Download or read book Multilateral Nash bargaining solutions written by Elaine Bennett and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Working Paper written by and published by . This book was released on 1979 with total page 88 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Non cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution written by Volker Britz. and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book On the Convergence to the Nash Bargaining Solution for Endogenous Bargaining Protocols written by Volker Britz and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Bargaining Theory with Applications written by Abhinay Muthoo and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1999-08-19 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Graduate textbook presenting abstract models of bargaining in a unified framework with detailed applications involving economic, political and social situations.

Download or read book Advances in Negotiation Theory written by Carlo Carraro and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2005 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determine the outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.

Download or read book Essays in Bargaining and Contracts written by Rakesh Chaturvedi and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Bargaining models of multilateral exchange have to contend with the possibility that a part of a proposed multilateral deal for a set of parties may still be a feasible and consensual deal for some of the parties. The first two chapters are based on embedding this possibility in two extensive form bargaining games for coalitional environments known in the literature. The third chapter explores in a simple credit relationship between a creditor and an entrepreneur with a sequential investment project, whether the strategy to commit not to refinance a project in the event of default of any value to the creditor. It is also concerned with the extent to which competition on the entrepreneurial side of the market and the informational environment may make such commitment sequentially rational. The final chapter studies an exchange environment with weak protection of property rights so that power is the basis of exchange. With property rights and income distribution constantly in flux, the question is whether the imperative to maintain stability can act as a constraint on classical allocative efficiency. In Chapter 1, a new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining mechanism studied in Okada (1996). This mechanism is used to analyze two classes of coalitional games with transferable utility. One class is that of strictly supermodular games; the other has the property that per capita value is increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement his proposal with any subset of responders who have accepted it. It is shown that for all sufficiently high discount factors, there exists an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strategies (SSPE) whose limiting outcome is the core-constrained Nash Bargaining Solution. For strictly supermodular games, Core constraints are binding on Nash Bargaining Solution while for the other class they are not. Also, all efficient SSPE are payoff-equivalent in the limit as the discount factor goes to 1.In Chapter 2, a new feature pertaining to proposer's ability to implement offers is introduced in the extensive form bargaining mechanism studied in Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray and Sengupta (1996). This mechanism is used to analyze two classes of coalitional games with transferable utility. One class is that of strictly supermodular games; the other has the property that per capita value is increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement his proposal with any subset of responders who have accepted it. It is shown that for all sufficiently high discount factors, there exists an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strategies (SSPE) whose limiting outcome is the core-constrained Nash Bargaining Solution. For strictly supermodular games, Core constraints are binding on Nash Bargaining Solution while for the other class they are not. In Chapter 3 which is coauthored with my advisor Kalyan Chatterjee, a simple contracting environment with a creditor who has wealth and a entrepreneur who has a two-period investment project is studied. After observing the partial completion of the project at the end of first period, the creditor may decide whether to refinance it or liquidate it. Contracting is subject to moral hazard and limited liability each period. The creditor prefers a contract that commits him not to refinance if and only if the extent of moral hazard problem is sufficiently high. Such a commitment may not be sequentially rational, however. The role of competition and hidden information in enforcing commitment is studied. When credit supply is scarce and the creditor lacks commitment, competition from other potential entrepreneurs may not be a credible deterrent against refinancing because of the wedge between the liquidation value of the output and its value as an input for second period. Sufficient conditions are developed under which hidden information makes commitment sequentially rational. In Chapter 4, an equilibrium existence theorem is established for a stochastic game model with discounted payoffs in which at each date every player has opportunities to redefine the prevailing state. A state in the model is a property rights allocation over an asset and a distribution of income from the asset among all the players. Property rights may be held by coalitions which may differ in terms of their power and their productivity with the asset. A transition from one state to another is feasible if the proposed owning coalition is at least as powerful as the current owning coalition and everyone in the proposed owning coalition consents to the change. State transitions in the stochastic game are endogenous because they are constrained by players' threat positions which are endogenous. A stylized example illustrates that when power is the basis of exchange, stability may be a constraint on classical allocative efficiency.

