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  • Release : 1995
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Download or read book written by and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book An Analysis of the Effect of the U  S  Marine Corps  Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program on Reenlistment Decisions

Download or read book An Analysis of the Effect of the U S Marine Corps Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program on Reenlistment Decisions written by Robert W. Barry, Jr. and published by . This book was released on 2001-12-01 with total page 126 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis analyzes the effect of the United States Marine Corps instituting a lump sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted Marines, Between fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 2000, Zone A reenlistees were paid 50 percent of their SRB on the date of reenlistment, and the remaining 50 percent was paid in annual installments over the reenlistment contract period. In fiscal year 2001, under the new program Marines received 100 percent of the SRB upon reenlisting The thesis surveys the literature on models of enlisted retention, The thesis empirically examines the impact of personal characteristics, civilian pay, unemployment, and the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions, Marine retention probabilities under the lump sum payment program are compared to the probabilities under the standard partial-annuity payment system The results show that the lump sum bonus is associated to a 5,8 percentage point increase in the reenlistment probability, A one-level increase in the SRB multiple during fiscal year 2001 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2,6 percentage points,

Book Military Retention Incentives  Effectiveness and Administration  Department of Defense

Download or read book Military Retention Incentives Effectiveness and Administration Department of Defense written by United States. General Accounting Office and published by . This book was released on 1974 with total page 76 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Department of Defense Appropriations for 2010  Part 3  111 1 Hearings

Download or read book Department of Defense Appropriations for 2010 Part 3 111 1 Hearings written by and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 494 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book An Analysis of the Effect of Using Lump Sum Payments for the U  S  Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program

Download or read book An Analysis of the Effect of Using Lump Sum Payments for the U S Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program written by David L. Ross and published by . This book was released on 2000-03-01 with total page 93 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis examines the estimated effects on enlisted retention in the Marine Corps of changing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) payment method to lump sum. The thesis surveys the literature on personal discount rates (PDR) and on models of enlisted retention. The thesis analyzes the potential effect of the payment method on retention of Zone A eligible personnel using a range of PDRs and retention elasticities estimated by the Center for Naval Analyses. The NPV of a lump sum payment was compared to that of the current payment method using the actual SRB multiples for each USMC Occupational Field. The results indicate Zone A first-term Marine retention will increase between 6. 8 percent and 11.7 percent if the SRB payment were made in lump sum. The effect of switching to a lump sum payment was also analyzed using the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. The ACOL model estimates reinforced the estimates predicted by this thesis. Finally, a Monte Carlo simulation was run in Microsoft Excel to estimate the probabilities of attaining a given number of Marines across all Occupational Fields. The Monte Carlo simulation runs show an increased probability of obtaining a given number of first-term Marines by changing the SRB payment method to lump sum.

Book Department of Defense Appropriations for 2010

Download or read book Department of Defense Appropriations for 2010 written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Department of Defense and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 496 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Department of Defense Appropriations for 1999

Download or read book Department of Defense Appropriations for 1999 written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on National Security and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 636 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book An Analysis of the Effect of the U  S  Marine Corps  Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program on Reenlistment Decisions

Download or read book An Analysis of the Effect of the U S Marine Corps Lump Sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program on Reenlistment Decisions written by and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 126 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis analyzes the effect of the United States Marine Corps instituting a lump sum Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program on reenlistment decisions of first-term enlisted Marines, Between fiscal year 1982 and fiscal year 2000, Zone A reenlistees were paid 50 percent of their SRB on the date of reenlistment, and the remaining 50 percent was paid in annual installments over the reenlistment contract period. In fiscal year 2001, under the new program Marines received 100 percent of the SRB upon reenlisting The thesis surveys the literature on models of enlisted retention, The thesis empirically examines the impact of personal characteristics, civilian pay, unemployment, and the lump sum bonus on reenlistment decisions, Marine retention probabilities under the lump sum payment program are compared to the probabilities under the standard partial-annuity payment system The results show that the lump sum bonus is associated to a 5,8 percentage point increase in the reenlistment probability, A one-level increase in the SRB multiple during fiscal year 2001 is related to a reenlistment rate increase of 2,6 percentage points,

Book Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2105 and the Future Years Defense Program  S Hrg 113 465  Part 6  March 26 and April 9  2014  113 2

Download or read book Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2105 and the Future Years Defense Program S Hrg 113 465 Part 6 March 26 and April 9 2014 113 2 written by and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book An Analysis of the Retention Effect of Using Lump Sum Payments for the U S  Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program

Download or read book An Analysis of the Retention Effect of Using Lump Sum Payments for the U S Marine Corps Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program written by David L. Ross and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis examines the estimated effects on enlisted retention in the Marine Corps of changing the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) payment method to lump sum. The thesis surveys the literature on personal discount rates (PDR) and on models of enlisted retention. The thesis analyzes the potential effect of the payment method on retention of Zone A eligible personnel using a range of PDRs and retention elasticities estimated by the Center for Naval Analyses. The NPV of a lump sum payment was compared to that of the current payment method using the actual SRB multiples for each USMC Occupational Field. The results indicate Zone A first-term Marine retention will increase between 6. 8 percent and 11.7 percent if the SRB payment were made in lump sum. The effect of switching to a lump sum payment was also analyzed using the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model. The ACOL model estimates reinforced the estimates predicted by this thesis. Finally, a Monte Carlo simulation was run in Microsoft Excel to estimate the probabilities of attaining a given number of Marines across all Occupational Fields. The Monte Carlo simulation runs show an increased probability of obtaining a given number of first-term Marines by changing the SRB payment method to lump sum.

