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Book Negotiation  Auction  Or Negotiauction   Evidence from the Field

Download or read book Negotiation Auction Or Negotiauction Evidence from the Field written by Tingting Liu and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We connect the extensive theoretical negotiation and auction literature to real-world practice using a rich, hand-collected data set offering a comprehensive picture of high-stake merger and acquisition (M&A) negotiations for 322 deals that aggregate more than $2.4 trillion in deal value. We find that a full-scale auction is not a common way to sell a firm, and about 75% of our sample deals switch to negotiating with only one buyer in the final stage of the sale process. Moreover, the majority of our sample involves a fluid deal process that changes the nature of the deal (negotiation or auction) as the process proceeds. Most initiating bidders have higher valuations for the target and are the eventual winning bidders. On average, it takes two to three months for the merging parties to reach an agreement on offer prices, and the delay is related to information asymmetry, valuation uncertainty, and potential outside options. Most bidders experiment with offers, but the final premiums are largely similar regardless of the number of offers made by the bidder. About half of the target firms make counteroffers during negotiation; most of the time, the target and the bidder split the price differences. The empirical patterns we document challenge some common assumptions on which much of auction theory is based. Our findings call for further developments in theories that consider the inherent interconnectedness between auctions and negotiations as in the real world.

Book Auctions Vs  Negotiations

Download or read book Auctions Vs Negotiations written by Jeremy Bulow and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: a public auction or an optimally structured negotiation with a smaller number of bidders? We show that under standard assumptions the public auction is always preferable, even if it forfeits all the seller's negotiating power, including the ability to withdraw the object from sale, provided that it attracts at least one extra bidder. An immediate public auction also dominates negotiating while maintaining the right to hold an auction subsequently with more bidders. The results hold for both the standard independent private values model and a common values model. They suggest that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition.

Book A comparison of auctions and multilateral negotiations

Download or read book A comparison of auctions and multilateral negotiations written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Negotiation  Auctions  and Market Engineering

Download or read book Negotiation Auctions and Market Engineering written by Henner Gimpel and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-02-05 with total page 242 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar "Negotiation and Market Engineering", held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented were carefully selected and reviewed. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them.

Book Auction Vs  Negotiations

Download or read book Auction Vs Negotiations written by Fabian Herweg and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Auctions Vs  Negotiations

Download or read book Auctions Vs Negotiations written by Fabian Herweg and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and if the buyer's bargaining position is sufficiently strong. Moreover, we show that negotiations provide stronger incentives for sellers to investigate possible design improvements than auctions. This provides an explanation for the widespread use of negotiations as a procurement mechanism in private industry.

Book Auctions Versus Negotiations

Download or read book Auctions Versus Negotiations written by Jeremy I. Bulow and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Auction Theory

Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2002-03-13 with total page 319 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Vijay Krishna's book provides a very thorough and patient presentation of auction theory, starting from the most basic analysis and graduating to sophisticated, state of the art theory, including multi-unit auctions. This book covers a very wide range of auction topics, providing a clear and accessible treatment. The theory is presented in a careful and easily understood style accessible to honors undergraduates as well as all economics graduate students. Krishna's book will certainly become the central book on auction theory." --R. Preston McAfee, Murray S. Johnson Chair in Economics, University of Texas "This book not only sets out much of the theoretical literature on auctions-including results that are very recent-but does so with a clarity, elegance, and rigor that is characteristic of Vijay Krishna's work." --Eric Maskin, A.O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey "The book gives a superb presentation of auction theory, with clear and concise proofs of all results. It is essential reading for any serious student of auctions." --Peter Cramton, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland "This is the book we have been waiting for: a high level treatment of auction theory that carefully presents the technical details necessary for an in depth understanding of the main themes of auction theory, ideal as a basis for a graduate course, and by an author who has himself made important contributions to the subject." --Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization and his clear proofs for each proposition make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multiunit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.

Book Understanding Auctions

Download or read book Understanding Auctions written by Asunción Mochón and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-09-15 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. “This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.

Book A Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations

Download or read book A Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations written by Federal Trade Federal Trade Commission and published by CreateSpace. This book was released on 2014-09-14 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We compare the well-known first-price auction with a common but previously unexamined exchange process that we term "multilateral negotiations." In multilateral negotiations, a buyer solicits price offers for a homogeneous product from sellers with heterogeneous costs, and then plays the sellers off one another to obtain additional price concessions. Using experimental methods, we find that transaction prices are statistically indistinguishable in the two institutions with a sufficiently large number of sellers, but that prices are higher in multilateral negotiations than in first-price auctions as the number of sellers decreases. With fewer sellers, the institutions are equally efficient, but with more sellers, there is some evidence that multilateral negotiations are slightly more efficient.

Book Putting Auction Theory to Work

Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Robert Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 396 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Table of contents

Book Auctions Versus Negotiations

Download or read book Auctions Versus Negotiations written by Chia-Hui Chen and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auctions are a popular and prevalent form of trading mechanism, despite the restriction that the seller cannot price-discriminate among potential buyers. To understand why this is the case, we consider an auction-like environment in which a seller with an indivisible object negotiates with two asymmetric buyers to determine who obtains the object and at what price. The trading process resembles the Dutch auction, except that the seller is allowed to offer different prices to different buyers. We show that when the seller can commit to a price path in advance, the optimal outcome can generally be implemented. When the seller lacks such commitment power, however, there instead exists an equilibrium in which the seller's expected payoff is driven down to the second-price auction level. Our analysis suggests that having the discretion to price discriminate is not necessarily beneficial for the seller, and even harmful under plausible conditions, which could explain the pervasive use of auctions in practice.

Book Auctions Vs  Negotiations in Vertically Related Markets

Download or read book Auctions Vs Negotiations in Vertically Related Markets written by Emanuele Bacchiega and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a two-tier industry with bottleneck upstream and two downstream firms producing vertically differentiated goods, we identify conditions under which the upstream supplier chooses exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations, or an English auction to sell its essential input. Auctioning off a two-part tariff contract is optimal for the supplier when its bar- gaining power is low and the final goods are not too differentiated. Otherwise, the supplier enters into exclusive or non-exclusive negotiations with the downstream firm(s). Finally, in contrast to previous findings, an auction is never welfare superior to negotiations.

Book Auction

    Book Details:
  • Author : William C. Ketchum
  • Publisher : Sterling Publishing (NY)
  • Release : 1980
  • ISBN :
  • Pages : 200 pages

Download or read book Auction written by William C. Ketchum and published by Sterling Publishing (NY). This book was released on 1980 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book A Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations

Download or read book A Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations written by Charles J. Thomas and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Auction Versus Negotiated Sale

Download or read book Auction Versus Negotiated Sale written by Yuen Leng Chow and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We offer a theoretical and empirical comparison of auctions and negotiated sales. We first build a simple model to show that auctions generate a higher relative price than negotiated sales when demand for the asset is strong, when the asset is more homogeneous, and when the asset attracts buyers with higher valuations. Using data from property sales in Singapore, we find support for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we find that auctions do not necessarily generate a higher price premium for foreclosed properties than for non-foreclosed properties.

Book The Efficiency of Real World Bargaining

Download or read book The Efficiency of Real World Bargaining written by Bradley Larsen and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 70 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study quantifies the efficiency of a real-world bargaining game with two-sided incomplete information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987) derived the theoretical efficient frontier for bilateral trade under two-sided uncertainty, but little is known about how well real-world bargaining performs relative to the frontier. The setting is wholesale used-auto auctions, an $80 billion industry where buyers and sellers participate in alternating-offer bargaining when the auction price fails to reach a secret reserve price. Using 270,000 auction/bargaining sequences, this study nonparametrically estimates bounds on the distributions of buyer and seller valuations and then estimates where bargaining outcomes lie relative to the efficient frontier. Findings indicate that the dynamic mechanism attains 80-91% of the surplus which can be achieved on the efficient frontier.