Download or read book Moral Hazard and Non exclusive Contracts written by Alberto Bisin and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Competition and Incentives with Non Exclusive Contracts written by Dilip Mookherjee and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a model in which customers sequentially negotiate nonexclusive credit or insurance contracts from multiple risk-neutral firms in a market with free entry. Each contract is subject to moral hazard arising from a common noncontractible effort decision. Outcomes of a relevant class of stationary perfect equilibria are characterized by a suitable notion of constrained efficiency. These may involve more rationing than in a context of exclusive contracts. Increases in public provision or competition can result in increased prices on the private market, owing to an induced reduction in customer effort.
Download or read book Adverse Selection and Non exclusive Contracts written by Laurence Ales and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Linear Contracts and the Double Moral hazard written by Sonku Kim and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Download or read book Advantageous Selection with Moral Hazard with an Application to Life Care Annuities written by Philippe De Donder and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Advantageous (or propitious) selection occurs when an increase in the premium of an insurance contract induces high-cost agents to quit, thereby reducing the average cost among remaining buyers. Hemenway (1990) and many subsequent contributions motivate its advent by differences in risk-aversion among agents, implying different prevention efforts. We argue that it may also appear in the absence of moral hazard, when agents only differ in riskiness and not in (risk) preferences. We first show that profit-maximization implies that advantageous selection is more likely when markup rates and the elasticity of insurance demand are high. We then move to standard settings satisfying the single-crossing property and show that advantageous selection may occur when several contracts are offered, when agents also face a non-insurable background risk, or when agents face two mutually exclusive risks that are bundled together in a single insurance contract. We exemplify this last case with life care annuities, a product which bundles long-term care insurance and annuities, and we use Canadian survey data to provide an example of a contract facing advantageous selection.
Download or read book Moral Hazard and Limited Liability written by Rohan Pitchford and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics written by Mathias Dewatripont and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Advantageous Selection Without Moral Hazard written by Philippe De Donder and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Moral Hazard and Unenforcable Implicit Contracts written by Christopher J. Ellis and published by . This book was released on 1983 with total page 11 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Double sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts written by Sugato Bhattacharyya and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Handbook of Insurance written by Georges Dionne and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2013-12-02 with total page 1133 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
Download or read book Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts Under Limited Liability and Monotonicity written by Steven M. Matthews and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimality and Equilibrium In a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard written by Joseph E. Stiglitz and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes optimal and equilibrium insurance contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard, comparing them with those under a single informational asymmetry. The complex interactions of self-selection and moral hazard constraints have important consequences. We develop an analytic approach that allows a characterization of equilibrium and optimal (Pareto Optimal (PO), and Utilitarian optimal (UO)) allocations. Among the results : (i) a PO allocation may involve "shirking" (not only less care in accident avoidance than is possible, but less care compared to the case of pure moral hazard) either by high risk individuals in the case of single-crossing preference or by one or both types in the case of multi-crossing preference (as may naturally be the case under the double informational asymmetry); and (ii) while an equilibrium, which is unique (even under multi-crossing preferences) if it exists, is more likely to exist as the non-shirking constraint for low-risk type gets more stringent (i.e. when low risk individuals shirk with lower levels of insurance). We also show that a pooling equilibrium, which is not feasible under pure adverse selection, may exist when individuals differ in risk aversion (as well as in accident probability) or when the provision of insurance is non-exclusive (i.e. individuals can purchase insurance from more than one firm). Furthermore, while with pure adverse selection, UO always entails pooling with complete insurance (in the standard model), with adverse selection and moral hazard, all PO allocations may entail separation and the UO may entail incomplete insurance. We show further that, in general, any PO allocation can be implemented by a basic pooling insurance provided by the government and a supplemental separating contracts that can be offered by the market, although, in the presence of moral hazard, a tax needs to be imposed upon the market provision. The analysis suggests that two commonly obser.
Download or read book Double Moral Hazard Monitoring and the Nature of Contracts written by Pradeep Agrawal and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research written by Rafael Wittek and published by Stanford University Press. This book was released on 2013-06-05 with total page 625 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of Rational Choice Social Research offers the first comprehensive overview of how the rational choice paradigm can inform empirical research within the social sciences. This landmark collection highlights successful empirical applications across a broad array of disciplines, including sociology, political science, economics, history, and psychology. Taking on issues ranging from financial markets and terrorism to immigration, race relations, and emotions, and a huge variety of other phenomena, rational choice proves a useful tool for theory- driven social research. Each chapter uses a rational choice framework to elaborate on testable hypotheses and then apply this to empirical research, including experimental research, survey studies, ethnographies, and historical investigations. Useful to students and scholars across the social sciences, this handbook will reinvigorate discussions about the utility and versatility of the rational choice approach, its key assumptions, and tools.
Download or read book Renegotiating Moral Hazard Contracts Under Limited Liability and Monotonicity written by Steven A. Matthews and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
