Download or read book Ownership Structure Agency Costs and Departure from Value Maximization written by Said T. Ebeid and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 422 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Ownership Structure Agency Costs and Departure from Value Maximation written by Said T. Ebeid and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page 422 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Agency Costs and Ownership Structure written by James S. Ang and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm's sole shareholder. We utilize a sample of 1,708 small corporations from the FRB/NSSBF database and find that agency costs (i) are significantly higher when an outsider rather than an insider manages the firm; (ii) are inversely related to the manager's ownership share; (iii) increase with the number of nonmanager shareholders, and (iv) to a lesser extent, are lower with greater monitoring by banks.
Download or read book Agency costs mispricing and ownership structure written by Sergey Chernenko and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Standard theories of corporate ownership assume that because markets are efficient, insiders ultimately bear agency costs and therefore have a strong incentive to minimize conflicts of interest with outside investors. We show that if equity is overvalued, however, mispricing offsets agency costs and can induce a controlling shareholder to list equity. Higher valuations support listings associated with greater agency costs. We test the predictions that follow from this idea on a sample of publicly listed corporate subsidiaries in Japan. When there is greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm, minority shareholders fare poorly after listing. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced.
Download or read book Ownership Structure Horizontal Agency Costs and the Performance of High Tech Entrepreneurial Firms written by Massimo G. Colombo and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We use the lens of the resource-based view and horizontal agency cost theory to analyse the effect of the presence of different types of individual owners, i.e. owner-managers and non-manager individual shareholders, on the performance of high-tech entrepreneurial firms. Ownership enlargement may contribute to fill the resource gap faced by entrepreneurial firms and improve firm performance. However, whereas owner-managers engender low horizontal agency costs, non-manager individual shareholders generate high horizontal agency problems due to their limited managerial involvement. Our results on a sample of Italian high-tech entrepreneurial firms show that the number of owner-managers has a positive effect on firm performance, whereas the effect of the number of non-manager individual shareholders is negligible. This latter effect becomes more positive, even though still not statistically significant, when firms are highly leveraged, confirming the disciplining role of bank debt.
Download or read book Dissertation Abstracts International written by and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 628 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Do Agency Costs Really Matter A Non Linear Approach to Panel Data written by Fitriya Fauzi and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates the relationship between agency cost, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms. Though previous studies of agency problems, corporate governance mechanisms or ownership variables suffer from endogeneity, with respect to the corporate governance it is unclear as to which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. This study, using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity, confirms noendogeneity issues should be addressed. Furthermore, addressing the issue of non-linearity, this study confirms that the relationship between agency costs, ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms are non-linear. Using a balanced panel of 79 New Zealand-listed firms, this study employs a non-linear panel data method using Tobit. Apart from block-holders' ownership, leverage, dividend, non-executive directors and audit committees, managerial ownership, the number of the board size, nomination and remuneration of the committee have significant impact in reducing the agency costs in the context of New Zealand-listed firms. Overall, it can be concluded that corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structures are vital in mitigating agency costs in the New Zealand context.
Download or read book Do Shareholder Coalitions Affect Agency Costs Evidence from Italian Listed Companies written by Fabrizio Rossi and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study investigates the relationship between agency costs and ownership structure for a sample of listed Italian companies to determine the impact of shareholder coalitions on agency costs. Using a balanced panel dataset of 1,956 firm-year observations for the period 2002-2013, the results provide evidence that ownership concentration and debt play a limited role in monitoring agency costs, whereas the type of shareholder plays an important role in either mitigating or exacerbating agency costs. Family-controlled firms and coalitions among non-controlling shareholders seem helpful in reducing agency costs. The results suggest that coalitions among non-controlling shareholders both in family and non-family firms reduce agency costs. The findings also indicate that multiple blockholders play a key role as mediators. The paper provides a new perspective on assessing the role of agency costs in a bank-based, civil law country. The results enable one to better understand the impact of blockholders on agency costs and their interactions within family-controlled firms. The results also provide support for both the entrenchment effect and the alignment-of-interests hypothesis.
Download or read book An Empirical Investigation of Agency Costs and Ownership Structure in Unlisted Small Businesses written by Nirosha Hewa Wellalage and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The study uses panel data to investigate agency costs, both principal-agent (PA) and principal-principal (PP), in 240 small businesses not listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. Results show that both forms of agency cost vary according to industry, the life of the business and size. The results indicate that the degree of owner involvement in the business influencesfirm PA and PP agency costs. Moreover, this study finds nonlinear relationship between agency costs and ownership structure align with convergence of interest hypothesis and managerialentrenchment hypothesis. It is noted that the distortion between equity returns and debt returns gives rise to a preference for quasiequity and distorts the productive base and effective pricing ofrisk. The analysis indicates there is considerable variability in the burden of agency cost and that this raises the potential for regulatory and policy reforms that may enhance the productivity and growth in the sector.
Download or read book A Theory of the Firm written by Michael C. Jensen and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2003-09-30 with total page 342 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This collection examines the forces, both external and internal, that lead corporations to behave efficiently and to create wealth. Corporations vest control rights in shareholders, the author argues, because they are the constituency that bear business risk and therefore have the appropriate incentives to maximize corporate value. Assigning control to any other group would be tantamount to allowing that group to play poker with someone else's money, and would create inefficiencies. The implicit denial of this proposition is the fallacy of the so-called stakeholder theory of the corporation, which argues that corporations should be run in the interests of all stakeholders. This theory offers no account of how conflicts between different stakeholders are to be resolved, and gives managers no principle on which to base decisions, except to follow their own preferences. In practice, shareholders delegate their control rights to a board of directors, who hire, fire, and set the compensation of the chief officers of the firm. However, because agents have different incentives than the principals they represent, they can destroy corporate value unless closely monitored. This happened in the 1960s and led to hostile takeovers in the market for corporate control in the 1970s and 1980s. The author argues that the takeover movement generated increases in corporate efficiency that exceeded $1.5 trillion and helped to lay the foundation for the great economic boom of the 1990s.
Download or read book Agency Costs Charitable Trusts and Corporate Control written by Jonathan Klick and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "In July of 2002 the trustees of the Milton Hershey School Trust announced a plan to diversify the Trust's investment portfolio by selling the Trust's controlling interest in the Hershey Company. The Company's stock jumped from $62.50 to $78.30 on news of the proposed sale. But the Pennsylvania attorney general, who was then running for governor, brought suit to stop the sale on the grounds that it would harm the central Pennsylvania community. In September 2002, after the attorney general obtained a preliminary injunction, the trustees abandoned the sale and the Company's stock dropped to $65.00. Using standard event study econometric analysis, we find that the sale announcement was associated with a positive abnormal return of over 25 percent and that canceling the sale was followed by a negative abnormal return of nearly 12 percent. Our findings imply that instead of improving the welfare of the needy children who are the Trust's main beneficiaries, the attorney general's intervention preserved charitable trust agency costs on the order of roughly $850 million and prevented the Trust from achieving salutary portfolio diversification. Overall, blocking the sale destroyed roughly $2.7 billion in shareholder wealth, reducing aggregate social welfare by preserving a suboptimal ownership structure of the Hershey Company. Our findings contribute to the literature of trust law by supplying the first empirical analysis of agency costs in the charitable trust form and by highlighting shortcomings in supervision of charitable entities by the state attorneys general. Our findings also contribute to the literature of corporate governance by measuring the difference in firm value when the Hershey Company was subject to a takeover versus under the control of a controlling shareholder"--Preface.
Download or read book Comprehensive Dissertation Index written by and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 978 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book American Doctoral Dissertations written by and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 696 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Cambridge Handbook of Corporate Law Corporate Governance and Sustainability written by Beate Sjåfjell and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2019-12-12 with total page 758 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The emerging field of corporate law, corporate governance and sustainability is one of the most dynamic and significant areas of law and policy in light of the convergence of environmental, social and economic crises that we face as a global society. Understanding the impact of the corporation on society and realizing its potential for contributing to sustainability is vital for the future of humanity. This Handbook comprehensively assesses the state-of-the-art in this field through in-depth discussion of sustainability-related problems, numerous case studies on regulatory responses implemented by jurisdictions around the world, and analyses of predominant strategies and potential drivers of change. This Handbook will be an essential reference for scholars, students, practitioners, policymakers, and general readers interested in how corporate law and governance have exacerbated global society's most pressing challenges, and how reforms to these fields can help us resolve those challenges and achieve sustainability.
Download or read book The Theory of Corporate Finance written by Jean Tirole and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2010-08-26 with total page 657 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Magnificent."—The Economist From the Nobel Prize–winning economist, a groundbreaking and comprehensive account of corporate finance Recent decades have seen great theoretical and empirical advances in the field of corporate finance. Whereas once the subject addressed mainly the financing of corporations—equity, debt, and valuation—today it also embraces crucial issues of governance, liquidity, risk management, relationships between banks and corporations, and the macroeconomic impact of corporations. However, this progress has left in its wake a jumbled array of concepts and models that students are often hard put to make sense of. Here, one of the world's leading economists offers a lucid, unified, and comprehensive introduction to modern corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book around a single model, using an incentive or contract theory approach. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an indispensable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as well as researchers of corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. Tirole conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of today's key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; the efficient determination of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk management; and the design of managerial incentive packages. He weaves empirical studies into the book's theoretical analysis. And he places the corporation in its broader environment, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, and examines the two-way interaction between the corporate environment and institutions. Setting a new milestone in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance will be the authoritative text for years to come.
Download or read book The Economics of the Business Firm written by Harold Demsetz and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1997 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The essays in this volume discuss the theory of the business firm and its applications in economics.
Download or read book Behavioral Corporate Finance written by Hersh Shefrin and published by College Ie Overruns. This book was released on 2017-04-16 with total page 300 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
