Download or read book Moral Hazard Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures written by Patrick Bajari and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. We empirically study this question by using data from the Health and Retirement Study to estimate a structural model of the demand for health insurance and medical care. Using a two-step semi-parametric estimation strategy we find significant evidence of moral hazard, but not of adverse selection.

Download or read book Moral Hazard Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures written by Patrick Bajari and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Theoretical models predict asymmetric information in health insurance markets may generate inefficient outcomes due to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, previous empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle adverse selection from moral hazard in health care. We empirically study this question by a using unique data set with confidential information from a large self-insured employer to estimate a structural model of the demand for health insurance and medical care. We propose a two-step semi-parametric estimation strategy that builds on the work on identification and estimation of auction models. We find significant evidence of moral hazard and adverse selection.

Download or read book Moral Hazard in Health Insurance written by Amy Finkelstein and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2014-12-02 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

Download or read book Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance written by David Powell and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Moral hazard and adverse selection create inefficiencies in private health insurance markets. The authors use claims data from a large firm to study the independent roles of both moral hazard and adverse selection. Previous studies have attempted to estimate moral hazard in private health insurance by assuming that individuals respond only to the spot price, end-of-year price, average price, or a related metric. There is little economic justification for such assumptions and, in fact, economic intuition suggests that the nonlinear budget constraints generated by health insurance plans make these assumptions especially poor. They study the differential impact of the health insurance plans offered by the firm on the entire distribution of medical expenditures without parameterizing the plans by a specific metric. They use a new instrumental variable quantile estimation technique introduced in Powell (2013b) that provides the quantile treatment effects for each plan, while conditioning on a set of covariates for identification purposes. This technique allows us to map the resulting estimated medical expenditure distributions to the nonlinear budget sets generated by each plan. Their method also allows them to separate moral hazard from adverse selection and estimate their relative importance. They estimate that 77% of the additional medical spending observed in the most generous plan in their data relative to the least generous is due to adverse selection. The remainder can be attributed to moral hazard. A policy which resulted in each person enrolling in the least generous plan would cause the annual premium of that plan to rise by over $1,500.

Download or read book Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Private Health Insurance written by and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Moral hazard and adverse selection create inefficiencies in private health insurance markets and understanding the relative importance of each factor is critical for policy. We use claims data from a large firm to isolate moral hazard from plan selection. Previous studies have attempted to estimate moral hazard in private health insurance by assuming that individuals respond only to the spot price, end-of-year price, expected price, or a related metric. The nonlinear budget constraints generated by health insurance plans make these assumptions especially poor and we statistically reject their appropriateness. We study the differential impact of the health insurance plans offered by the firm on the entire distribution of medical expenditures without assuming that individuals only respond to a parameterized price. Our empirical strategy exploits the introduction of new plans during the sample period as a shock to plan generosity, and we account for sample attrition over time. We use an instrumental variable quantile estimation technique that provides quantile treatment effects for each plan, while conditioning on a set of covariates for identification purposes. This technique allows us to map the resulting estimated medical expenditure distributions to the nonlinear budget sets generated by each plan. We estimate that 53% of the additional medical spending observed in the most generous plan in our data relative to the least generous is due to moral hazard. The remainder can be attributed to adverse selection. A policy which resulted in each person enrolling in the least generous plan would cause the annual premium of that plan to rise by $1,000.

Download or read book Moral Hazzard Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures a Semiparametric Analysis written by Patrick L. Bajari and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Adverse Selection in Health Insurance written by David M. Cutler and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Individual choice over health insurance policies may result in risk-based sorting across plans. Such adverse selection induces three types of losses: efficiency losses from individuals being allocated to the wrong plans; risk sharing losses since premium variability is increased; and losses from insurers distorting their policies to improve their mix of insureds. We discuss the potential for these losses, and present empirical evidence on adverse selection in two groups of employees: Harvard University, and the Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts (serving state and local employees). In both groups, adverse selection is a significant concern. At Harvard, the University's decision to contribute an equal amount to all insurance plans led to the disappearance of the most generous policy within 3 years. At the GIC, adverse selection has been contained by subsidizing premiums on a proportional basis and managing the most generous policy very tightly. A combination of prospective or retrospective risk adjustment, coupled with reinsurance for high cost cases, seems promising as a way to provide appropriate incentives for enrollees and to reduce losses from adverse selection.

Download or read book Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Ex Ante Adverse Selection and Ex Post Moral Hazard written by William Jack and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Health Insurance in China and Germany written by Weihong Li and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Rising healthcare costs are putting pressure on many countries in the world. As an endogenous reason for the increasing health expenditures, adverse selection and moral hazard are intensively discussed. This paper uses a comparative method to investigate adverse selection and moral hazard in the Chinese and German health insurance systems. Focusing on the perspective of policyholders, this paper compares the key characteristics of the two systems and discusses instruments implemented in the two systems to tackle adverse selection and moral hazard. The conclusion is that both China and Germany have implemented effective enrollment policies to deal with adverse selection, but the two countries are taking different levels of measures to tackle moral hazard. The Chinese health insurance system is more effective in tackling moral hazard, but fails to provide vulnerable population with equal access to health resources. The German system, on the other hand, provides good access to essential healthcare, but suffers more from moral hazard.

