Download or read book Capital Structure Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance written by Christian M. Pfeil and published by Peter Lang Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der Wissenschaften. This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: What factors determine a firm's financing decision? Informational economics and contract theory have contributed a great deal to answer this question. This book contains three essays that further contribute to this strand of literature with the focus on theories that view capital structure as a disciplining instrument for a self-interested management. Some of the existing theories abstract from other disciplining devices such as ordinary incentive wages to justify debt as a mean to mitigate a moral hazard problem between managers and owners of a firm. Two of the models presented here turn to the question of whether debt can play a role as an incentive device when other incentive mechanisms are available as well. A third model revisits the signaling literature on capital structure in the light of new empirical evidence. All models are embedded into a corporate governance framework that allows to set the conclusions into a broader perspective.
Download or read book Managerial Incentives Capital Structure and Corporate Governance written by Xinping Li and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Capital Structure and Corporate Governance written by Lorenzo Sasso and published by Kluwer Law International B.V.. This book was released on 2013-08-01 with total page 248 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Despite a clear distinction in law between equity and debt, the results of such a categorization can be misleading. The growth of financial innovation in recent decades necessitates the allocation of control and cash-flow rights in a way that diverges from the classic understanding. Some of the financial instruments issued by companies, so-called hybrid instruments, fall into a grey area between debt and equity, forcing regulators to look beyond the legal form of an instrument to its practical substance. This innovative study, by emphasizing the agency relations and the property law claims embedded in the use of such unconventional instruments, analyses and discusses the governance regulation of hybrids in a way that is primarily functional, departing from more common approaches that focus on tax advantages and internal corporate control. The author assesses the role of hybrid instruments in the modern company, unveiling the costs and benefits of issuing these securities, recognizing and categorizing the different problem fields in which hybrids play an important role, and identifying legal and contracting solutions to governance and finance problems. The full-scale analysis compares the U.K. law dealing with hybrid instruments with the corresponding law of the most relevant U.S. jurisdictions in relation to company law. The following issues, among many others, are raised: decisions under uncertainty when the risks of opportunism of the parties is very high; contract incompleteness and ex post conflicts; protection of convertible bondholders in mergers and acquisitions and in assets disposal; use of convertible bonds to reorganise and restructure a firm; timing of the conversion and the issuer’s call option; majority-minority conflict in venture capital financing; duty of loyalty; fiduciary duties to preference shareholders; and financial contract design for controlling the board’s power in exit events. Throughout, the analysis includes discussion, comparison, and evaluation of statutory provisions, existing legal standards, and strategies for protection. It is unlikely that a more thorough or informative account exists of the complex regulatory problems created by hybrid financial instruments and of the different ways in which regulatory regimes have responded to the problems they raise. Because business parties in these jurisdictions have a lot of scope and a strong incentive to contract for their rights, this book will also be of uncommon practical value to corporate counsel and financial regulators as well as to interested academics.
Download or read book A Study on Capital Structure and Corporate Governance written by Ryoonhee Kim and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Capital structure and corporate governance are the important areas that represent salient part of corporate finance research. By studying various aspects of the two areas, this study attempts to deepen our understanding of the two. First, this study provides both a theoretical model and empirical evidence on the interaction between capital structure and managerial incentive compensation (one of key measures of corporate governance). Researchers acknowledge that the two interact to each other and the interaction should affect their optimal determination, but few studies formally consider the interaction. This study shows that due to the interaction through agency conflicts, key firm characteristics that represent agency costs affect leverage and managerial incentive compensation in opposite directions. After controlling for the opposite interactions, the two are shown to be positively related. Second, this study provides empirical evidence on the interaction between financial structure and product market performance by examining business group affiliated firms. The firms that are affiliated to a business group is not only affected by their own financial position, but also affected by the position of business groups which the firms belong to. The empirical investigation suggests that affiliated firms lose market shares to their rivals in their product market when their business group is financially weak due to high group leverage. Third, this study examines whether special governance structure of business groups is actually beneficial to the groups0́9 member firms. The study exploit unique dataset of firms that were once stand alone, but later acquired by business groups. The empirical methodology we employ can account for the fact that the firms which are acquired by business groups can be very different from other firms which are not acquired. The findings from matching estimator suggest that performance increase of the acquired firms is significantly greater than the performance of matched stand alone firms, implying that business groups are actually helping their affiliated firms to perform better than stand alone firms.
