Download or read book Investor Protection CEO Pay and CEO Turnover written by Sihong Zhang and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 212 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines CEO compensation and turnover in eight countries (including Australia, India, Ireland, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa and United Kingdom) from 2000 to 2013 period and focuses on how legal investor protection affects compensation and replacement decisions. I use logistic regressions to investigate the association between investor protection and pay-performance sensitivity, and the association between investor protection and turnover-performance sensitivity. My empirical analysis documents that in firms with stronger investor protection, CEO cash compensation and turnover are more sensitive to accounting performance. And such an effect of investor protection is more pronounced for firms with low level of earnings management. However, the association between investor protection and the CEO pay-performance relationship is weaker after including equity-based compensation.
Download or read book Investor Protection and Corporate Governance written by Mark L. DeFond and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong investor protection, where investor protection is defined as both (1) the extent of the laws that protect investors' rights and (2) the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement. The purpose of this study is to test whether the two components of investor protection are associated with an important role of good corporate governance: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. Our tests find no relation between CEO turnover and firm performance in countries with extensive laws protecting investors. However, we find that CEO turnover is associated with poor firm performance in countries with strong law enforcement institutions. We also find that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative, and with poor earnings otherwise. Further, our findings are robust to controlling for the influence of public opinion, the effects of block-holders, the level of financial market development, a country's legal origin, and several alternative research design specifications.Our results suggest that strong law enforcement institutions are important in fostering corporate governance mechanisms that eliminate unfit CEOs, but that extensive laws are not. This finding is consistent with: (1) limited investor protection laws being capable of cultivating good corporate governance as long as law enforcement institutions are strong; and (2) insiders (including directors and CEOs) in countries with weak law enforcement being more likely to engage in collusive behavior to expropriate shareholder wealth, thereby reducing directors' incentives to dismiss poorly performing CEOs. More generally these findings suggest that good corporate governance requires law enforcement institutions capable of protecting shareholders' property rights (i.e. protecting shareholders from expropriation by insiders), but does not require extensive shareholder protection laws.
Download or read book CEO Turnover Firm Performance and Corporate Governance in Chinese Listed Firms written by Takao Kato and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on CEO turnover, ownership structure and board characteristics, we estimate Logit models of CEO turnover and find that: (i) even if the firm is listed in Stock Exchanges, there is no significant and negative link between CEO turnover and firm performance unless the listing is accompanied by an ownership change from state to private; (ii) the presence of a large controlling shareholder makes CEO turnover more sensitive to firm performance; (iii) the appointment of independent directors enhances turnover-performance sensitivities; (iv) CEO turnover-performance sensitivities are weaker for listed firms with CEOs who also hold positions in the controlling shareholders; and (v) firm performance will improve significantly after the replacement of the CEO and the improvement will be greater for privately controlled firms than for state controlled firms. These findings have important implications for China's stock market development and SOE reform as well as more generally the law and finance approach to corporate governance. Consistent with the law and finance approach to corporate governance, the wholesale change of ownership and control from the state to private individuals and firms is found to be the most consistent and significant contributor to stronger CEO turnover-performance link and hence the higher quality of corporate governance. The positive effects of higher independence of board members on turnover-performance link are also consistent with the weak investor protection theory.
Download or read book Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Governance with Poor Investor Protection written by Paolo Volpin and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book CEO Pay Cuts and Forced Turnover written by Huasheng Gao and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study large discrete decreases in CEO pay and compare them to CEO forced turnover. The determinants are similar, as are the performance improvements after the action. After the pay cut, the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is abnormally high, such that the CEO can restore his pay level by reversing the poor performance. After either a pay cut or forced turnover, CEOs reduce investment and leverage, and improve performance, on average. Together, our results show that the possibility of these large compensation cuts provides ex ante incentives for CEOs to exert effort to avoid poor performance and that CEOs take actions to improve poor performance once pay is cut. The similarity of the causes and outcomes of large pay cuts compared to forced turnover suggests that large pay cuts are used as a substitute for forced turnover, helping to explain why forced turnover is rare.
Download or read book Executive Pay written by Ira T. Kay and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Takeover Laws and Financial Development written by Tatiana Nenova and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2006 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The issue of "an appropriate" legal framework, especially in the case of the takeover market, has been poorly studied in the case of emerging markets, yet it is of immediate relevance and practical policymaker interest. The study makes a first attempt to analyze takeover regulations in a comparative context across 50 countries. It proposes a methodology to create a detailed index on the most salient features of capital market laws, and illustrates the approach on the case of takeover legislation. The methodology allows better understanding of the impact of laws on markets and development, allows a detailed quantification of a given regulation, in this case takeover market rules, and helps determine relevant policy implications. Specifically, the framework permits the exploration of the effects of individual regulations, their substitutability and interplay, as well as the overall extent of friendliness of the laws to investors, or particular groups thereof (such as minority shareholders), and the links of specialized regulation with the overall legal system. Finally, the study explores the effect of the investor-friendliness of takeover laws on stock market development.
