Download or read book Mind sets and Missiles written by Kenneth Michael Absher and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 110 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This chronology provides details and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in strategic decisionmaking. The author describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure.
Download or read book Mind sets and Missiles written by Kenneth Michael Absher and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 124 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This chronology provides details and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in strategic decisionmaking. The author describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure.
Download or read book Mindsets and Missiles written by Kenneth Michael Absher and published by . This book was released on 2009-09-10 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work, by a retired CIA officer, provides details and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in strategic decision making. It describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and memoirs written by CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversary's true plans and intentions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure. (Originally published by the Strategic Studies Institute)
Download or read book Mind Sets and Missiles written by Kenneth Absher and published by . This book was released on 2009-09-30 with total page 122 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and suggests the applicability of lessons learned to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence in strategic decisionmaking. The author was assigned to Sherman Kent's Office of National Estimates (ONE) after completing his Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Junior Officer Training Program in June 1962. He was one of two analysts for Latin America in Kent's ONE. He was a participant in the drafting of every National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Cuba and the Soviet military build-up from June 1962 to February 1963. This paper describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure. When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided secretly to place offensive missiles in Cuba, he clearly did not believe President John Kennedy would use military action to enforce U.S. policy warnings against such a deployment. Lacking hard intelligence to the contrary, the American Intelligence Community (IC) also issued a failed SNIE on September 19, 1962, stating Khrushchev would not place offensive missiles in Cuba. The Soviets had never before placed such missiles outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Warsaw Pact and the IC believed that Khrushchev certainly would not run the risk of a U.S. military response to such a provocation. Thanks to the leadership of the Director of Central Intelligence and the President, the United States overcame a political mind set against scheduling U-2 flights directly over Cuba where they risked being shot down by Soviet surface-to-air missiles. Intelligence from an espionage agent was used by the historic U-2 flight to photograph the SS-4 medium range missiles being installed in western Cuba. An analysis of this and subsequent U-2 photography utilizing the operational manuals of the Soviet offensive missiles provided clandestinely enabled the IC to tell the President how much time he had prior to each missile site becoming operational. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev finally agreed to withdraw the missiles, bombers, and nuclear weapons after being convinced that the United States was preparing to launch a massive bombing and invasion of Cuba. The author concluded that such U.S. military operations were within 48-72 hours of being launched when Khrushchev publicly said the missiles would be withdrawn. There was a last minute understanding that Jupiter missiles would probably be withdrawn later from Turkey if Soviet missiles were first withdrawn from Cuba. But imminent U.S. military action was what convinced Khrushchev that the missiles had to be withdrawn.
Download or read book Mind sets and Missiles written by Kenneth Michael Absher and published by Pickle Partners Publishing. This book was released on 2018-02-27 with total page 85 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Letort Paper provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The author, Mr. Kenneth Absher, contends that, when our national security is at stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations, including espionage, to penetrate our adversary’s deceptions. At the same time, the United States must also understand that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure. As both a student of and key participant in the events of the crisis, the author is able to provide in-depth analysis of the failures and successes of the national intelligence community and executive leadership during the build-up to the confrontation, and the risky but successful actions which led to its peaceful settlement. From his analysis, the author suggests considerations relevant to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence which have continuing application.
Download or read book Mind Sets and Missiles written by Department of Defense (DoD) and published by . This book was released on 2018-03-02 with total page 80 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This unique book provides a detailed chronology and analysis of the intelligence failures and successes of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It contends that, when our national security is at stake, the United States should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations, including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. At the same time, the United States must also understand that our adversary may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or may not allow its own agenda to be influenced by U.S. diplomatic pressure. As both a student of and key participant in the events of the crisis, the author is able to provide in-depth analysis of the failures and successes of the national intelligence community and executive leadership during the buildup to the confrontation, and the risky but successful actions which led to its peaceful settlement. From his analysis, the author suggests considerations relevant to the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence which have continuing application. The author was assigned to Sherman Kent's Office of National Estimates (ONE) after completing his Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Junior Officer Training Program in June 1962. He was one of two analysts for Latin America in Kent's ONE. He was a participant in the drafting of every National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Cuba and the Soviet military build-up from June 1962 to February 1963. This paper describes how the crisis unfolded using the author's personal recollection, declassified documents, and many memoirs written by senior CIA officers and others who were participants. Lessons learned include the need to avoid having our political, analytical and intelligence collection mind-sets prevent us from acquiring and accurately analyzing intelligence about our adversaries true plans and intentions. When our national security is at stake, we should not hesitate to undertake risky intelligence collection operations including espionage, to penetrate our adversary's deceptions. We must also understand that our adversaries may not believe the gravity of our policy warnings or allow their own agendas to be influenced by diplomatic pressure. When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided secretly to place offensive missiles in Cuba, he clearly did not believe President John Kennedy would use military action to enforce U.S. policy warnings against such a deployment. The Seeds of Crisis - 1961 * Soviet Deception * The Vienna Summit * Technical Collection Versus Espionage * Khrushchev Pushes the Envelope * Intelligence Used to War Khrushchev * Kennedy Launches Operation MONGOOSE * Khrushchev Decides to Put Missiles in Cuba * Khrushchev Explains His Decision * The Soviet Plan * Crisis Without Our Best Espionage Agent * Soviet Weapons and DCI Warnings * More Soviet Deception * Final Communication with Penkovsky * Additional Soviet Nuclear Weapons * Rapid Construction of Missile Sites * The DCI Honeymoon Cables * Aerial Reconnaissance and "The Photo Cap" * Opposition to U-2 Flights * The Failed Estimate * Sherman Kent Reflects * McCone Forces Approval of Overflights * The Deception Continues * Intelligence Not Disseminated * Missiles Discovered * Crisis Management * Soviet Deception and Presidential Warning * Estimates Lead to Policy Decisions * The President Decides to Blockade * Military Strike Reviewed * Briefing Ike, LBJ, and Allies * The President's Address and DEFCON 3 * DEFCON 2 * Initial Reaction * Official Soviet Reaction * The Darkest Day * The Final Warning * Aftermath * Missiles in Caves * The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board * Khrushchev Resigns * Lessons Learned
Download or read book Mind Sets and Missiles written by Kenneth Michael Absher and published by . This book was released on 2015-02-16 with total page 124 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Download or read book The Uncertain Course written by Carl G. Jacobsen and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 1987 with total page 400 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive analysis of the strategic, military, and technological forces changing the nature and likelihood of war, this book confronts the dangers that exist in a world with 21st-century weapons and 19th-century ways of thought.
Download or read book The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis written by Sergo Anastasovich Mikoi︠a︡n and published by Cold War International History. This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: 300 pages of documents include: telegrams, memoranda of conversations, instructions to diplomats, etc.
Download or read book Army of None Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War written by Paul Scharre and published by W. W. Norton & Company. This book was released on 2018-04-24 with total page 384 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "The book I had been waiting for. I can't recommend it highly enough." —Bill Gates The era of autonomous weapons has arrived. Today around the globe, at least thirty nations have weapons that can search for and destroy enemy targets all on their own. Paul Scharre, a leading expert in next-generation warfare, describes these and other high tech weapons systems—from Israel’s Harpy drone to the American submarine-hunting robot ship Sea Hunter—and examines the legal and ethical issues surrounding their use. “A smart primer to what’s to come in warfare” (Bruce Schneier), Army of None engages military history, global policy, and cutting-edge science to explore the implications of giving weapons the freedom to make life and death decisions. A former soldier himself, Scharre argues that we must embrace technology where it can make war more precise and humane, but when the choice is life or death, there is no replacement for the human heart.
Download or read book Studies in Intelligence written by and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 840 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity written by Avner Cohen and published by Rowman & Littlefield. This book was released on 1986 with total page 514 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The excellent quality and depth of the various essays make [the book] an invaluable resource....It is likely to become essential reading in its field.--CHOICE
Download or read book Reflections on a Ravaged Century written by Robert Conquest and published by W. W. Norton & Company. This book was released on 2001 with total page 340 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A look at the twentieth century examines the factors and events that have sent millions to their deaths, discussing the philosophies that have caused so much conflict, as well as what the future may hold for the human race.
