Download or read book Mind sets and Missiles written by Kenneth Michael Absher and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 110 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This chronology provides details and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in strategic decisionmaking. The author describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure.

Download or read book Mindsets and Missiles written by Kenneth Michael Absher and published by . This book was released on 2009-09-10 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work, by a retired CIA officer, provides details and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in strategic decision making. It describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and memoirs written by CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversary's true plans and intentions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure. (Originally published by the Strategic Studies Institute)

Download or read book Mind sets and Missiles written by Kenneth Michael Absher and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 124 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This chronology provides details and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in strategic decisionmaking. The author describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure.

Download or read book Mind Sets and Missiles written by Kenneth Absher and published by . This book was released on 2009-09-30 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in strategic decisionmaking. The author was assigned to Sherman Kent's Office of National Estimates (ONE) after completing his Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Junior Officer Training Program in June 1962. He was one of two analysts for Latin America in Kent's ONE. He was a participant in the drafting of every National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Cuba and the Soviet military build-up from June 1962 to February 1963. This paper describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure. When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided secretly to place offensive missiles in Cuba, he clearly did not believe President John Kennedy would use military action to enforce U.S. policy warnings against such a deployment. Lacking hard intelligence to the contrary, the American Intelligence Community (IC) also issued a failed SNIE on September 19, 1962, stating Khrushchev would not place offensive missiles in Cuba. The Soviets had never before placed such missiles outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Warsaw Pact and the IC believed that Khrushchev certainly would not run the risk of a U.S. military response to such a provocation. Thanks to the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence and the President, the United States overcame a political mind set against scheduling U-2 flights directly over Cuba where they risked being shot down by Soviet surface-to-air missiles. Intelligence from an espionage agent was used by the historic U-2 flight to photograph the SS-4 medium range missiles being installed in western Cuba. An analysis of this and subsequent U-2 photography utilizing the operational manuals of the Soviet offensive missiles provided clandestinely enabled the IC to tell the President how much time he had prior to each missile site becoming operational. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev finally agreed to withdraw the missiles, bombers, and nuclear weapons after being convinced that the United States was preparing to launch a massive bombing and invasion of Cuba. The author concluded that such U.S. military operations were within 48-72 hours of being launched when Khrushchev publicly said the missiles would be withdrawn. There was a last minute understanding that Jupiter missiles would probably be withdrawn later from Turkey if Soviet missiles were first withdrawn from Cuba. But imminent U.S. military action was what convinced Khrushchev that the missiles had to be withdrawn.

Download or read book Mind sets and Missiles written by Kenneth Michael Absher and published by Pickle Partners Publishing. This book was released on 2018-02-27 with total page 85 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author, Mr. Kenneth Absher, contends that, when our national security is at stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations, including espionage, to penetrate our adversary’s deceptions. At the same time, the United States must also understand that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure. As both a student of and key participant in the events of the crisis, the author is able to provide in-depth analysis of the failures and successes of the national intelligence community and executive leadership during the build-up to the confrontation, and the risky but successful actions which led to its peaceful settlement. From his analysis, the author suggests considerations relevant to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence which have continuing application.

Download or read book Mind Sets and Missiles written by Department of Defense (DoD) and published by . This book was released on 2018-03-02 with total page 80 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This unique book provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It contends that, when our national security is at stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations, including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. At the same time, the United States must also understand that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure. As both a student of and key participant in the events of the crisis, the author is able to provide in-depth analysis of the failures and successes of the national intelligence community and executive leadership during the buildup to the confrontation, and the risky but successful actions which led to its peaceful settlement. From his analysis, the author suggests considerations relevant to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence which have continuing application. The author was assigned to Sherman Kent's Office of National Estimates (ONE) after completing his Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Junior Officer Training Program in June 1962. He was one of two analysts for Latin America in Kent's ONE. He was a participant in the drafting of every National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Cuba and the Soviet military build-up from June 1962 to February 1963. This paper describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure. When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided secretly to place offensive missiles in Cuba, he clearly did not believe President John Kennedy would use military action to enforce U.S. policy warnings against such a deployment. The Seeds of Crisis - 1961 * Soviet Deception * The Vienna Summit * Technical Collection Versus Espionage * Khrushchev Pushes the Envelope * Intelligence Used to War Khrushchev * Kennedy Launches Operation MONGOOSE * Khrushchev Decides to Put Missiles in Cuba * Khrushchev Explains His Decision * The Soviet Plan * Crisis Without Our Best Espionage Agent * Soviet Weapons and DCI Warnings * More Soviet Deception * Final Communication with Penkovsky * Additional Soviet Nuclear Weapons * Rapid Construction of Missile Sites * The DCI Honeymoon Cables * Aerial Reconnaissance and "The Photo Cap" * Opposition to U-2 Flights * The Failed Estimate * Sherman Kent Reflects * McCone Forces Approval of Overflights * The Deception Continues * Intelligence Not Disseminated * Missiles Discovered * Crisis Management * Soviet Deception and Presidential Warning * Estimates Lead to Policy Decisions * The President Decides to Blockade * Military Strike Reviewed * Briefing Ike, LBJ, and Allies * The President's Address and DEFCON 3 * DEFCON 2 * Initial Reaction * Official Soviet Reaction * The Darkest Day * The Final Warning * Aftermath * Missiles in Caves * The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board * Khrushchev Resigns * Lessons Learned

