Download or read book Essays on Matching Markets with Correlated Preferences written by Onur Burak Celik and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Matching Markets with Correlated Preferences written by Onur Celik and published by LAP Lambert Academic Publishing. This book was released on 2010-04 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The objective of this dissertation is to explore, via simulations, the effect of correlation in the preference lists on the aggregate satisfaction of the participants in the marriage matching model and the roommates problem. In the first chapter, a general methodology is presented to introduce correlation in the preference lists that can be used in any kind of matching market. The second chapter focuses on the simplest two-sided and one-to-one matching market, that is, a marriage matching model, using the men-propose Gale and Shapley algorithm. The third chapter focuses on a one-sided matching market, namely the roommates problem, using the extended version of the Gale and Shapley algorithm. For each of the matching markets in question, a measure to quantify the level of the correlation is also provided which enables us to sort the preference profiles according to their correlation levels and makes it possible to do statistical analysis.Results show that the correlation is an important factor that affects the aggregate satisfaction levels of the participants.
Download or read book Mechanisms Preferences and Heterogeneity in Matching Markets written by Nadja Stroh-Maraun and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets written by Peter Coles and published by . This book was released on with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets written by James W. Boudreau and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Models of Matching Markets written by Sangram Vilasrao Kadam and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The structure, length, and characteristics of matching markets affect the outcomes for their participants. This dissertation attempts to fill the lacuna in our understanding about matching markets on three dimensions through three essays. The first essay highlights the role of constraints at the interviewing stage of matching markets where participants have to make choices even before they discover their own preferences entirely. Two results stand out from this setting. When preferences are ex-ante aligned, relaxing the interviewing constraints for one side of the market improves the welfare for everyone on the other side. Moreover, such interventions can lead to a decrease in the number of matched agents. The second essay elucidates the importance of rematching opportunities when relationships last over multiple periods. It identifies sufficient conditions for existence of a stable matching which accommodates the form of preferences we expect to see in multi-period environments. Preferences with inter-temporal complementarities, desire for variety and a status-quo bias are included in this setting. The third essay furthers our understanding while connecting two of the sufficient conditions in a specialized matching with contracts setting. It provides a novel linkage by providing a constructive way of arriving at a preference condition starting from another and thus proving that the later implies the former.
Download or read book Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets written by Timm Opitz and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Agents with reciprocal preferences prefer to be matched to a partner who also likes to collaborate with them. In this paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for mechanism design. Formally, the preferences of an agent can depend on the preferences of potential partners and there is incomplete information about thepartners' preferences. We find that there is no stable mechanism in standard two-sided markets. Observing the final allocation of the mechanism enables agents to learn about each other's preferences, leading to instability. However, in a school choice setting with one side of the market being non-strategic, modified versions of the deferred acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and their implications for efficient information and mechanism design.
Download or read book Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets written by Yeon-Koo Che and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently written by Itai Ashlagi and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study how to reduce congestion in two-sided matching markets with private preferences. We measure congestion by the number of bits of information that agents must (i) learn about their own preferences, and (ii) communicate with others before obtaining their final match. Previous results by Segal (2007) and Gonczarowski et al. (2015) suggest that a high level of congestion is inevitable under arbitrary preferences before the market can clear with a stable matching. We show that when the unobservable component of agent preferences satisfies certain natural assumptions, it is possible to recommend potential matches and encourage informative signals such that the market reaches a stable matching with a low level of congestion. This is desirable because the communication overhead is minimized while agents have negligible incentives to leave the marketplace or to look beyond the set of recommended partners. The main idea is to only recommend partners with whom the agent has a non-negligible chance of both liking and being liked by. The recommendations are based both on the observable component of preferences, and on the signals sent by agents on the other side that indicate interest.
