Download or read book Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents written by D. Mookherjee and published by . This book was released on with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Optimal Principal Agent Contracts for a Class of Incentive Schemes written by Prajit K. Dutta and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents written by Joel S. Demski and published by . This book was released on 1983 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Principal Agent Model written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2003 with total page 726 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The economics of asymmetric information has been the most important new tool of economic analysis and has proved powerful in explaining many aspects of the functioning of the economy. This anthology brings together every major paper in the field.

Download or read book Incentive Contracts with Strategic Agents written by Jacques Paul Lawarrée and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 418 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

Download or read book Optimal incentive schemes in multiagent situations written by D. Mookherjee and published by . This book was released on 1982 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Discretion in Managerial Bonus Pools written by Merle Ederhof and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2011 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Discretion in Managerial Bonus Pools synthesizes and integrates a growing literature that has emerged over the past 10-15 years on the use of both objective and subjective performance indicators in managerial incentive plans. The authors examine the structure of efficient bonus pools (fixed payment schemes) in the presence of subjective performance indicators. The analysis covers a range of scenarios including single- and multi-agent settings, the interplay of objective and subjective indicators and short-term as opposed to long-term contracting relations. To synthesize the existing research, the authors frame their exposition around five recurring themes which collectively speak to the structure and the efficiency of incentive schemes based on subjective information i. Value of Subjective Performance Indicators. ii. Incremental Agency Cost. iii.Compression of Optimal Incentive Contracts. iv. Optimality of Proper Bonus Pools. v. Value of Multiperiod Contracting

Download or read book An Optimal Incentive System for Real Estate Agents written by Timothy E. Jares and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This article presents an alternative system for selling real estate. It overcomes the well-known deficiencies of the percentage commission system. In our system, the agent purchases the property from the seller and simultaneously receives a put option. The put option gives the agent the right to put the property back to the original owner. It is shown that this system has many of the desirable properties of a dealer system, while avoiding some of the problems that are inherent in that system.

Download or read book Agency Theory Information and Incentives written by Günter Bamberg and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 538 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.

Download or read book Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications written by R.J. Aumann and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 1992 with total page 824 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes

Download or read book Handbook of Industrial Organization written by Mark Armstrong and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2007-10-05 with total page 943 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is Volume 3 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization series (HIO). Volumes 1 & 2 published simultaneously in 1989 and many of the chapters were widely cited and appeared on graduate reading lists. Since the first volumes published, the field of industrial organization has continued to evolve and this volume fills the gaps. While the first two volumes of HIO contain much more discussion of the theoretical literature than of the empirical literature, it was representative of the field at that time. Since then, the empirical literature has flourished, while the theoretical literature has continued to grow, and this new volume reflects that change of emphasis. Thie volume is an excellent reference and teaching supplement for industrial organization or industrial economics, the microeconomics field that focuses on business behavior and its implications for both market structures and processes, and for related public policies. *Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series *Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields *A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists

Download or read book Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents written by Suren Basov and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing incentive schemes under bounded rationality. It starts from a standard principal-agent model and then superimposes an assumption of boundedly rational behavior on the part of the agent. Boundedly rational behavior is modeled as an explicit optimization procedure which combines gradient dynamics with a specipc form of social learning called imitation of scope. The results predict the underprovision of optimal incentives and deviation from a standard suCEcient statistics result from the agency literature. It also allows us to address the question of creating the optimal incentives in a multicultural environment.

Download or read book The New Institutional Economics written by Eirik Grundtvig Furubotn and published by Mohr Siebeck. This book was released on 1991 with total page 394 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book An Introduction to the Economics of Information written by Inés Macho-Stadler and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 1996-10-03 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling. The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.

Download or read book The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics written by and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-05-18 with total page 7493 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The award-winning The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition is now available as a dynamic online resource. Consisting of over 1,900 articles written by leading figures in the field including Nobel prize winners, this is the definitive scholarly reference work for a new generation of economists. Regularly updated! This product is a subscription based product.

Download or read book A Course in Microeconomic Theory written by David M. Kreps and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2020-05-26 with total page 870 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: David M. Kreps has developed a text in microeconomics that is both challenging and "user-friendly." The work is designed for the first-year graduate microeconomic theory course and is accessible to advanced undergraduates as well. Placing unusual emphasis on modern noncooperative game theory, it provides the student and instructor with a unified treatment of modern microeconomic theory--one that stresses the behavior of the individual actor (consumer or firm) in various institutional settings. The author has taken special pains to explore the fundamental assumptions of the theories and techniques studied, pointing out both strengths and weaknesses. The book begins with an exposition of the standard models of choice and the market, with extra attention paid to choice under uncertainty and dynamic choice. General and partial equilibrium approaches are blended, so that the student sees these approaches as points along a continuum. The work then turns to more modern developments. Readers are introduced to noncooperative game theory and shown how to model games and determine solution concepts. Models with incomplete information, the folk theorem and reputation, and bilateral bargaining are covered in depth. Information economics is explored next. A closing discussion concerns firms as organizations and gives readers a taste of transaction-cost economics.