Download or read book Mind Sets and Missiles written by Kenneth Michael Absher and published by . This book was released on 2015-02-16 with total page 124 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.

Download or read book The Cuban Missile Crisis written by Roger Hilsman and published by Praeger. This book was released on 1996-03-20 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book shows how President Kennedy and his brother Robert used this information to bring about the withdrawal of the missiles without war.

Download or read book The Shattered Crystal Ball written by James G. Blight and published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. This book was released on 1990 with total page 230 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study of the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis provides a contribution to the field of international relations and nuclear psychology. The book contains a reassessment of the lessons learned from the crisis. A number of political theorists have indicated that historically, if world leaders had access to a crystal ball, they would have foreseen the dire consequences of their military actions and would have never taken the steps they did. In The Shattered Crystal Ball the author believes the Soviet, Cuban and US leaders were able to look, to see the future shatter and to step back from nuclear disaster.

Download or read book War and Human Nature written by Stephen Peter Rosen and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2007-02-25 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Why did President John F. Kennedy choose a strategy of confrontation during the Cuban missile crisis even though his secretary of defense stated that the presence of missiles in Cuba made no difference? Why did large numbers of Iraqi troops surrender during the Gulf War even though they had been ordered to fight and were capable of doing so? Why did Hitler declare war on the United States knowing full well the power of that country? War and Human Nature argues that new findings about the way humans are shaped by their inherited biology may help provide answers to such questions. This seminal work by former Defense Department official Stephen Peter Rosen contends that human evolutionary history has affected the way we process the information we use to make decisions. The result is that human choices and calculations may be very different from those predicted by standard models of rational behavior. This notion is particularly true in the area of war and peace, Rosen contends. Human emotional arousal affects how people learn the lessons of history. For example, stress and distress influence people's views of the future, and testosterone levels play a role in human social conflict. This thought-provoking and timely work explores the mind that has emerged from the biological sciences over the last generation. In doing so, it helps shed new light on many persistent puzzles in the study of war.

Download or read book The Cuban Missile Crisis written by Len Scott and published by Pen and Sword History. This book was released on 2023-11-23 with total page 249 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is sixty years since the events of October 1962 brought the world close to nuclear catastrophe. The Cuban missile crisis has long been recognized as the moment of greatest danger in the life (and near death) of humanity. In those sixty years, our knowledge and understanding of events have undergone significant change. There are some reasons to be encouraged, inasmuch as we have learned how both President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev sought to avoid nuclear war. More ominously, we have learned of incidents and events that suggest nuclear weapons might have been used by subordinate military commanders, in circumstances frequently unknown to their political leaders. Decisions whether to use nuclear weapons lay in the hands of often junior military commanders, some of whom were perilously close to crossing the nuclear threshold. This does not mean – as often assumed – that if some nuclear weapons were used, escalation to all-out war was inevitable. Yet the undoubted risk of thermonuclear war in these circumstances threatened the very survival of civilization. Hundreds, if not thousands, of millions of people would have died from immediate and short-term effects, while the longer-term prospect of a ‘Nuclear Winter’ portended the virtual extinction of humanity. Drawing lessons from sixty years ago faces significant challenges. If we draw lessons only to discover our understanding was mistaken, we might well have drawn the wrong lessons. Many received wisdoms about the crisis have been shown to be misleading. What is striking is how after forty or fifty or even sixty years, new evidence has emerged to challenge previously accepted explanations. It is for the reader to reach their own verdicts on the history of the crisis, and how much we owe to political leaders who averted catastrophe (as well as how their words and deeds helped create the crisis in the first place). It is for the reader to conclude how close we came to nuclear war. Whatever conclusions are reached, one overriding lesson looms large. However we judge the actions of political and military leaders, one factor was crucial in why we avoided nuclear war in 1962. It was luck. In October 1962, humanity was very lucky. Will we be so lucky next time?