Download or read book The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling written by Kenneth George Binmore and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book On the Nash Bargaining Solution with Noise written by Werner Güth and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market written by Kalyan Chatterjee and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2013 with total page 229 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market OCo Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining consists of selected research in bargaining carried out by Kalyan Chatterjee by himself and with various co-authors. Chatterjee has been one of the earliest researchers to work on noncooperative bargaining theory and has contributed to bilateral bargaining with parties having private information as well as multilateral coalition formation models. Some of his work in each of these areas finds place here.The main theme of this collection of papers is the nature of negotiations when participants have alternatives to continue negotiating, either by beginning negotiations with a different partner or set of partners or by engaging in time-consuming search for such partners. Chapters in this book include: a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining and features a laboratory experiment relevant to this theory as well as an extension to political negotiations, search for alternative partners, the effect of markets and bargaining on incentives of players to invest in the partnership and related papers on incentive compatibility, arbitration and a dynamic model of negotiation. The book also includes a new introduction that puts these papers in the context of the broader literature in the field.

Download or read book Automated Multilateral Negotiation on Multiple Issues with Private Information written by Ronghuo Zheng and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we propose and analyze a distributed negotiation strategy for a multi-agent multi-attribute negotiation in which the agents have no information about the utility functions of other agents. We analytically prove that, if the zone of agreement is non-empty and the agents concede up to their reservation utilities, agents generating offers using our offer-generation strategy, namely the sequential projection strategy, will converge to an agreement acceptable to all the agents; the convergence property does not depend on the specific concession strategy. In considering agents' incentive to concede during the negotiation, we propose and analyze a reactive concession strategy. We demonstrate through computational experiments that our distributed negotiation strategy yields performance sufficiently close to the Nash bargaining solution, and that our algorithms are robust to potential deviation strategies. Methodologically, our paper advances the state of the art of alternating projection algorithms, in that we establish the convergence for the case of multiple, moving sets (as opposed to two, static sets in the current literature). Our paper introduces a new analytical foundation for a broad class of computational group decision and negotiation problems.

Download or read book Recursive Nash in Nash Bargaining Solution written by Xiaowei Yu and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The standard Nash-in-Nash solution is commonly applied in a number of policy applications. However, this bargaining framework does not capture renegotiation on off-equilibrium paths or contingent contracts and as a result in some situations the predictions of standard Nash-in-Nash are counter-intuitive. Thus, we propose a new bargaining solution for interdependent bilateral negotiations, which we call the recursive Nash-in-Nash bargaining solution. The main difference between this bargaining framework and the standard Nash-in-Nash is in the treatment of the disagreement point, which we assume is the bargaining payoffs given that all other negotiations happen with recognition of this disagreement rather than the equilibrium outcomes. We show that under some assumptions, the recursive Nash-in-Nash bargaining solution is the same as the Shapley value or the more general Myerson value for the corresponding cooperative game. This equivalence allows the recursive Nash-in-Nash solution to be calculated relatively easily for policy applications.

Download or read book Nash in Nash Bargaining written by Allan Collard-Wexler and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A "Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains" has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a non-cooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends the Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers model to multiple upstream and downstream firms. We provide conditions on firms' marginal contributions under which there exists, for sufficiently short time between offers, an equilibrium with agreement among all firms at prices arbitrarily close to "Nash-in-Nash prices"--i.e., each pair's Nash bargaining solution given agreement by all other pairs. Conditioning on equilibria without delayed agreement, limiting prices are unique. Unconditionally, they are unique under stronger assumptions.

Download or read book On the Nash Program for the Nash Bargaining Solution written by Walter Trockel and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Market Analysis written by Gilbert L. Skillman and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Do Norms Against Threats Have Real Effects written by Nejat Anbarci and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book On the interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution and its extension to non expected utility preferences written by Ariel Rubinstein and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: