Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents Can Save Borrow and Default written by David S. Bizer and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The standard Principal-Agent (PA) model assumes that the principal can control the agent's consumption profile. In an intertemporal setting, however, Rogerson (1985a) shows that given the optimal PA contract, the agent has an unmet precautionary demand for savings. Thus the standard PA model is invalid if the agent has access to credit markets. In this paper we generalize the standard PA model to allow for saving and borrowing by the agent. We show that the impact of such access critically depends upon the treatment of default. If default is notpermitted, efficiency is strictly reduced by the introduction of credit markets, and the equilibrium level of borrowing or saving is indeterminate in the model. If default is allowed, however, the optimal contract depends upon the level of bankruptcy protection in the economy, which is described by a minimum level of wage income. We show that there is an optimal intermediate range of bankruptcy protection. Within this range, allowing default increases efficiency in the economy relative to the case of no default. Also, the model predicts specific levels of consumer debt, interest and default rates as function of the level of bankruptcy protection level.
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard when the Agent is Free to Leave written by Florian Englmaier and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents written by Joel S. Demski and published by . This book was released on 1983 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incentive Contracts with Strategic Agents written by Jacques Paul Lawarrée and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 418 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts with Hidden Savings written by Archawa Paweenawat and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Journal of Financial Intermediation written by and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 546 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Contracts When Agents Envy Each Other written by Anjan V. Thakor and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the characteristics of endogenously-determined optimal incentive contracts for agents who envy each other and work for a risk-neutral (non-envious) principal. Envy makes each agent care not only about absolute consumption but also about relative consumption. Incentive contracts in this setting display properties strikingly different from those associated with optimal contracts in standard principal-agent theory. We derive results that help explain some of the discrepancies between the predictions of principal-agent theory and the stylized facts about real-world contracts.
Download or read book Optimal Incentive Contracts with Job Destruction Risk written by Borys Grochulski and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the implications of job destruction risk for optimal incentives in a long-term contract with moral hazard. We extend the dynamic principal-agent model of Sannikov (2008) by adding an exogenous Poisson shock that makes the match between the firm and the agent permanently unproductive. In modeling job destruction as an exogenous Poisson shock, we follow the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching literature. The optimal contract shows how job destruction risk is shared between the rm and the agent. Arrival of the job-destruction shock is always bad news for the rm but can be good news for the agent. In particular, under weak conditions, the optimal contract has exactly two regions. If the agent's continuation value is below a threshold, the agent's continuation value experiences a negative jump upon arrival of the job-destruction shock. If the agent's value is above this threshold, however, the jump in the agent's continuation value is positive, i.e., the agent gets rewarded when the match becomes unproductive. This pattern of adjustment of the agent's value at job destruction allows the firm to reduce the costs of effort incentives while the match is productive. In particular, it allows the firm to adjust the drift of the agent's continuation value process so as to decrease the risk of reaching either of the two inefficient agent retirement points. Further, we study the sensitivity of the optimal contract to the arrival rate of job destruction.
Download or read book The Journal of Political Economy written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 572 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays in Optimal Dynamic Risk Sharing in Equity and Debt Markets written by Branko Vladeta Urosevic and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 400 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A Game Theory Analysis of Options written by Alexandre Ziegler and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-06-29 with total page 154 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Modem option pricing theory was developed in the late sixties and early seventies by F. Black, R. C. Merton and M. Scholes as an analytical tool for pricing and hedging option contracts and over-the-counter warrants. However, already in the seminal paper by Black and Scholes, the applicability of the model was regarded as much broader. In the second part of their paper, the authors demonstrated that a levered firm's equity can be regarded as an option on the value of the firm, and thus can be priced by option valuation techniques. A year later, Merton showed how the default risk structure of corporate bonds can be determined by option pricing techniques. Option pricing models are now used to price virtually the full range of financial instruments and financial guarantees such as deposit insurance and collateral, and to quantify the associated risks. Over the years, option pricing has evolved from a set of specific models to a general analytical framework for analyzing the production process of financial contracts and their function in the financial intermediation process in a continuous time framework. However, virtually no attempt has been made in the literature to integrate game theory aspects, i. e. strategic financial decisions of the agents, into the continuous time framework. This is the unique contribution of the thesis of Dr. Alexandre Ziegler. Benefiting from the analytical tractability of continuous time models and the closed form valuation models for derivatives, Dr.
Download or read book The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics written by and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-05-18 with total page 7493 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The award-winning The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition is now available as a dynamic online resource. Consisting of over 1,900 articles written by leading figures in the field including Nobel prize winners, this is the definitive scholarly reference work for a new generation of economists. Regularly updated! This product is a subscription based product.
Download or read book After the Flood written by Edward L. Glaeser and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2017-03-23 with total page 320 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Includes papers presented at a conference held at the Columbia Business School in the spring of 2013 in honor of Josae Scheinkman's 65th birthday.
Download or read book The Theory of Corporate Finance written by Jean Tirole and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2010-08-26 with total page 657 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Magnificent."—The Economist From the Nobel Prize–winning economist, a groundbreaking and comprehensive account of corporate finance Recent decades have seen great theoretical and empirical advances in the field of corporate finance. Whereas once the subject addressed mainly the financing of corporations—equity, debt, and valuation—today it also embraces crucial issues of governance, liquidity, risk management, relationships between banks and corporations, and the macroeconomic impact of corporations. However, this progress has left in its wake a jumbled array of concepts and models that students are often hard put to make sense of. Here, one of the world's leading economists offers a lucid, unified, and comprehensive introduction to modern corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book around a single model, using an incentive or contract theory approach. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an indispensable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as well as researchers of corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. Tirole conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of today's key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; the efficient determination of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk management; and the design of managerial incentive packages. He weaves empirical studies into the book's theoretical analysis. And he places the corporation in its broader environment, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, and examines the two-way interaction between the corporate environment and institutions. Setting a new milestone in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance will be the authoritative text for years to come.
Download or read book The Chicago Plan Revisited written by Mr.Jaromir Benes and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2012-08-01 with total page 71 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: At the height of the Great Depression a number of leading U.S. economists advanced a proposal for monetary reform that became known as the Chicago Plan. It envisaged the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, by requiring 100% reserve backing for deposits. Irving Fisher (1936) claimed the following advantages for this plan: (1) Much better control of a major source of business cycle fluctuations, sudden increases and contractions of bank credit and of the supply of bank-created money. (2) Complete elimination of bank runs. (3) Dramatic reduction of the (net) public debt. (4) Dramatic reduction of private debt, as money creation no longer requires simultaneous debt creation. We study these claims by embedding a comprehensive and carefully calibrated model of the banking system in a DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We find support for all four of Fisher's claims. Furthermore, output gains approach 10 percent, and steady state inflation can drop to zero without posing problems for the conduct of monetary policy.
Download or read book Financial Integration and Development written by Ernest Aryeetey and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2005-07-28 with total page 266 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines the effects of financial liberalization on development, with a particular focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and includes studies of Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria and Tanzania.
Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
