (penalties) exhibit performance reactions that counterbalance those of workers receiving subjective penalties (rewards). While the net performance effect of subjective rewards and implicit penalties is not significantly different than zero, we find that the net performance effect of subjective penalties and implicit rewards is significantly positive. Our study documents effects of subjective evaluations that might alter the effectiveness of tournament incentive systems, and are relevant for the practice of management accounting.
Download or read book Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments written by Sherwin Rosen and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The role of rewards for maintaining performance incentives in multistage, sequential games of survival is studied. The sequential structure is a statistical design-of-experiments for selecting and ranking contestants. It promotes survival of the fittest and saves sampling costs by early elimination of weaker contenders. Analysis begins with the case where competitors' talents are common knowledge and is extended to cases where talents are unknown. It is shown that extra weight must be placed on top ranking prizes to maintain performance incentives of survivors at all stages of the game. The extra weight at the top induces competitors to aspire to higher goals independent of past achievements. In career games workers have many rungs in the hierarchical ladder to aspire to in the early stages of their careers, and this plays an important role in maintaining their enthusiasm for continuing. But the further one has climbed, the fewer the rungs left to attain. If top prizes are not large enough, those who have succeeded in attaining higher ranks rest on their laurels and slack off in their attempts to climb higher. Elevating the top prizes makes the ladder appear longer for higher ranking contestants, and in the limit makes it appear of unbounded length: no matter how far one has climbed, it looks as if there is always the same length to go. Concentrating prize money on the top ranks eliminates the no-tomorrow aspects of competition in the final stages
Download or read book Distribution of Prizes in a Match play Tournament with Single Eliminations written by Sherwin Rosen and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper begins to study the reward-incentive structure in sequential knock-out or elimination tournaments with matched, pairwise comparisons among players at each stage. The prize structure required to elicit constant expected quality of play in all matches throughout the tournament is characterized for competition among equally talented (or perfectly handicapped), players.The incentive maintaining prize structure is shown to concentrate' extra weight on the top ranking prize, a phenomenon observed in most tournaments. More can be said. Prizes that maintain performance incentives at all stages award a constant increment for each match won up to the last stage; and an amount greater than this for the player who wins the final match. Players' incentives to perform in early rounds are propelled by the probability of achieving higher ranks and surviving to later stages where rewards are larger. These continuation options are played out in the final match, so it is only the difference between winning and losing prizes in the finals that controls incentives there. Many athletic tournaments are structured in the manner analyzed here, but the general framework ultimately may have application to certain career games as well. More generally, a tournament structure may he viewed as a statistical, experimental design problem.The prize structure interacts with the design in providing incentives for the best players to survive to the finals and win the top prizes
Download or read book Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection written by Christine Harbring and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Achievement Effects of Individual Performance Incentives in a Teacher Merit Pay Tournament written by Margaret Brehm and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper estimates the effect of the individual incentives teachers face in a teacher-based value-added merit pay tournament on student achievement. We first build an illustrative model in which teachers use proximity to an award threshold to update their information about their own ability, which informs their expected marginal return to effort. The model predicts that those who are closer to an award cutoff in a given year will increase effort and thus will have higher achievement gains in the subsequent year. However, if value-added scores are too noisy, teachers will not respond. Using administrative teacher-student linked data, we test this prediction employing a method akin to the bunching estimator of Saez (2010). Specifically, we examine whether teachers who are proximal to a cutoff in one year exhibit excess gains in test score growth in the next year. Our results show consistent evidence that teachers do not respond to the incentives they face under this program. In line with our model, we argue that a likely reason for the lack of responsiveness is that the value-added measures used to determine awards were too noisy to provide informative feedback about one's ability. This highlights the importance of value-added precision in the design of incentive pay systems.
Download or read book Setting Incentives written by Volker Meier and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Heterogeneity and Performance in Tournaments A Test for Incentive Effects Using Professional Tennis Data written by Uwe Sunde and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: This paper provides an approach to test whether greater heterogeneity of contestants leads to lower effort exertion in elimination tournaments, as predicted by conventional tournament models. This prediction is difficult to test with real world data because effort is difficult to measure. Based on a simple behavioral model, testable implications are derived and an identification strategy is suggested that allows to test for an incentive effect of heterogeneity even when effort is unobservable. The application uses data from professional tennis tournaments and provides evidence that heterogeneity affects the incentives to exert effort
Download or read book Performance Incentives written by Matthew G. Springer and published by Rowman & Littlefield. This book was released on 2009-12-01 with total page 348 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The concept of pay for performance for public school teachers is growing in popularity and use, and it has resurged to once again occupy a central role in education policy. Performance Incentives: Their Growing Impact on American K-12 Education offers the most up-to-date and complete analysis of this promising—yet still controversial—policy innovation. Performance Incentives brings together an interdisciplinary team of experts, providing an unprecedented discussion and analysis of the pay-for-performance debate by • Identifying the potential strengths and weaknesses of tying pay to student outcomes; • Comparing different strategies for measuring teacher accomplishments; • Addressing key conceptual and implemen - tation issues; • Describing what teachers themselves think of merit pay; • Examining recent examples in Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, and Texas; • Studying the overall impact on student achievement.
Download or read book Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud written by Lars Helge Hass and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper identifies a new incentive for managers to engage in corporate fraud stemming from the relative performance evaluation feature of CEO promotion tournaments. We document higher propensities to engage in fraud for firms with strong tournament incentives (as proxied for by the CEO pay gap). We posit that the relative performance evaluation feature of CEO promotion tournaments creates incentives to manipulate performance, while the option-like character can motivate managers to engage in risky activities. We thereby extend previous corporate fraud literature that focuses mainly on equity-based incentives and reports mixed findings. Our results are robust to using different fraud samples, and controlling for other known determinants of fraud as well as manager skills.
Download or read book Measuring Effort Incentives in a Tournament with Many Participants written by Chirok Han and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article provides an empirical measure to compare incentive effects of different tournament structures. Although there have been many theoretical attempts to analyze incentive effects of a tournament competition, empirical applications are limited as the provided conditions cannot easily be empirically observed. We show that the empirical density of the performance distribution can be used to measure effort incentives in a tournament with many participants. We apply this method to evaluate the grading policy change in the 2008 College Scholastic Ability Test in South Korea.
Download or read book The Effect of Local Tournament Incentives on Firms Performance Risk Taking Decisions and Financial Reporting Decisions written by Matthew Ma and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 71 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study documents the existence of local employment preferences for corporate executives and examines how the compensation of executives' local peers affects their own performance, risk-taking decisions, and financial reporting decisions. We find that external hires of new CEOs (CFOs) are five (eight) times more likely to be from local firms than non-local firms. We also find that local tournament incentives--as proxied by the pay gap between an executive and higher-paid executives in the area--are associated with stronger performance, greater risk taking, and more financial misreporting. We find consistent results using a difference-in-difference analysis that exploits plausibly exogenous variation in local tournament incentives caused by the sudden death of a local CEO. Our findings are consistent with executives taking actions to compete for a promotion to a nearby firm with higher pay. In addition, we find the effect of local tournament incentives is larger when local mobility is greater and executives' local preferences are stronger.
Download or read book Psychological Incentives Financial Incentives and Risk Attitudes in Tournaments written by and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
