Download or read book Market Competition and Effectiveness of Performance Pay written by Pooyan Khashabi and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is well-established that the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (PfP) schemes depends on employee- and organization-specific factors. However, less is known about the role of external forces. Investigating the role of market competition on the effectiveness of PfP, we theorize that there are two counteracting effects - business stealing and competitor response - that jointly generate an inverted U-shape relationship between PfP effectiveness and competition. Weak competition discourages effort response to PfP because there is little extra market to gain, while strong competition creates low incentives because competitors are more likely to respond. PfP hence has the strongest effect under moderate competition. Field data from a bakery chain and its competitive environment confirm our theory, allow us to empirically separate the business stealing and competitor response effects, and refute alternative explanations.

Download or read book Market Competition and the Effectiveness of Performance Pay written by Pooyan Khashabi and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Heterogeneous Effects of Performance Pay with Market Competition written by Pooyan Khashabi and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 39 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: It is well established that the effectiveness of pay-for-performance (PfP) schemes depends on employee- and firm-specific factors. Much less is known about the role of factors outside the firm. We investigate the role of market competition on the effectiveness of PfP. Our theory posits that there are two counteracting effects, a business stealing and a competitor response effect, that jointly generate an inverted U-shape relationship between PfP effectiveness and competition. Weak competition creates low incentives to exert effort because there is little extra market to gain, while strong competition creates low incentives as competitors respond more. PfP hence has the strongest effect for moderate competition. We test this prediction with a field experiment on a retail chain which confirms our theory and refutes alternative explanations.

Download or read book The Effect of Supplier Industry Competition on Pay for Performance Incentive Intensity written by Mary Ellen Carter and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine how competition in supplier industries affects CEO incentive intensity in procuring firms. Using the Input-Output Accounts Data (IO Data) published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), we compute a weighted supplier industry competition measure. We then predict and find that higher supplier competition is associated with stronger CEO pay-for-performance incentive intensity. This effect is incremental to the effect of competition in the firm's own industry documented in prior research and is robust to using alternative measures of supplier competition. Importantly, we show that performance risk and product margin act as mediating variables in the relation between supplier competition and CEO incentive intensity providing support for the theory underpinning our finding. This study shows that firms use CEO compensation contracts as a mechanism to exploit the market dynamics of upstream industries to their own benefit.

Download or read book Pay for Results written by Mercer, LLC and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2009-03-17 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The numerous incentive approaches and combinations and their implications can be dizzying even to the compensation professional. Pay for Results provides a road map for developing and implementing executive incentives that drive business needs and strategy. It is filled with specific analytic tools, including tables, exhibits, forms, checklists. In addition, it uncovers myths in performance measurement strategy and design. Timely and thorough, this book expertly shows businesses how to drive their specific needs and strategy. Human resources and compensation officers will discover how to apply performance metrics that align with shareholder investment.

Download or read book The Effect of Product market Competition on Managerial Incentives and Managerial Pay in Compensation Contracts written by Christo Suresh Karunananthan and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The New Pay written by Jay R. Schuster and published by Jossey-Bass. This book was released on 1992 with total page 390 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Based on an insightful study of the methods employed by the most successful Fortune 100 companies, this pioneering book offers innovative strategies for creating employee compensation packages that any company can use to increase its competitiveness and achieve superior performance. Line drawings.

Download or read book What is the Impact of Increased Business Competition written by Sónia Félix and published by International Monetary Fund. This book was released on 2019-12-13 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the macroeconomic effect and underlying firm-level transmission channels of a reduction in business entry costs. We provide novel evidence on the response of firms' entry, exit, and employment decisions. To do so, we use as a natural experiment a reform in Portugal that reduced entry time and costs. Using the staggered implementation of the policy across the Portuguese municipalities, we find that the reform increased local entry and employment by, respectively, 25% and 4.8% per year in its first four years of implementation. Moreover, around 60% of the increase in employment came from incumbent firms expanding their size, with most of the rise occurring among the most productive firms. Standard models of firm dynamics, which assume a constant elasticity of substitution, are inconsistent with the expansionary and heterogeneous response across incumbent firms. We show that in a model with heterogeneous firms and variable markups the most productive firms face a lower demand elasticity and expand their employment in response to increased entry.

Download or read book Market Performance and Competition in the Petroleum Industry written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and published by . This book was released on 1974 with total page 488 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Product Market Competition and Top Management Compensation written by Simi Kedia and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the effect of competition in the product markets on the design of a firm's governance structure. In oligopolies, profits are not just a function of a firm's own actions but also of the actions taken by rivals. Firms therefore behave strategically and commit to actions which elicit the most favorable responses from rivals. It is shown both theoretically and empirically that firms strategically use incentive features of compensation contracts toalter behavior in product markets. When a firm's output market decisions are strategic substitutes (i.e., marginal profits decrease with an increase in the rival's actions) managerial incentives are decreased, while if these decisions are strategic complements (i.e., marginal profits increase with an increase in the rival's actions) managerial incentives are increased. I develop an empirical measure which captures the sensitivity of a firm's marginal profits to changes in its rival's actions. An examination of CEO incentives in the data shows that when decisions are strategic substitutes, CEOs get awarded stock options with lower pay-for-performance incentives, own a smaller percentage of the firm and have a smaller threat of dismissal following bad performance of the firm. On the other hand, when decisions are strategic complements CEOs get higher pay-for-performance incentives from both cash and stock based compensation.