Book Army SRB Program

Download or read book Army SRB Program written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "In this study the effects of Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) on Army reenlistments over the 1990-2000 period at Zones A, B, and C at three levels of occupational aggregation - all Army, career management field (CMF), and military occupational specialty (MOS) - were re-estimated to explicitly control for the drawdown in the mid-1990s as well as labor market conditions. In general, the results for Zone A at all levels of occupational aggregation indicate that reenlistment bonuses have a positive and statistically significant effect on Zone A reenlistments. A one-level increase in SRB at Zone A typically increases the reenlistment rate by 3 to 7 percentage points, depending upon the occupation. The results for Zone B are also solid at both the CMF and MOS levels. Results for Zone C, where reenlistment rates are typically very high, were reasonably solid but not quite as good as the Zone A and B results. The results provide the Army with estimates of reenlistment responsiveness to bonus changes for all three zones for all MOS. We also estimated the effect of SRBs on the reenlisting Soldier's choice of length of reenlistment. Increases in the SRB level not only increase reenlistments, but also increase the length of reenlistment. The length of reenlistment effects were incorporated into the SRB Management System to better predict program costs and the additional staff years of contracted service provided by the bonus program."--Stinet.

Book Department of Defense Appropriations for 1999  Personnel quality of life issues

Download or read book Department of Defense Appropriations for 1999 Personnel quality of life issues written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on National Security and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 644 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015 and the Future Years Defense Program  Personnel

Download or read book Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015 and the Future Years Defense Program Personnel written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Military Cash Incentives  DOD Should Coordinate and Monitor Its Efforts to Achieve Cost Effective Bonuses and Special Pays

Download or read book Military Cash Incentives DOD Should Coordinate and Monitor Its Efforts to Achieve Cost Effective Bonuses and Special Pays written by Brenda S. Farrell and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on 2011 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Assesses DoD¿s use of cash incentives to recruit and retain highly qualified individuals for service in the armed forces. It: (1) identifies recent trends in DoD's use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses; (2) assesses the extent to which the services have processes to determine which occupational specialties require bonuses and whether bonus amounts are optimally set; and (3) determines how much flexibility DoD has in managing selected special and incentive pays for officer and enlisted personnel. The report analyzed service data on bonuses and special and incentive pays, and reviewed relevant guidance and other documentation from DoD and the services. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.

Book Indefinite Reenlistment and Noncommissioned Officers

Download or read book Indefinite Reenlistment and Noncommissioned Officers written by Laura L. Miller and published by Rand Corporation. This book was released on 2007 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In 1998, the U.S. Army became the only service to shift its senior enlistment force from a fixed enlistment contract system to indefinite reenlistment, which eliminated the reenlistment requirement in the latter half of a noncommissioned officer's career and placed them on the same indefinite service contract as officers. This study considers the utility of this program and potential applicability to the other service branches.

Book Military Retention Incentives

Download or read book Military Retention Incentives written by Justin Joffrion and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The limited lateral entry and rigid pay structure for U.S. military personnel present challenges in retaining skilled individuals who have attractive options in the civilian labor market. One tool the services use to address this challenge is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), which offers eligible personnel with particular skills a substantial cash bonus upon reenlistment. However, the sequential nature of the bonus offer and reenlistment process limits the ability to adjust manpower quickly, raising interest in research that estimates the effect of the SRB on retention. While this literature has acknowledged challenges including potential endogeneity of bonus levels, attrition, and reenlistment eligibility, many studies do not address these concerns adequately. This paper uses a comprehensive panel data set on Air Force enlisted personnel to estimate the effect of the SRB on retention rates. We exploit variation in bonus levels within skill groups, control for civilian labor market conditions, and model reenlistment eligibility to avoid common assumptions that lead to biased impact estimates. We find substantial heterogeneity in the effect of the bonus, with the largest effects on first-term service members and those whose skills have not historically received a substantial bonus. We also find evidence that the bonus affects the timing of reenlistment decisions in addition to their frequency.

Book Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment  Attrition  and Reenlistment

Download or read book Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment Attrition and Reenlistment written by Beth J. Asch and published by RAND Corporation. This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This monograph provides an empirical analysis of the enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment effects of bonuses, applying statistical models that control for such other factors as recruiting resources, in the case of enlistment and deployments in the case of reenlistment, and demographics. Enlistment and attrition models are estimated for the Army and our reenlistment model approach is twofold. The Army has greatly increased its use of reenlistment bonuses since FY 2004, and we begin by providing an in-depth history of the many changes in its reenlistment bonus program during this decade. We follow this with two independent analyses of the effect of bonuses on Army reenlistment. As we show, the results from the models are consistent, lending credence to the robustness of the estimates. One approach is extended to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, to obtain estimates of the effect of bonuses on reenlistment for all services. We also estimate an enlistment model for the Navy. The estimated models are used to address questions about the cost-effectiveness of bonuses and their effects in offsetting other factors that might adversely affect recruiting and retention, such as changes in the civilian economy and frequent deployments"--P. iii.