Download or read book Nothing Is Beyond Our Reach written by Kristie Macrakis and published by Georgetown University Press. This book was released on 2023-04-03 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An eye-opening account of the perils of America’s techno-spy empire Ever since the earliest days of the Cold War, American intelligence agencies have launched spies in the sky, implanted spies in the ether, burrowed spies underground, sunk spies in the ocean, and even tried to control spies’ minds by chemical means. But these weren’t human spies. Instead, the United States expanded its reach around the globe through techno-spies. Nothing Is Beyond Our Reach investigates how America’s technophiles inadvertently created a global espionage empire: one based on technology, not land. Author Kristie Macrakis shows how in the process of staking out the globe through technology, US intelligence created the ability to collect a massive amount of data. But did it help? Featuring the sites visited during her research and stories of the people who created the techno-spy empire, Macrakis guides the reader from its conception in the 1950s to its global reach in the Cold War and Global War on Terror. In an age of ubiquitous technology, Nothing Is Beyond Our Reach exposes the perils of relying too much on technology while demonstrating how the US carried on the tradition of British imperial espionage. Readers interested in the history of espionage and technology as well as those who work in the intelligence field will find the revelations and insights in Nothing Is Beyond Our Reach fascinating and compelling.
Download or read book Et Presence the Role of the Usa and New World Visions written by Renato Longato and published by BalboaPress. This book was released on 2012-03-27 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Other countries have openly announced and welcomed the ET presence. When will America own up to the truth? Or will it be forced under exceptional circumstances to begin a communication with our cosmic counterparts? The author provides insights and historical references concerning the potential cultural impact of the extraterrestrial presence in this millennium with the USA as the leading country in the epicenter of economic, social and geopolitical changes. An official contact with an advanced society may bring opportunity or risk depending on how we face the challenges on our planet and most importantly within ourselves. This book summarizes more than thirty years of study and research about UFOs and looks at the forthcoming possibilities.
Download or read book Privileged and Confidential written by Kenneth Michael Absher and published by University Press of Kentucky. This book was released on 2012-08-16 with total page 525 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the first and only study of the PIAB. As foreign policy veterans, the authors trace the board's history from Eisenhower through Obama and evaluate its effectiveness under each president. Created to be an independent panel of nonpartisan experts, the PIAB has become increasingly susceptible to politics in recent years and has lost some of its influence. The authors clearly demonstrate the board's potential to offer a unique and valuable perspective on intelligence issues and not only illuminates a little-known element of U.S. intelligence operations but also offers suggestions for enhancing a critical executive function.
Download or read book Blind over Cuba written by David M. Barrett and published by Texas A&M University Press. This book was released on 2012-09-01 with total page 226 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, questions persisted about how the potential cataclysm had been allowed to develop. A subsequent congressional investigation focused on what came to be known as the “photo gap”: five weeks during which intelligence-gathering flights over Cuba had been attenuated. In Blind over Cuba, David M. Barrett and Max Holland challenge the popular perception of the Kennedy administration’s handling of the Soviet Union’s surreptitious deployment of missiles in the Western Hemisphere. Rather than epitomizing it as a masterpiece of crisis management by policy makers and the administration, Barrett and Holland make the case that the affair was, in fact, a close call stemming directly from decisions made in a climate of deep distrust between key administration officials and the intelligence community. Because of White House and State Department fears of “another U-2 incident” (the infamous 1960 Soviet downing of an American U-2 spy plane), the CIA was not permitted to send surveillance aircraft on prolonged flights over Cuban airspace for many weeks, from late August through early October. Events proved that this was precisely the time when the Soviets were secretly deploying missiles in Cuba. When Director of Central Intelligence John McCone forcefully pointed out that this decision had led to a dangerous void in intelligence collection, the president authorized one U-2 flight directly over western Cuba—thereby averting disaster, as the surveillance detected the Soviet missiles shortly before they became operational. The Kennedy administration recognized that their failure to gather intelligence was politically explosive, and their subsequent efforts to influence the perception of events form the focus for this study. Using recently declassified documents, secondary materials, and interviews with several key participants, Barrett and Holland weave a story of intra-agency conflict, suspicion, and discord that undermined intelligence-gathering, adversely affected internal postmortems conducted after the crisis peaked, and resulted in keeping Congress and the public in the dark about what really happened. Fifty years after the crisis that brought the superpowers to the brink, Blind over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis offers a new chapter in our understanding of that pivotal event, the tensions inside the US government during the cold war, and the obstacles Congress faces when conducting an investigation of the executive branch.