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Download or read book Executive Compensation Strategic Competition and Relative Performance Evaluation written by Raj Aggarwal and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We argue that strategic interactions between firms in an oligopoly can explain the puzzling lack of high-powered incentives in executive compensation contracts written by shareholders whose objective is to maximize the value of their shares. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own and their rivals' performance, we show that there will be an inverse relationship between the magnitude of high-powered incentives and the degree of competition in the industry. More competitive industries are characterized by weaker pay-performance incentives. Empirically, we find strong evidence of this inverse relationship in the compensation of executives in the United States. Our econometric results are not consistent with alternative theories of the effect of competition on executive compensation. We conclude that strategic considerations can preclude the use of high-powered incentives, in contrast to the predictions of the standard principal-agent model.

Download or read book Gender Differences in Market Competitiveness in a Real Workplace written by Victor Lavy and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 58 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent lab and field experiments suggest that women are less effective than men in a competitive environment. In this paper I examine how individual performance in a real work place is affected by a competitive environment and by its gender mix. The competition is among math, English and Language teachers who participated in a rank order tournament that rewarded teachers with large cash bonuses based on the test performance of their classes. The evidence suggest that the average ranking, winning rate and awarded prize did not differ by gender nor between teachers in competition groups with only female teachers or with both genders. I also find that the direct impact of the bonus program on students' outcomes did not vary by male and female teachers or by the type of competitive environment in terms of gender mix of the participants. As for mechanisms that can explain these results, I found no differences by either gender or by the gender mix of the competition group in teachers' awareness and familiarity with the program and its rules, and in effort and teaching methods. Women though were more pessimistic about the effectiveness of teachers' performance pay and more realistic than men about their likelihood of winning bonuses.

Download or read book Compensation Organizational Strategy and Firm Performance written by Luis R. Gomez-Mejia and published by Thomson South-Western. This book was released on 1992 with total page 444 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Competition and the Ratchet Effect written by Gary Charness and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "In labor markets, the ratchet effect refers to a situation where workers subject to performance pay choose to restrict their output, because they rationally anticipate that firms will respond to higher output levels by raising output requirements or cutting pay. We model this effect as a multi-period principal-agent problem with hidden information, and study its robustness to labor market competition both theoretically and experimentally. Consistent with our theoretical model, we observe substantial ratchet effects in the absence of competition, which is nearly eliminated when competition is introduced; this is true regardless of whether market conditions favor firms or workers"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Download or read book Compensation and Peer Effects in Competing Sales Teams written by Tat Y. Chan and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines how compensation systems impact peer effects and competition in collocated sales teams. We use department store sales data to show that compensation systems influence worker incentives to help and compete with peers within and across firms, which in turn changes how coworker ability impacts worker performance. We find that high-ability workers improve peer productivity under team-based compensation while hurting peers under individual-based compensation. We also document peer effects across firm boundaries that depend on compensation system and impact market competition, and identify how compensation influences workers' strategic responses to peers through discretionary price discounting. We further exploit compensation changes by two firms to discount alternative explanations of endogenous compensation choice and hiring. Our results suggest that heterogeneity in worker ability enhances team performance under team-based compensation while hurting individual-based firms, and that peer interactions are a critical component in understanding firm performance and market competition.

Download or read book The WorldatWork Handbook of Total Rewards written by WorldatWork and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2021-02-24 with total page 421 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Equip yourself to manage, motivate, compensate, and reward everyone in this workplace revolution The future of work is here. From the shift to Millennials and Gen Z in the workforce to the advent of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the Gig Economy, the world of work and rewards has significantly changed since the initial WorldatWork Handbook was published. Human resources and total rewards professionals need tools to equip them to manage a changing workforce. This completely revised second edition addresses the challenging and disruptive issues facing employers today and tomorrow. The WorldatWork Handbook of Total Rewards is the definitive authority on compensation and rewards from the leading global nonprofit organizations for professionals who are engaged in the critically important practice of total rewards. This book is a go-to resource for all business professionals and leaders who reward and create productive, committed and inspired workforces worldwide. Readers will learn the basics of rewards, along with a deep dive and high-level view of how rewards programs enable organizations to deliver on their brand promises and perform at their optimal level. Gain a thorough understanding of compensation and benefits, along with employee well-being, development, and recognition, all updated to address the realities of today’s workplace. Understand why the Millennial and Gen Z workforce requires a different value proposition, and how to meet their needs. Discover the tools and techniques you need to help you reskill and become a highly valued workforce contributor and leader in the digital era. Learn how to attract, retain, and engage talent by building a healthy workplace culture and employing unique incentives that drive high performance and loyalty. Technical enough for specialists but broad in scope for managers and HR generalists, this well-rounded resource belongs on the desk of anyone interested in organizational effectiveness. An indispensable tool for understanding and implementing the total rewards concept, The WorldatWork Handbook of Total Rewards, Second Edition is the key to designing programs and practices that ensure employee engagement and organizational success.