Download or read book Managerial Ownership Entrenchment and Innovation written by Dirk Czarnitzki and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Principle-agent theory suggests managers might under-invest into R&D for reasons of risk tied to project failure, such as reduced remuneration and job loss. However, managers might over-invest into innovation for reasons of growth implying higher remuneration, power and prestige. Using a sample of 1,406 Belgian firms, we find, first, that managers holding no company shares under-invest into R&D compared to owners giving rise to the risk argument. Second, we find an inverse u-shaped relationship between the degree of managerial ownership and R&D. Thus, managers become entrenched, i.e. powerful enough to pursue their own interests. When entrenched, managers do not fear detrimental effects of risky innovation projects on their career, and hence tend to over-invest into innovation.
Download or read book Antitakeover Provisions Managerial Entrenchment and Firm Innovation written by Atreya Chakraborty and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We explore the relation between antitakeover provisions (i.e. managerial entrenchment) and firm performance in innovation. Empirical results indicate that an increase in antitakeover provisions is negatively related to number of patents and number of citations to patents. Thus managers who are protected from takeover market perform worse on innovation. However, the negative relation between antitakeover provisions and firm innovation holds only for low-tech firms. For high-tech firms, this relation is not statistically significant. One possible explanation is that high-tech firms have to innovate continuously to survive in the long run. The competitive pressure to innovate or perish dissipates the negative effect of managerial entrenchment on firm innovation. Overall, our results support the agency based explanation of the relation between antitakeover provisions and firm performance in innovation.
Download or read book Innovation and Institutional Ownership written by Philippe Aghion and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 59 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We find that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is associated with more innovation (measured by cite-weighted patents). To explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model that nests the lazy-manager hypothesis with career-concerns, where institutional owners increase managerial incentives to innovate by reducing the career risk of risky projects. The data supports the career concerns model. First, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts a substitution effect between institutional ownership and product market competition (and managerial entrenchment generally), the career-concern model allows for complementarity. Empirically, we reject substitution effects. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumental variables, policy changes and disaggregating by type of owner we find that the effect of institutions on innovation does not appear to be due to endogenous selection.
Download or read book Innovation and Institutional Ownership written by Philippe Aghion and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We find that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is associated with more innovation (measured by cite-weighted patents). To explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model that nests the lazy-manager hypothesis with career-concerns, where institutional owners increase managerial incentives to innovate by reducing the career risk of risky projects. The data supports the career concerns model. First, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts a substitution effect between institutional ownership and product market competition (and managerial entrenchment generally), the career-concern model allows for complementarity. Empirically, we reject substitution effects. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumental variables, policy changes and disaggregating by type of owner we find that the effect of institutions on innovation does not appear to be due to endogenous selection.
Download or read book The Relationship Between a Firm s Ownership Structure Governance and Innovation written by Erica J. Wagner and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 57 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Firm innovation is key for many companies to continuously thrive in the marketplace. Unfortunately, there are drawbacks to making innovative investments because of the upfront costs and riskiness of future returns. This creates conflicts because managers are under pressure to meet short-term earnings forecasts. A managers' short-term focus on a firm's business strategy may not be in the best interests of the shareholders' long-term vision of a firm. For this reason, a strong corporate governance system can trigger an increased level of monitoring of the decision-making of managers so that it's aligned with shareholders' goals. Often, a firm's long-term strategy focuses on firm innovation. A major influencer of a firm's innovative strategy is its ownership structure. This research specifically focuses on the impact of ownership concentration, institutional ownership, activist investors, large passive investors, and Board of Director composition on firm innovation. Key components of a firm's organizational structure, such as ownership concentration and Board member composition, are analyzed to explain the variance iv of innovation when other variables are controlled. Based on a sample of technology firms, the findings show that publicly-traded information technology firms' level of passive investors and percentage of independent Board members are significant relative to firm innovation. There are also important findings from the unsupported variables, which are the firm's ownership concentration of shareholders, activist investors, and institutional investors. Finally, inferences are drawn from these results as to whether a firm's ownership structure and governance affect a firm's long-term strategy.
Download or read book Managerial Entrenchment and Performance of Firms written by Nejla Ould Daoud Ellili and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The objective of this article is to determine the relation between managerial ownership and the performance of firms as well as the impact of managerial entrenchment on the firms' financial policy.The analyses of regressions on 283 firms show that the relation between the managerial ownership and the performance of firms is non linear. It takes the shape of the alignment, then of the entrenchment, then again of the alignment, as the managerial ownership increases. The manager possessing a part of capital between 5.72% and 55.47% is more susceptible to be entrenched and he/she prefers a weak ratio of debt to escape both the shareholders' control and the market's pressures of performance.
Download or read book Corporate Governance Strengthening Latin American Corporate Governance The Role of Institutional Investors written by OECD and published by OECD Publishing. This book was released on 2011-07-01 with total page 78 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report reflects long-term, in-depth discussion and debate by participants in the Latin American Roundtable on Corporate Governance.