Download or read book Prescription Drug Utilization written by Julie M. Ganther and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 622 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Measuring Adverse Selection in Managed Health Care written by Richard G. Frank and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Health plans paid by capitation have an incentive to distort the quality of services they offer to attract profitable and to deter unprofitable enrollees. We characterize plans' rationing as imposing a show that the profit maximizing shadow price depends on the dispersion in health costs, how well individuals forecast their health costs, the correlation between use in different illness categories, and the risk adjustment system used for payment. We further show how these factors can be combined in an empirically implementable index that can be used to identify the services that will be most distorted in competition among managed care plans. A simple welfare measure is developed to quantify the distortion caused by selection incentives. We illustrate the application of our ideas with a Medicaid data set, and conduct policy analyses of risk adjustment and other options for dealing with adverse selection.

Download or read book Health Risk Pooling for Small group Health Insurance written by White House Task Force on Health Risk Pooling (U.S.) and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Basic Versus Supplementary Health Insurance written by Jan Boone and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 19 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market. Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered by basic insurance.

Download or read book Moral Hazard Effects in Health Insurance written by Olesya Kazantseva and published by . This book was released on 2014-07-21 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 2014 in the subject Business economics - Economic Policy, grade: 1,3, University of Kassel, language: English, abstract: Within the discussion about the increasing expenditures in health insurance, the overutilization of medical care is often attributed to the existence of a moral hazard problem. Since moral hazard has a great impact on health insurance policies, there is a growing interest in the economic literature to identify and to measure its effects. Although the problem of overconsumption of medical care does not mean moral hazard per se, the determination of the latter may reduce its scope and help to mitigate the problem of overutilization. The main objective of this paper is an empirical evidence of the moral hazard phenomenon. By analysing the economic literature on moral hazard in health insurance this paper seeks for examples of its empirical evidence, whereby the emphasis lies on distinguishing between the demand-oriented (especially ex-post) and the supply-oriented (external) moral hazard.

Download or read book The Economics of Health and Health Care written by Sherman Folland and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2016-05-23 with total page 625 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For courses in Health Economics, U.S. Health Policy/Systems, or Public Health, taken by health services students or practitioners, the text makes economic concepts the backbone of its health care coverage. Folland, Goodman and Stano's book is the bestselling Health Care Economics text that teaches through core economic themes, rather than concepts unique to the health care economy. This edition contains revised and updated data tables, where applicable. The advent of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in 2010 has also led to changes in many chapters , most notably in the organization and focus of Chapter 16.

Download or read book Health Economics written by Frank A. Sloan and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2012-03-23 with total page 815 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A textbook that combines economic concepts with empirical evidence to explain in economic terms how health care institutions and markets function. This book introduces students to the growing research field of health economics. Rather than offer details about health systems around the world without providing a theoretical context, Health Economics combines economic concepts with empirical evidence to enhance readers' economic understanding of how health care institutions and markets function. It views the subject in both microeconomic and macroeconomic terms, moving from the individual and firm level to the market level to a macroeconomic view of the role of health and health care within the economy as a whole. The book includes discussion of recent empirical evidence on the U.S. health system and can be used for an undergraduate course on U.S. health economics. It also contains sufficient material for an undergraduate or masters course on global health economics, or for a course on health economics aimed at health professionals. It includes a chapter on nurses as well as a chapter on the economics of hospitals and pharmaceuticals, which can be used in master's courses for students in these fields. It supplements its analysis with readings (both classic and current), extensive references, links to Web sites on policy developments and public programs, review and discussion questions, and exercises. Downloadable supplementary material for instructors, including solutions to the exercise sets, sample syllabuses, and more than 600 slides that can be used for class presentations, is available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/health_economics. A student solutions manual with answers to the odd-numbered exercises is also available.

Download or read book Care Without Coverage written by Institute of Medicine and published by National Academies Press. This book was released on 2002-06-20 with total page 213 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Many Americans believe that people who lack health insurance somehow get the care they really need. Care Without Coverage examines the real consequences for adults who lack health insurance. The study presents findings in the areas of prevention and screening, cancer, chronic illness, hospital-based care, and general health status. The committee looked at the consequences of being uninsured for people suffering from cancer, diabetes, HIV infection and AIDS, heart and kidney disease, mental illness, traumatic injuries, and heart attacks. It focused on the roughly 30 million-one in seven-working-age Americans without health insurance. This group does not include the population over 65 that is covered by Medicare or the nearly 10 million children who are uninsured in this country. The main findings of the report are that working-age Americans without health insurance are more likely to receive too little medical care and receive it too late; be sicker and die sooner; and receive poorer care when they are in the hospital, even for acute situations like a motor vehicle crash.