Download or read book CEO Power Compensation and Governance written by Rui A. Albuquerque and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper presents a contracting model of governance based on the premise that CEOs are the main promoters of governance change. CEOs use their power to extract higher pay or private benefits, and different governance structures are preferred by different CEOs as they favor one or the other type of compensation. The model explains why good country- wide investor protection breeds good firm governance and predicts a race to the top in firm-governance quality after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. However, such governance changes may be associated with higher rather than lower CEO pay as CEOs substitute away from private benefits. The model also provides an explanation for the observed correlation of CEO pay and firm governance as driven by CEO power.
Download or read book CEO Turnover written by Kathleen Anne Farrell and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 152 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book CEO Pay and Shareholder Value written by Ira T. Kay and published by CRC Press. This book was released on 1997-11-11 with total page 164 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: U.S. executive pay, particularly that of CEOs, has been under serious attack for nearly a decade. Despite the fact that tying executive performance and pay to stock price has appeared to have substantially benefited the U.S. economy, this criticism has not subsided. CEO Pay and Shareholder Value challenges some assumptions behind this criticism by addressing these pertinent questions and more:
Download or read book CEO Compensation and Turnover written by Eliezer M. Fich and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The recent wave of revelations involving corporate governance problems has created significant interest in the relationships between chief executive officers (CEOs) and their boards of directors. In this paper we focus on one important but previously uninvestigated characteristic of boards: the tendency of many boards to have two (or more) directors who are also members of another company's board. We define this relationship as a mutual interlock. We explore the consequences of this phenomenon for CEO compensation and CEO turnover.Our empirical analyses - conducted for a sample of 366 large companies, in which 87% of the companies have at least one mutual interlock - show that CEO compensation tends to be higher and CEO turnover tends to be lower when the CEO's board has one or more pairs of board members who are mutually interlocked with another company's board. There are two possible interpretations of these results. One is that the mutual interlocks are an indication of and a contributor to CEO entrenchment, and the higher compensation and lower turnover follow from this entrenchment. The other is that the mutual interlocks are an indication of the strengthening of an important and valuable strategic alliance for the company, and the higher CEO compensation and lower turnover are the CEO's reward for arranging the alliance. We believe that the first interpretation is more accurate, for the reasons discussed in the paper.
Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian Bebchuk and published by . This book was released on 2004-11-22 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, "Pay Without Performance" points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Download or read book CEO Pay Firm Size and Corporate Performance written by Xianming Zhou and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive compensation of 755 Canadian firms is examined over the period 1991-95, and evidence is obtained consistent with previous studies: CEO pay rises with firm size and compensation is tied to company performance. In addition, executives in utilities earn lower pay, and their compensation is less responsive to performance, than is true for their counterparts in other industries. Some novel findings are also documented. First, the sales elasticity of CEO compensation is greater in larger firms. Second, while CEO turnover probability is generally negatively related to the firm's stock performance, the threat of dismissal appear to be less pronounced in small firms.
Download or read book Indispensable and Other Myths written by Michael Dorff and published by Univ of California Press. This book was released on 2014-08-01 with total page 326 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Prodded by economists in the 1970s, corporate directors began adding stock options and bonuses to the already-generous salaries of CEOs with hopes of boosting their companiesÕ fortunes. Guided by largely unproven assumptions, this trend continues today. So what are companies getting in return for all the extra money? Not much, according to the empirical data. In Indispensable and Other Myths: Why the CEO Pay Experiment Failed and How to Fix It, Michael Dorff explores the consequences of this development. He shows how performance pay has not demonstrably improved corporate performance and offers studies showing that performance pay cannot improve performance on the kind of tasks companies ask of their CEOs. Moreover, CEOs of large established companies do not typically have much impact on their companiesÕ results. In this eye-opening exposŽ, Dorff argues that companies should give up on the decades-long experiment to mold compensation into a corporate governance tool and maps out a rationale for returning to the era of guaranteed salaries.
Download or read book Investor Protection and Corporate Governance written by Alberto Chong and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2007-06-26 with total page 584 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: 'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level the first such data in the region and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital. This title will be useful to researchers, policy makers, government officials, and other professionals involved in corporate governance, economic policy, and business finance, law, and management.
Download or read book Changes in the Structure of CEO Compensation and the Firm s Pay Performance Sensitivity Following CEO Turnover written by David W. Blackwell and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We document significant improvements in earnings and stock returns after CEO turnover. Compared to old CEOs, new CEOs derive more of their compensation from salary and bonus and option grants, but less from stock holdings. The sensitivity of pay to performance increases significantly after a change in CEO. The salary and bonus of the new CEO is much more sensitive to performance than that of the old CEO; stock holdings and option grants are less sensitive. Changes in pay-performance sensitivity are greater after exogenous turnover than after exogenous turnover.