Download or read book Market Structure and Dynamics written by Qingyun Wu (Researcher in game theory and market design) and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis consists of three self-contained essays that investigate the algebraic structure of matching markets and the stabilization dynamics in decentralized markets. Chapter 2 is based on Wu and Roth (2018). It studies envy-free matchings that naturally arise from workers retiring or companies expanding. We show that the set of envy-free matchings forms a lattice that has a Conway-like join, but not a Conway-like meet. Furthermore, a job hopping process in which companies make offers to their favorite blocking workers, and workers accept their favorite offers, producing a sequence of vacancy chains, is a Tarski operator on this lattice. The fixed points of this Tarski operator correspond to the set of stable matchings; and the steady state matching starting from any given initial state is derived analytically. Chapter 3 is based on Wu (2020). The goal of this chapter, is to provide a systematic approach for analyzing entering classes in the college admissions model. When dealing with a many-to-one matching model, we often convert it into a one-to-one matching problem by assigning each seat of a college to a single student, instead of matching each college to multiple students. The preferences in this new model are significantly correlated and severely restrict the possible changes to entering classes. Through the so-called "rotations" that correspond to the join-irreducible elements in the lattice of stable matchings, we present a unified treatment for several results on entering classes, including the famous "Rural Hospital Theorem". We also show that, the least preferred student in an entering class appears to play a very interesting role. For example, each entering class can be completely characterized by its worst student. Chapter 4 is based on Gu, Roth, and Wu (2020). The motivating question is that, how come some black markets, such as the market for hitmen are well-regulated, but many others like the market for drugs are far from being under our control, even though we try very hard to eliminate them. To understand this, we build a three-dimensional discrete time Markov chain to study how black markets evolve over time, focusing on social repugnance and search frictions. We borrow tools from Markov jump processes, random walks, exponential martingales and optional sampling theory to analyze both the steady state limit and the realizations along the way. In the first part of the chapter, we identify conditions that lead to market survival or extinction. And the second part studies speed of convergence. We show that if a market is going to die eventually, then it dies exponentially fast. This further implies if a market has survived for a long time, then it is likely to survive forever.
Download or read book Essays on the Analysis and Implications of Two sided Matching Markets written by James W. Boudreau and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Two Sided Matching written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-06-26 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann
Download or read book Fundamentals of Computation Theory written by Evripidis Bampis and published by Springer. This book was released on 2021-09-12 with total page 476 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the proceedings of the 23rd International Symposium on Fundamentals of Computation Theory, FCT 2021, held in Athens, Greece, in September 2021. The 30 full papers included in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 94 submissions. In addition, the book contains 2 invited talks. The papers cover topics of all aspects of theoretical computer science, in particular algorithms, complexity, formal and logical methods.
Download or read book An Experimental Study on Strategic Preference Formation in Two sided Matching Markets written by Natsumi Shimada and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study an experiment of the students-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) in matching markets where firms are matched with students. We investigated the two different situations: (i) Students know firms' preferences and firms submit their true preference, (ii) Students know firms' preferences and firms submit a higher ranking to students who give them higher ranking. This experiment confirms that the matching results under DA in uence students' preference formation, which decreases the degree of stability. If firms do not submit their true preferences, students also do not submit their true preferences. As a result, the situation induces instability. Moreover, we find the new pattern of submitted preferences - compromise strategy. If there is an extreme option, students will tend to prefer the in-between option.
Download or read book Unravelling in Two Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences written by Hanna Halaburda and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism that the literature focuses on), unravelling is more likely to occur when participants have more similar preferences. It also shows that any Pareto-optimal mechanism must prevent unravelling, and that the ex-post stable mechanism is Pareto-optimal if and only if it prevents unravelling.
Download or read book Identification and Estimation in Two Sided Matching Markets written by Nikhil Agarwal and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study estimation and non-parametric identification of preferences in two-sided matching markets using data from a single market with many agents. We consider a model in which preferences of each side of the market are vertical, utility is non-transferable and the observed matches are pairwise stable. We show that preferences are not identified with data on one-to-one matches but are non-parametrically identified when data from many-to-one matches are observed. The additional empirical content in many-to-one matches is illustrated by comparing two simulated objective functions, one that does and the other that does not use information available in many-to-one matching. We also prove consistency of a method of moments estimator for a parametric model under a data generating process in which the size of the matching market increases, but data only on one market is observed. Since matches in a single market are interdependent, our proof of consistency cannot rely on observations of independent matches. Finally, we present Monte Carlo studies of a simulation based estimator.
Download or read book Fundamentals of Computation Theory written by Evripidis Bampis and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-09-11 with total page 476 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the proceedings of the 23rd International Symposium on Fundamentals of Computation Theory, FCT 2021, held in Athens, Greece, in September 2021. The 30 full papers included in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 94 submissions. In addition, the book contains 2 invited talks. The papers cover topics of all aspects of theoretical computer science, in particular algorithms, complexity, formal and logical methods.