Download or read book The Soviets Greatest Gambit written by Alan J. Levine and published by Rowman & Littlefield. This book was released on 2021-08-19 with total page 255 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Adam J. Levine analyzes the origins of the Cuban Missile Crisis, with a particular focus on Nikita Khrushchev’s motives and the response of the Kennedy administration. Levine’s account presents a different portrayal of the events than popularly told, shedding light on John F. Kennedy’s decision-making practices and personal behavior while out of public eye.

Download or read book The Cuban Missile Crisis written by Regis D. Heitchue and published by Dorrance Publishing. This book was released on 2022-08-08 with total page 260 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Cuban Missile Crisis: When Intelligence Made a Difference By: Regis D. Heitchue The Cuban Missile Crisis—the most dangerous event of the Cold War— has been chronicled in countless books and several movies that speak primarily to the political and diplomatic aspects, with only marginal reference to activities of U.S. intelligence before and during the crisis. Nothing in the historical record portrays the scope of those efforts which were critical to President Kennedy as he sought to resolve the crisis in a peaceful manner and on terms favorable to the U.S.. Recognizing the absence of the intelligence chapter in the historical record of the crisis, the author undertook to document that story in The Cuban Missile Crisis: When Intelligence Made a Difference. The author’s account is a unique story of what American intelligence knew, when it knew it, and how it knew what the Soviets were doing in Cuba prior to and during the crisis—and what we now know, 60 years later, quite accurately, what the Soviets were actually doing in Cuba. In that way this book is a valuable addition to the history of the crisis. There are intriguing aspects of the Cuban Missile Crisis that scholars still debate: Why did Khrushchev take the enormous gamble that he did? Did the mysterious backchannel between the Washington KGB chief and an ABC newsman help to resolve the standoff between Moscow and Washington? The author sheds light on these and other mysteries of the Cuban Missile Crisis. There are striking parallels between the Russian war in Ukraine and the Soviet misadventure in Cuba: In both, the Soviets and the Russians lied and deceived to conceal their true intentions, and in both, Soviet and Russian leaders badly miscalculated.

Download or read book Gambling with Armageddon written by Martin J. Sherwin and published by Vintage. This book was released on 2022-02-22 with total page 641 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: From the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of American Prometheus comes the first effort to set the Cuban Missile Crisis, with its potential for nuclear holocaust, in a wider historical narrative of the Cold War—how such a crisis arose and why, at the very last possible moment, it never happened. “Fresh and thrilling.... A fascinating work of history that is very relevant to today’s politics.” —Walter Isaacson, bestselling author of The Code Breaker Pulitzer Prize-winning author Martin J. Sherwin introduces a dramatic new view of how luck and leadership avoided a nuclear holocaust during the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Set within the sweep of the Cold War and its nuclear history, every chapter of this gripping narrative of the origins and resolution of history’s most dangerous thirteen days offers lessons and a warning for our time. Gambling with Armageddon presents a riveting, page turning account of the crisis as well as an original exploration of the evolving place of nuclear weapons in the Post-World War II world.

Download or read book High Noon in the Cold War written by Max Frankel and published by Presidio Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 234 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis analyzes the roles, objectives, and actions of John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev during the October 1962 showdown between the U.S. and Soviet Union.

Download or read book Britain NATO and Nuclear Weapons written by Ken Booth and published by Springer. This book was released on 1989-01-13 with total page 383 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An examination of nuclear arms control and defence containing papers that present opposing sides of the debate. Nuclear deterrence, Britain's defence budget, the state of Anglo-American relations, NATO strategies and Mr Gorbachev's security arrangements in Europe proposals are discussed.

Download or read book The Fundamentalist Mindset written by Charles B. Strozier and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2010-04-19 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This penetrating book sheds light on the psychology of fundamentalism, with a particular focus on those who become extremists and fanatics. What accounts for the violence that emerges among some fundamentalist groups? The contributors to this book identify several factors: a radical dualism, in which all aspects of life are bluntly categorized as either good or evil; a destructive inclination to interpret authoritative texts, laws, and teachings in the most literal of terms; an extreme and totalized conversion experience; paranoid thinking; and an apocalyptic world view. After examining each of these concepts in detail, and showing the ways in which they lead to violence among widely disparate groups, these engrossing essays explore such areas as fundamentalism in the American experience and among jihadists, and they illuminate aspects of the same psychology that contributed to such historical crises as the French Revolution, the Nazi movement, and post-Partition Hindu religious practice.