Download or read book Complementarities in Corporate Governance written by Ralph P. Heinrich and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2002-06-04 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance reform is currently on the agenda in the European Union, the United States, Japan and in emerging market economies. This book takes a fresh look at the reform debate by focusing on the trade-offs involved in reconciling the diverging interests of shareholders, creditors and managers. It shows how effective corporate governance systems exploit complementarities between the incentives generated by the capital structure, the ownership structure, investor monitoring, takeover threats, and management compensation to minimize the sum of all agency costs facing the public corporation. The book combines a general theoretical treatment with a detailed study of the institutions of corporate governance in Germany, Japan and the United States and a critical assessment of recent reforms.
Download or read book Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics written by Li-Kai (Connie) Liao and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Morellec, Nikolov, and Schürhoff (2012) predict that a self-interested manager prefers a leverage level that is lower than the shareholders' desired level, and effective corporate governance encourages timely capital structure rebalancing. In a U.S. sample during 1996-2008, we confirm that both a higher level of financial leverage and a faster speed of adjustment of leverage toward the shareholders' desired level are associated with a better corporate governance quality as defined by a more independent board featuring CEO-Chairman separation and greater presence of outside directors, coupled with larger institutional shareholding. In contrast, managerial incentive compensation on average discourages use of debt or adjustments toward the shareholders' desired level, consistent with its entrenchment effect. The effect of corporate governance on leverage adjustments is most pronounced when the initial leverage is between the manager's desired level and the shareholders' desired level where the interests of managers and shareholders conflict.
Download or read book Financial Management And Corporate Governance written by Daisuke Asaoka and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2022-06-16 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides an integrative perspective on financial management and corporate governance deployed in management decisions. It analyzes wide-ranging issues such as valuation, capital investment, capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, shareholder and stakeholder value management, and corporate governance structure. Throughout the analyses, the book provides a coherent view of firms, laws and markets, and offers practical financial modeling techniques to assist in financial decisions.This book also incorporates the latest developments in practice, such as direct listings and SPACs in capital markets, contractual arrangements in mergers and acquisitions, setting of corporate purpose, protection of minority investors in related party transactions, balancing of shareholder and stakeholder value from an ESG perspective, and the growing influence of activist funds, index investors and proxy advisors. It looks at these complex issues in firm management through the dual lens of asymmetric information and conflicts of interest that managers deal with, and gives coherency and clarity to the understanding of these key issues in management.
Download or read book Optimal Capital Structure written by Marc Schauten and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Despite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm there still is a big gap between theory and practice. Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani amp; Miller, much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital structure from the shareholders' point of view. Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stakeholders' interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company. Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure. Furthermore, the issue of corporate control and, related, the issue of corporate governance, receive a lion's part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions. From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather, the management of the capital structure over time) has to deal with more issues than the maximization of the firm's market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We show that capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria decision problems which can then benefit from multiple criteria decision support tools that are widely available.
Download or read book Capital Structure Implications for Corporate Governance written by Nishanth Rajan and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 158 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation consists of two essays that look at the outcome of agency costs of debt on the firm's capital structure and governance decisions. The first essay considers how monitoring of management by a shareholder aligned board of directors may induce an asymmetric information problem between shareholders and creditors. To mitigate this problem, the board may be more lenient with the manager and may have an incentive to be inherently weaker. In the second essay, I consider how creditors and shareholders interact when both actively monitor the manager. I demonstrate that, ex-post to floating debt, active shareholders may unilaterally shirk their monitoring duties to shift the burden of costly monitoring to debt claimants.
Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance written by Musbau Kolawole Kayode and published by . This book was released on 2015-09-10 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research paper from the year 2015 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: A, Atlantic International University (SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS), language: English, abstract: Corporate governance involves different checks and balances with the ability to influence the incentives and monitoring of a firm's management. Sound corporate governance is predominantly essential when a firm's management is different from its ownership. Randall (2009) argued that in the absence of appropriate corporate governance, managers who are separate from a company's ownership may not be incentivized to work hard towards achieving shareholders' goal of maximizing profits. Instead, non-owner managers might end up lavishly spending money and other resources in ways that directly benefits themselves, for example on perks, and living an expensive life. Surprisingly, some other managers may be tempted to spend firm's money to accumulate personal wealth through frauds or theft.