Download or read book The Impact of Managerial Ownership and Good Governance Practice on Firm Performance in Australia and Thailand written by Wanachan Singhchawla and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 424 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study investigated whether managerial share ownership and internal corporate governance practice serve to enhance firm performance through the comparison of listed companies in two countries-Australia (a developed economy) and Thailand (a developing economy).
Download or read book Political Power and Corporate Control written by Peter A. Gourevitch and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2010-06-20 with total page 365 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.
Download or read book Ownership Structure Efficiency Managerial Entrenchment and Antitakeover Charter Amendments written by Cindy Robin Alexander and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Ownership Structure and Innovative Behavior written by Waleed Omri and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The primary objective of the present study was to expand understanding of the determinants of adoption innovation in SME context by empirically examine the effect of corporate governance structure on manager's innovative behavior. This was done through exploring whether ownership structure affects managers' innovative behavior and if so, whether the effect is mediated by board composition. Using a sample of 197 managers within Tunisian SMEs, the study finds that ownership structure is significantly associated with manager's innovative behavior. Further analysis arising from introducing outsiders' representation on the board as a mediating variable reveals that the relationship is fully mediated by this variable. Research and practical implications are discussed.
Download or read book Institutions Innovation in the Manufacturing Industry of Colombia written by Ivan Dario Hernandez Umaña and published by Univ. Nacional de Colombia. This book was released on 2002 with total page 298 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Corporate Governance and Its Implications on Accounting and Finance written by Alqatan, Ahmad and published by IGI Global. This book was released on 2020-09-25 with total page 425 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: After the global financial crisis, the topic of corporate governance has been gaining momentum in accounting and finance literature since it may influence firm and bank management in many countries. Corporate Governance and Its Implications on Accounting and Finance provides emerging research exploring the implications of a good corporate governance system after global financial crises. Corporate governance mechanisms may include board and audit committee characteristics, ownership structure, and internal and external auditing. This book is devoted to all topics dealing with corporate governance including corporate governance characteristics, board diversity, CSR, big data governance, bitcoin governance, IT governance, and governance disclosure, and is ideally designed for executives, BODs, financial analysts, government officials, researchers, policymakers, academicians, and students.
Download or read book A History of Corporate Governance around the World written by Randall K. Morck and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2007-11-01 with total page 700 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For many Americans, capitalism is a dynamic engine of prosperity that rewards the bold, the daring, and the hardworking. But to many outside the United States, capitalism seems like an initiative that serves only to concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few hereditary oligarchies. As A History of Corporate Governance around the World shows, neither conception is wrong. In this volume, some of the brightest minds in the field of economics present new empirical research that suggests that each side of the debate has something to offer the other. Free enterprise and well-developed financial systems are proven to produce growth in those countries that have them. But research also suggests that in some other capitalist countries, arrangements truly do concentrate corporate ownership in the hands of a few wealthy families. A History of Corporate Governance around the World provides historical studies of the patterns of corporate governance in several countries-including the large industrial economies of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States; larger developing economies like China and India; and alternative models like those of the Netherlands and Sweden.
Download or read book Corporate Governance Finance and the Technological Advantage of Nations written by Andrew Tylecote and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2007-12-19 with total page 442 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Winner of the Gunnar Myrdal Prize 2010. This prize is awarded annually for the best monograph, on a theme broadly in accord with the EAEPE (European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy) Theoretical Perspectives. There is much debate regarding which countries’ economies have the best economic systems to encourage economic growth and technological change. This book is a major contribution to this discussion, connecting the fields of corporate governance and finance with the field of innovation and technology and analysing the ways in which countries’ systems of corporate governance affect firms’ ability to meet the technological challenges of different sectors. Tylecote and Visintin combine incisive analysis with empirical studies systems of corporate governance in the US, Europe, East Asia and China, demonstrating how these systems vary and how the demands on those who control and finance industry are changing. The authors argue that while certain types of system have worked for particular sectors, the technological revolution through which we are passing demands innovation in corporate governance and finance. Indeed, this book goes some way in challenging accepted views of best practise in corporate governance and finance, showing how structures and rules intended to advance ‘shareholder value’ may undermine it by inhibiting technological change. This book will be very interesting reading for students and researchers engaged with corporate governance and national business systems, as well as those interested in systems of innovation.
Download or read book All the Right Moves written by Constantinos Markides and published by Harvard Business Press. This book was released on 2000 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Annotation Markides (chairman, strategic and international management department, London Business School) contends that the essence of business strategy is to allow a company to create and exploit a unique strategic position in industry, and helps managers zero in on critical choices that lie at the heart of all innovative strategies. He approaches strategic thinking as a creative process, and poses key questions for readers to ask as he guides them through a framework for developing strategic thinking skills.
Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
