Download or read book Managerial Ownership and Incentive Alignment written by Phillip James Quinn and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mandatory stock ownership plans require executives to hold a minimum level of stock. I exploit these changes in managerial stock ownership to examine the relation between managerial ownership and manager-shareholder incentive alignment. In contrast to prior work that suggests equity incentives induce opportunistic managerial behavior, I find earnings management declines following the adoption of mandatory stock ownership plans relative to a propensity-matched control sample. I also posit and find a reduction in bid-ask spreads following plan adoptions, consistent with manager-shareholder incentive alignment improving market liquidity and decreasing information asymmetry. These findings are consistent with boards of directors contracting with managers to reduce the agency costs of equity.

Download or read book Reexamining the Managerial Ownership Effect on Firm Value written by Bradley W. Benson and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Whether equity-based compensation and equity ownership aligns the interests of managers with stockholders is an important question in finance. Early studies found an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm value, but later studies using firm fixed effects found no relation. Managerial ownership levels change very slowly over time which may mask an ownership effect on firm value when using a fixed effect model. This is due to a much smaller within firm variation than between firm variation. We demonstrate that using pay-performance semi-elasticity, rather than pay-performance sensitivity as a measure of managerial ownership incentives, results in meaningful variation within firm over time. The greater within firm variation increases the power to detect a relation between managerial ownership and firm value with fixed effect regressions. As in the early research on this issue, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in fixed effects regressions and after controlling for endogeneity with both two-stage and three-stage least squares regressions. Our results are consistent with incentive alignment at low levels and risk aversion at high levels of managerial ownership.

Download or read book Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management written by Nobuyuki Teshima and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and opportunistic managerial behavior relating to earnings management. Economics theory identifies two apparently conflicting effects of managerial ownership on managers' incentives: the incentive alignment effect and the management entrenchment effect. We construct a theoretical model demonstrating the two effects. This model suggests that as managerial ownership increases, earnings management decreases for both high and low levels of managerial ownership, while it increases for intermediate levels of managerial ownership if the sensitivity of the probability of managerial dismissal to the corporate performance is high enough and/or the manager's private benefit derived from managerial position is high enough. In a sample of Japanese firms, we find a significant nonmonotonic relationship between managerial ownership and discretionary accruals, consistent with our model.

Download or read book Managerial Ownership Incentive Contracting and the Use of Zero Cost Collars and Equity Swaps by Corporate Insiders written by J. Carr Bettis and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Zero-cost collars and equity swaps provide insiders with the opportunity to hedge the risk associated with their personal holdings in the company's equity. Consequently their use has important implications for incentive-based contracting and for understanding insider-trading behavior. Our analysis indicates that these transactions generally involve high-ranking insiders, and effectively reduce their ownership by about 25% on average. Given the potential of these financial instruments to substantially alter the incentive alignment between managers and shareholders, we suggest that increasing the transparency of these transactions may provide valuable information to investors.

Download or read book Compensation and Organizational Performance written by Luis R. Gomez-Mejia and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2014-12-18 with total page 366 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This up-to-date, research-oriented textbook focuses on the relationship between compensation systems and firm overall performance. In contrast to more traditional compensation texts, it provides a strategic perspective to compensation administration rather than a functional viewpoint. The text emphasizes the role of managerial pay, its importance, determinants, and impact on organizations. It analyzes recent topics in executive compensation, such as pay in high technology firms, managerial risk taking, rewards in family companies, and the link between compensation and social responsibility and ethical issues, among others. The authors provide a thorough and comprehensive review of the vast literatures relevant to compensation and revisit debates grounded in different theoretical perspectives. They provide insights from disciplines as diverse as management, economics, sociology, and psychology, and amplify previous discussions with the latest empirical findings on compensation, its dynamics, and its contribution to firm overall performance.

Download or read book Managerial Ownership and Corporate Diversification written by Maria L. Goranova and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 15 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Strategy and finance research suggests that managerial ownership results in increased incentive alignment and therefore is negatively related to corporate diversification. Using a longitudinal approach, we develop arguments to examine whether managerial ownership is associated with subsequent changes in diversification and/or if diversification is associated with subsequent changes in ownership. The results indicate that levels of managerial ownership in one time period are not associated with subsequent changes in corporate diversification, which raises incentive alignment questions. We also find that higher levels of corporate diversification are associated with changes in managerial ownership, which suggests support for the employment risk-reduction perspective. This study provides important reasons to reassess the longitudinal implications of the managerial ownership-corporate diversification link from both theoretical and managerial perspectives.

Download or read book Managerial Ownership and Firms Information Environment written by Sam Han and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 49 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the relation between managerial stock ownership and the firm's information environment. We focus on three dimensions of the information environment: total, public, and private information precisions (Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens 1998). Our results suggest that firms' total and public information precisions are positively related to managerial ownership. In contrast, there is no clear pattern in private information precision across different levels of managerial ownership. We also observe that managerial ownership has a greater impact on the firm's public information environment after the implementation of Regulation Fair Disclosure, suggesting that the regulation was more effective in terms of improving the firms' public information flow for firms whose managers' interests are better aligned. Collectively, our findings suggest that one of the possible channels through which managerial ownership associates with earnings informativeness and firm value is the firms' public information precision and that managerial incentive alignment plays an important role in how managers respond to a new disclosure regulation.

Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance written by Musbau Kolawole Kayode and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2015-08-26 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research Paper (undergraduate) from the year 2015 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: A, ( Atlantic International University ) (SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS), language: English, abstract: Corporate governance involves different checks and balances with the ability to influence the incentives and monitoring of a firm’s management. Sound corporate governance is predominantly essential when a firm’s management is different from its ownership. Randall (2009) argued that in the absence of appropriate corporate governance, managers who are separate from a company’s ownership may not be incentivized to work hard towards achieving shareholders’ goal of maximizing profits. Instead, non-owner managers might end up lavishly spending money and other resources in ways that directly benefits themselves, for example on perks, and living an expensive life. Surprisingly, some other managers may be tempted to spend firm’s money to accumulate personal wealth through frauds or theft.

Download or read book Managerial Share Ownership and Operating Performance written by Arifur Khan and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate the relationship between managerial share ownership (MSO) and earnings as a measure of operating performance in Australia. To mitigate potential earnings management, we also use discretionary accrual adjusted earnings as an alternative measure of performance. We document a negative relation between MSO and performance followed by a positive relation. We suggest that these unique results are an artifact of certain Australian institutional features and imply that the ownership-performance relation is context-specific, with the wider corporate governance systems influencing the theorized incentive effects. We also posit that executive directors and independent directors have different ownership-performance incentives. Our results are consistent with this proposition and suggest that independent directors may be immune to the theorised incentive alignment or entrenchment effects associated with share ownership.

Download or read book Ownership Structure as a Determinant of Capital Structure An Empirical Study of DAX Companeis written by Christian Funke and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2012-03-02 with total page 105 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Diploma Thesis from the year 2004 in the subject Business economics - Business Management, Corporate Governance, grade: 1.1, European Business School - International University Schloß Reichartshausen Oestrich-Winkel, language: English, abstract: Empirische Diplomarbeit die mit einer multivariaten Regression untersucht, ob sich die beobachtete Variabilität der Kapitalstrukturen von Unternehmen durch unterschiedliche Eigentümerstrukturen erklären lässt.

Download or read book Corporate Payout Policy written by Harry DeAngelo and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2009 with total page 215 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.

Download or read book Managerial Equity Ownership and the Demand for Outside Directors written by Ken V. Peasnell and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates the relationship between managerial equity ownership and the demand for outside directors in the U.K. corporate control process. In recognition of both the benefits (incentive-alignment effects) and costs (entrenchment effects) of managerial ownership, we propose and test for evidence of a convex association between the proportion of outside board members and the level of insider ownership. Two non-linear specifications (quadratic and logarithmic) are estimated and compared with the simple linear relationship assumed in prior research. Cross-sectional results provide strong evidence that the association between board composition and managerial ownership is indeed non-linear, with both the quadratic and logarithmic models outperforming the linear specification. Further analysis indicates that of the two non-linear models, the logarithmic specification dominates. These findings are also confirmed by an analysis of changes in board composition in response to the Cadbury Report's best practice recommendations on the use of outside directors. Overall, our results suggest that the role of outside directors and their association with managerial ownership is more complex than the simple substitution effect previously assumed.

Download or read book Asymmetric Information Corporate Finance and Investment written by R. Glenn Hubbard and published by University of Chicago Press. This book was released on 2009-05-15 with total page 354 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this volume, specialists from traditionally separate areas in economics and finance investigate issues at the conjunction of their fields. They argue that financial decisions of the firm can affect real economic activity—and this is true for enough firms and consumers to have significant aggregate economic effects. They demonstrate that important differences—asymmetries—in access to information between "borrowers" and "lenders" ("insiders" and "outsiders") in financial transactions affect investment decisions of firms and the organization of financial markets. The original research emphasizes the role of information problems in explaining empirically important links between internal finance and investment, as well as their role in accounting for observed variations in mechanisms for corporate control.

Download or read book Management Share Ownership written by Christian Alexander Wegener and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2011-01-31 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Business economics - Investment and Finance, grade: sehr gut, University of Münster (Finance Center Münster), language: English, abstract: Many scholars have analyzed whether and how management share ownership should be used in terms of a corporate governance instrument to enhance corporate performance. The empirical results, however, have been inconclusive till this day. This seminar paper attempts to explain the problems and difficulties that underlie the obscurity and how researches might eventually unravel this challenge.

Download or read book The Control of Corporate Europe written by Fabrizio Barca and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2001-11-15 with total page 354 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.

Download or read book The Role of Incentive Alignment and Monitoring on Managerial Decision Making written by Jeffrey P. Katz and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 428 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance written by Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 108 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: