Download or read book On the existence of equilibrium in pure strategies in symmetric games on the cube written by John Roberts and published by . This book was released on 1975 with total page 7 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Existence of a Pure Strategy Equilibrium in Finite Symmetric Games Where Payoff Functions are Integrally Concave written by Takahiro Watanabe and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper we show that a finite symmetric game has a pure strategy equilibrium if the payoff functions of players are integrally concave (the negative of the integrally convex functions due to Favati and Tardella [Convexity in nonlinear integer programming, Ricerca Operativa, 1990, 53:3-44]). Since the payoff functions of any two-strategy game are integrally concave, this generalizes the result of Cheng et al. , [Notes on equilibria in symmetric games, Proceedings of the 6th Workshop On Game Theoretic And Decision Theoretic Agents, 2004, 23-28]. A simple algorithm to find an equilibrium is also provided.

Download or read book Pure Strategy Equilibria in Symmetric Two Player Zero Sum Games written by Peter Dürsch and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general two-player zero-sum games using the symmetrization of zero-sum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies.

Download or read book On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Two Person Discrete Games written by Indrajit Mallick and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We construct a generalized two-person discrete strategy static game of complete information where continuity, convexity and compactness cannot be invoked to show the existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. We show that, when Best Responses are unique from both sides, a condition of Minimal Acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria.

Download or read book Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs written by Brian John Crone and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 212 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games written by Guilherme Carmona and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colell's theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players' payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an pure, equilibrium for all gt; 0. We also show that our result is equivalent to Mas-Colell's existence theorem, implying that it can properly be considered as its asymptotic version.

Download or read book The Berge Equilibrium A Game Theoretic Framework for the Golden Rule of Ethics written by Mindia E. Salukvadze and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-02-18 with total page 290 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The goal of this book is to elaborate on the main principles of the theory of the Berge equilibrium by answering the following two questions: What are the basic properties of the Berge equilibrium? Does the Berge equilibrium exist, and how can it be calculated? The Golden Rule of ethics, which appears in Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism and other world religions, states the following: “Behave towards others as you would like them to behave towards you." In any game, each party of conflict seeks to maximize some payoff. Therefore, for each player, the Golden Rule is implemented through the maximization of his/her payoff by all other players, which matches well with the concept of the Berge equilibrium. The approach presented here will be of particular interest to researchers (including undergraduates and graduates) and economists focused on decision-making under complex conflict conditions. The peaceful resolution of conflicts is the cornerstone of the approach: as a matter of fact, the Golden Rule precludes military clashes and violence. In turn, the new approach requires new methods; in particular, the existence problems are reduced to saddle point design for the Germeier convolution of payoff functions, with further transition to mixed strategies in accordance with the standard procedure employed by E. Borel, J. von Neumann, J. Nash, and their followers. Moreover, this new approach has proven to be efficient and fruitful with regard to a range of other important problems in mathematical game theory, which are considered in the Appendix.

Download or read book On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players written by Ali Khan and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Existence of Equilibria in Constrained Discontinuous Games written by Adib Bagh and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with discontinuous payoffs where the set of feasible actions of each player varies, also in a discontinuous fashion, as a function of the actions of the other players. Such games are used in modeling abstract economies and other games where players share common constraints. Our approach circumvents the difficulties that arise from the presence of discontinuities by modifying the original problem and allowing the players to use strategies that possibly lie outside their feasible sets. We then show that each modified game has "epsilon-equilibria points. Under certain conditions, and as the extent of modification becomes smaller and smaller and " approaches zero, the "epsilon-equilibria points of the modified games will converge to a strategy profile that is an equilibrium of the original game. Hence, we obtain a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of pure equilibria of the original game. We apply our results to a number of classic games that have discontinuous payoffs and discontinuous constraintcorrespondences.

Download or read book On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players written by Edward Cartwright and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria of Games with Incomplete Information written by Hiroshi Tateishi and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 6 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper is concerned with the existence of approximate pure strategy equilibria of games with incomplete information.

Download or read book The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information written by Helmut Meister and published by Springer. This book was released on 1987 with total page 148 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.

Download or read book A Sufficient Condition on the Existence of Pure Equilibrium in Two person Symmetric Zerosum Games written by Mehmet Ismail and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 10 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Games of Incomple Information written by Susan Athey and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Ordinally Symmetric Games written by Zhigang Cao and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 9 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We extend the notion of an ordinally symmetric game of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) from two to n players. We prove that each ordinally symmetric game with two strategies is an ordinal potential game and thus possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, generalizing a result of Hofbauer and Sorger (2002) on symmetric games.

Download or read book A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in large generalized games with atomic players written by Alvaro Riascos Villegas and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 10 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Dual Reduction and Elementary Games written by Roger B. Myerson and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: