Download or read book List Pricing and Pure Strategy Outcomes in a Bertrand Edgeworth Duopoly written by Antón García Díaz and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 23 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bertrand Competition with Asymmetric Costs written by Thomas Demuynck and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 10 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider two versions of a Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric costs and homogeneous goods. They differ in whether predatory pricing is allowed. For each version, we derive the Myopic Stable Set in pure strategies as introduced by Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017). We contrast our prediction to the prediction of Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Download or read book Excess Capacity and Pricing in Bertrand Edgeworth Markets written by Miguel A. Fonseca and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Bertrand Edgeworth Duopoly written by Jun Wang and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 28 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Nowadays most firms compete for multiple separate markets as opposed to a single market. Extant IO works mainly focus on these firms' cooperative behavior, assuming away their capacity constraints and studying the effect of potential multi-market retaliation upon these firms' collusive incentive. With the assumption that the firms have a single capacity constraint, which applies to the multiple separate markets they compete for, this paper sheds light on the effects of the capacity constraint and demand linkages across different markets in the context of a non-cooperative duopoly model. Different from the classical single market capacity-constrained price competition theory, which has three regions divided by three different types of price equilibria as we adjust the firms' capacity constraints, two asymmetric markets capacity-constrained price competition has five regions divided by five different types of price equilibria as we adjust the firms' capacity constraints. An interesting result is that the firms do not always set higher price in the big or rich market than the small or poor market. When the capacities are endogenously determined, we find that the classical single market result (Kreps and Scheinkman 1983) that the Cournot-Nash quantity is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium cannot hold for the two asymmetric markets competition model. In sum, the results of the asymmetric markets capacity-constrained price competition may yield different implications on merger, price leadership, and collusive behavior.
Download or read book Learning to Deal with Risk written by Albert Burgos and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Pure Component Pricing in a Duopoly written by Chun Hsiung Liao and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we focus on price competition between several multiproduct firms which produce differentiated systems, each consisting of two complementary products. It is shown here that if firms are restricted to pure component pricing (bundling is not allowed) whenever components produced are compatible, pure strategy equilibrium may not exist. With the use of bundling strategies, pure strategy equilibrium always exists. For the pure component pricing case we provide a full characterization for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
Download or read book Sequential Decisions in the College Admissions Problem written by José Alcalde and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A Further Comparison of Some Models of Duopoly written by Martin Shubik and published by . This book was released on 1967 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The author attempts to present an exhaustive examination of the models that can be constructed by considering price and/or quantity at the strategic variables. These included the Cournot, Edgeworth and Bertrand cases as well as two further models reflecting the effect of inventory costs and penalties for failure to supply. Each model had a different noncooperative solution. The difference between Bertrand and Edgeworth hinged upon capacity conditions. Given limited capacity the price, price-quantity and stock penalty models all gave rise to an instability manifested by the existence of the Edgeworth cycle (which is of the same length for both the price and price-quantity models) and the somewhat different 'stockout cycles' when the stock penalty is sufficiently low in the stock penalty model. It is of interest to note that when the stockout penalty is large the resultant equilibria yield higher payoffs to the firms than they would obtain noncooperatively without the penalty. One may regard the penalty as providing an extra threat available to help enforce the equilibrium. The power of competitive price-cutting becomes so great that neither wishes to risk using the weapon too much.
Download or read book Oligopoly Pricing written by Xavier Vives and published by MIT Press (MA). This book was released on 1999 with total page 446 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Applies a modern game-theoretic approach to develop a theory of oligopoly pricing. The text relates classic contributions to the field of modern game theory and discusses basic game-theoretic tools and equilibrium, paying particular attention to developments in the theory of supermodular games.
Download or read book The Economics of Competition Collusion and In between written by Claude d’Aspremont and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-05-18 with total page 160 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a methodology for the analysis of oligopolistic markets from an equilibrium viewpoint, considering competition within and between groups of firms. It proposes a well-founded measure of competitive toughness that can be used in empirically relevant applications. This measure reflects the weight put by each firm on competition for market share relative to competition for market size – two dimensions of competition involving conflicting and convergent interests, respectively. It further explores several applications, such as the effect of tougher competition on innovation and of output market power on the emergence of involuntary unemployment, as well as the importance of strategic interactions for investment decisions. Relative to the dominant model of monopolistic competition, The Economics of Competition, Collusion and In-between aims to explore an alternative tractable model of firm competition opening the application of oligopoly theory to many fields in economics where general equilibrium features are crucial. It will be relevant to those interested in applied industrial organization, trade, macroeconomics (in particular macrodynamics) and quantitative economics.
Download or read book The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games written by London School of Economics and Political Science and published by . This book was released on 1982 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Strategies and Games second edition written by Prajit K. Dutta and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2022-08-09 with total page 713 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The new edition of a widely used introduction to game theory and its applications, with a focus on economics, business, and politics. This widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of Strategies and Games not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science. The book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, and cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory.
Download or read book An Introduction to Game Theory written by Martin J. Osborne and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2009-01 with total page 533 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This text emphasizes the ideas behind modern game theory rather than their mathematical expression, but defines all concepts precisely. It covers strategic, extensive and coalitional games and includes the topics of repeated games, bargaining theory and evolutionary equilibrium.
Download or read book Differential Information Economies written by Dionysius Glycopantis and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2005-12-28 with total page 656 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.
Download or read book Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis written by Peter Davis and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-11-16 with total page 1185 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book combines practical guidance and theoretical background for analysts using empirical techniques in competition and antitrust investigations. Peter Davis and Eliana Garcés show how to integrate empirical methods, economic theory, and broad evidence about industry in order to provide high-quality, robust empirical work that is tailored to the nature and quality of data available and that can withstand expert and judicial scrutiny. Davis and Garcés describe the toolbox of empirical techniques currently available, explain how to establish the weight of pieces of empirical work, and make some new theoretical contributions. The book consistently evaluates empirical techniques in light of the challenge faced by competition analysts and academics--to provide evidence that can stand up to the review of experts and judges. The book's integrated approach will help analysts clarify the assumptions underlying pieces of empirical work, evaluate those assumptions in light of industry knowledge, and guide future work aimed at understanding whether the assumptions are valid. Throughout, Davis and Garcés work to expand the common ground between practitioners and academics.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Hans Peters and published by Springer. This book was released on 2015-06-04 with total page 493 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It is the second, revised version of the successful 2008 edition. The book covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to all these topics on a basic yet formally precise level. It includes chapters on repeated games, social choice theory, and selected topics such as bargaining theory, exchange economies, and matching. Part II goes deeper into noncooperative theory and treats the theory of zerosum games, refinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic as well as extensive form games, and evolutionary games. Part III covers basic concepts in the theory of transferable utility games, such as core and balancedness, Shapley value and variations, and nucleolus. Some mathematical tools on duality and convexity are collected in Part IV. Every chapter in the book contains a problem section. Hints, answers and solutions are included.
Download or read book Models in Microeconomic Theory written by Martin J. Osborne and published by Open Book Publishers. This book was released on 2023-06-26 with total page 382 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice. The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathematics (with almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It includes about 150 exercises. With its formal but accessible style, this textbook is designed for undergraduate students of microeconomics at intermediate and advanced levels.