Download or read book Complementarities in Corporate Governance written by Ralph P. Heinrich and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Capital Structure Corporate Governance and Firm Performance of Small and Medium Sized Listed Companies written by Yiming Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Based on the panel data of small and medium-sized companies listed on A-share market from the year 2003 to 2009, the paper analyzes the effect of capital structure and corporate governance on firm performance. In general, debt constrains are negatively related to firm performance. And the relationship between them is closely dependent on the nature of the controller. The empirical result implies the positive relationship between firm performance and some corporate governance mechanisms, such as duality of CEO and COB, state-controlled, and ownership concentration. Independent directors may do harm to the firm performance of small and medium-sized listed companies. Compensation incentive and equity incentive are both effective. Meanwhile, the gap among managers should be reduced.
Download or read book Corporate Governance written by Kevin Keasey and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2005-05-05 with total page 482 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The decade since the publication of the Cadbury Report in1992 has seen growing interest in corporate governance. This growth has recently become an explosion with major corporate scandals such as WorldCom and Enron in the US, the international diffusion of corporate governance codes and wider interest in researching corporate governance in different institutional contexts and through different subject lenses. In view of these developments, this book will be a rigorous update and development of the editor’s earlier work, Corporate Governance: Economic, Management and Financial Issues. Each chapter, written by an expert in the subject offers a high level review of the topic, embracing material from financial accounting, strategy and economic perspectives.
Download or read book U S Corporate Governance written by Donald H. Chew and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2009-09-22 with total page 385 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate governance constitutes the internal and external institutions, markets, policies, and processes designed to help companies maximize their efficiency and value. In this collection of classic and current articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, thought leaders such as Michael Jensen and Robert Monks discuss the corporate mission of value maximization and the accomplishments and limitations of U.S. governance in achieving that end. They address the elements driving corporate value: the board of directors, compensation for CEOs and other employees, incentives and organizational structure, external ownership and control, role of markets, and financial reporting. They evaluate best practice methods, challenges in designing equity plans, the controversy over executive compensation, the values of decentralization, identifying and attracting the "right" investors, the evolution of shareholder activism, creating value through mergers and acquisitions, and the benefits of just saying no to Wall Street's "earnings game." Grounded in solid research and practice, U.S. Corporate Governance is a crucial companion for navigating the world of modern finance.
Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Capital Structure written by Larry Lang and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 12 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Employees and Corporate Governance written by Margaret M. Blair and published by Brookings Institution Press. This book was released on 2010-12-01 with total page 369 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Most scholarship on corporate governance in the last two decades has focused on the relationships between shareholders and managers or directors. Neglected in this vast literature is the role of employees in corporate governance. Yet "human capital," embodied in the employees, is rapidly becoming the most important source of value for corporations, and outside the United States, employees often have a significant formal role in corporate governance. This volume turns the spotlight on the neglected role of employees by analyzing many of the formal and informal ways that employees are actually involved in the governance of corporations, in U.S. firms and in large corporations in Germany and Japan. Examining laws and contexts, the essays focus on the framework for understanding employees' role in the firm and the implications for corporate governance. They explore how and why the special legal institutions in German and Japanese firms by which employees are formally involved in corporate governance came into being, and the impact these institutions have on firms and on their ability to compete. They also consider theoretical and empirical questions about employee share ownership. The result of a conference at Columbia University, the volume includes essays by Theodor Baums, Margaret M. Blair, David Charny, Greg Dow, Bernd Frick, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Nobuhiro Hiwatari, Katharina Pistor, Louis Putterman, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, and Michael L. Wachter. Margaret M. Blair is a senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution and author of Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century (Brookings, 1995). Mark J. Roe, professor of business regulation and director of the Sloan Project on Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School, is the author of Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton, 1996).
Download or read book Global Corporate Governance written by Donald H. Chew and published by Columbia University Press. This book was released on 2009-08-24 with total page 393 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Effective corporate governance, or the set of controls and incentives that drive top management, originates both outside and inside the firm and assures investors who hope to commit their capital. Essential when buying stocks in one's own country, effective corporate governance is even more important abroad, where information can be less reliable and investor influence (or protection) more limited. In this collection of articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, more than thirty leading scholars and practitioners discuss the possibilities and limitations of global corporate finance and governance systems, whether in Europe and North America or in the emerging markets of Israel, India, Korea, and South Africa. Essays discuss the political roots of American corporate finance; the structural and financial variations between international corporations; control premiums and the effectiveness of corporate governance systems; debt, folklore, and cross-country differences in financial structures; the driving forces behind the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997; corporate ownership and control in India, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom; financial and economic lessons of Italy's privatization program; changes in Korean corporate governance; sovereign wealth funds; and the new organization of Canadian business trusts. A special roundtable discussion addresses shareholder activism in the U.K.