Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Control written by Walter Novaes and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 240 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance written by Musbau Kolawole Kayode and published by GRIN Verlag. This book was released on 2015-08-26 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research Paper (undergraduate) from the year 2015 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: A, ( Atlantic International University ) (SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS), language: English, abstract: Corporate governance involves different checks and balances with the ability to influence the incentives and monitoring of a firm’s management. Sound corporate governance is predominantly essential when a firm’s management is different from its ownership. Randall (2009) argued that in the absence of appropriate corporate governance, managers who are separate from a company’s ownership may not be incentivized to work hard towards achieving shareholders’ goal of maximizing profits. Instead, non-owner managers might end up lavishly spending money and other resources in ways that directly benefits themselves, for example on perks, and living an expensive life. Surprisingly, some other managers may be tempted to spend firm’s money to accumulate personal wealth through frauds or theft.

Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Control in Listed Firms written by Marc Steffen Rapp and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Managerial Incentives Executive Compensation Corporate Control and Corporate Financial Structure written by Hamid Mehran and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Corporate Control Leverage and Managerial Incentives written by Joetta Forsyth and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper is motivated by the corporate control wave and high debt of the 1980s. I model a role for high debt in corporate control events and the restructuring of firms that follows. An underlying economic factor requires a large restructuring of a firm. High leverage motivates the manager to restructure because of the risk of job loss associated with bankruptcy, and restructuring reduces the chance of bankruptcy. I derive a diverse set of implications regarding restructuring and investment after a leveraging corporate control event, and find a new kind of myopia. High debt levels encourage cash-generating restructurings. Profitable investment is discouraged because investment reduces cash useable to prevent bankruptcy, and the unobservable component of investment is not imputed into the stock price. Therefore, the probability of bankruptcy increases with unobservable investment. This incentive problem rises with the probability of default. Firms with high debt levels may therefore mimic credit constrained firms, and the theory is consistent with credit constraint evidence. The theory is testable because managerial shareholdings are predicted to be positively related to profitable investment and negatively related to wasteful investment. High leverage strongly discourages management from making wasteful investments.

Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Governance written by Musbau Kolawole Kayode and published by . This book was released on 2015-09-10 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Research paper from the year 2015 in the subject Business economics - Accounting and Taxes, grade: A, Atlantic International University (SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS), language: English, abstract: Corporate governance involves different checks and balances with the ability to influence the incentives and monitoring of a firm's management. Sound corporate governance is predominantly essential when a firm's management is different from its ownership. Randall (2009) argued that in the absence of appropriate corporate governance, managers who are separate from a company's ownership may not be incentivized to work hard towards achieving shareholders' goal of maximizing profits. Instead, non-owner managers might end up lavishly spending money and other resources in ways that directly benefits themselves, for example on perks, and living an expensive life. Surprisingly, some other managers may be tempted to spend firm's money to accumulate personal wealth through frauds or theft.

Download or read book Managerial Incentives Capital Structure and Corporate Governance written by Xinping Li and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud written by Shane A. Johnson and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Operating and stock return results imply that managers that commit fraud likely anticipate large stock price declines if they do not misreport earnings. Stock price declines cause greater losses for managerial stockholdings than for option holdings because of differences in payoff convexity. Fraud firms have significantly greater incentives from unrestricted stockholdings than control firms do, and unrestricted stockholdings are the largest source of incentives at fraud firms. Collectively, these results emphasize the importance of the shape and vesting status of managerial incentive payoffs in providing incentives to commit fraud. Fraud firms also have characteristics that suggest a lower likelihood of fraud detection, which implies lower expected costs of fraud. Overall, the results are consistent with the economic theory of crime.

Download or read book Symposium on Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance Effects of Executive Compensation Organzational Structure Takeovers and Government Policy written by Ray Ball and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 380 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Investment Dividends Firm Performance and Managerial Incentives written by Mahmoud Agha and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We combine the incentive schemes offered to managers in practice into a single incentive package and construct a governance index to analyze the role of governance and the incentive package in addressing the agency costs of free cash flow. Using US based data, we find empirical evidence that managers in practice do not consume perks but make a tradeoff when they allocate the cash flows of the firm between investment and dividends. In general, managers in practice underinvest and overpay dividends; an increase in their incentive package would retract both investment and dividends toward the optimal levels; hence, firm performance would improve. We also find that governance is used as a control mechanism rather than as a substitute for the incentive package. Principals employ governance to slow down investment and increase dividends when there is a high informational asymmetry between the manager and the investors, and set these variables close to the optimal levels otherwise. Moreover, we find that firms in practice do not use dividends as a substitute for governance. Furthermore, we find monotone relations between investment, firm performance and dividends on the one hand, and governance and the incentive package on the other hand.

Download or read book The Japanese Market for Corporate Control and Managerial Incentives written by Jun-Koo Kang and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine bidder returns in Japanese mergers from 1976 to 1990. Using a comprehensive sample of 104 Japanese bidders, we find that shareholders of Japanese bidders experience a significant positive abnormal return of 1.41%. Bidder returns are higher when firms acquire targets in the same industry, when their managers performed well before the merger, and when their managers acquire relatively large targets. We also find that bidder returns increase with the bidder's leverage and the bidder's ties to financial institutions through borrowings. Our evidence is consistent with the view that managerial incentives affect a firm's investment decisions and therefore firm value, and that these incentives are affected by the internal governance mechanisms that control managerial discretion.

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Download or read book Corporate Payout Policy written by Harry DeAngelo and published by Now Publishers Inc. This book was released on 2009 with total page 215 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.

Download or read book Enterprise Risk Management written by James Lam and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2014-01-06 with total page 501 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A fully revised second edition focused on the best practices of enterprise risk management Since the first edition of Enterprise Risk Management: From Incentives to Controls was published a decade ago, much has changed in the worlds of business and finance. That's why James Lam has returned with a new edition of this essential guide. Written to reflect today's dynamic market conditions, the Second Edition of Enterprise Risk Management: From Incentives to Controls clearly puts this discipline in perspective. Engaging and informative, it skillfully examines both the art as well as the science of effective enterprise risk management practices. Along the way, it addresses the key concepts, processes, and tools underlying risk management, and lays out clear strategies to manage what is often a highly complex issue. Offers in-depth insights, practical advice, and real-world case studies that explore the various aspects of ERM Based on risk management expert James Lam's thirty years of experience in this field Discusses how a company should strive for balance between risk and return Failure to properly manage risk continues to plague corporations around the world. Don't let it hurt your organization. Pick up the Second Edition of Enterprise Risk Management: From Incentives to Controls and learn how to meet the enterprise-wide risk management challenge head on, and succeed.

Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Corporate Performance written by Ray Ball and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 380 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation written by Lin Peng and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We present a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices and the manipulation propensity is uncertain. We analyze the tradeoffs involved in conditioning pay on long- versus short-term performance and show how manipulation, and investorsņuncertainty about it, affects the equilibrium pay contract and the informativeness of prices. Firm and manager characteristics determine the optimal compensation scheme: the strength of incentives, the pay horizon, and the use of options. We consider how corporate governance and disclosure regulations can help create an environment that enables better contracting.

Download or read book The Role of Managerial Incentives in Corporate Acquisitions and Corporate Mergers and Top Management Turnover written by David Scott North and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 252 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: