Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Multiple Products written by Jean-Charles Rochet and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study the multiproduct monopoly profit maximisation problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly-ordered then optimality for the seller requires intertemporal price discrimination and it can be implemented by dynamic pricing on the cross-sell to the bundle. If consumers are perfectly negatively correlated, reducing the cross-sell price at a single point in time is optimal. For general valuations we show that if the cross-partial derivative of the profit function is negative then dynamic pricing on the cross-sell is more profitable than fixing prices. So we show that the celebrated Stokey (1979) no-discrimination-across-time result does not extend to multiple good sellers when consumers' valuations are drawn from the tilted uniform, the shifted uniform, the exponential, or the normal distribution. We extend our results to welfare, to complementarities in demand, and to the determination of optimal discount schedules.
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Consumer Packaged Goods written by Ryan Mansley and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Temporary price promotions, or sales, are common in many markets. Using retail scanner data, I find that manufacturers, not retailers, control the timing of sales, while retailers exercise some control over the magnitude of the price decrease. I also find that observed sale policy is more consistent with intertemporal price discrimination than with other explanations. I develop an empirically tractable model that is consistent with these facts and use it to show that sales generally improve consumer surplus and total welfare relative to static pricing. I also find that the effects of market concentration on sales are ambiguous; firms must have some degree of market power for sales to occur, but there are also scenarios when an increase in market power can decrease the occurrence of sales or eliminate them entirely.
Download or read book Intertemporal price discrimination in storable goods markets written by Igal Hendel and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: We study intertemporal price discrimination when consumers can store for future consumption needs. To make the problem tractable we offer a simple model of demand dynamics, which we estimate using market level data. Optimal pricing involves temporary price reductions that enable sellers to discriminate between price sensitive consumers, who anticipate future needs, and less price-sensitive consumers. We empirically quantify the impact of intertemporal price discrimination on profits and welfare. We find that sales: (1) capture 25-30% of the profit gap between non-discriminatory and third degree price discrimination profits, and (2) increase total welfare
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Complementary Products written by Hui Li and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies intertemporal price discrimination (IPD) with complementary products in the context of e-readers and e-books. Using individual-level data (2008-2012), I estimate a dynamic demand model for e-reader adoption and subsequent book quantity, reading format, and retailer choices in several book genres. I use the estimates to simulate a monopolist's optimal dynamic pricing strategies when facing forward-looking consumers. The results illustrate how skimming/penetration pricing incentives for e-readers and harvesting/investing incentives for e-books interact in this novel setting. The optimal joint IPD strategy is skimming for e-readers and investing for e-books. Counterfactual results suggest that combining IPD with complementary product pricing improves firm profitability because it attenuates the limitations of each pricing approach. In a single-product IPD setting, firms' pricing power is limited when consumers anticipate future price changes and delay purchases. Adding complementary products offers firms two pricing instruments; opposite price trajectories provide conflicting incentives for consumers, limiting intertemporal arbitrage. In a static complementary product setting, firms' pricing power is limited when the relative elasticity between the two products is heterogeneous and conflicting among consumers. Adding IPD sorts heterogeneous consumers into different periods and reduces the need to balance across consumer types.
Download or read book Handbook of Industrial Organization written by Richard Schmalensee and published by North Holland. This book was released on 1989-09-11 with total page 640 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Handbook of industrial organization/Schmalensee.-V.2.
Download or read book Dynamic Allocation and Pricing written by Alex Gershkov and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-12 with total page 209 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A new approach to dynamic allocation and pricing that blends dynamic paradigms from the operations research and management science literature with classical mechanism design methods. Dynamic allocation and pricing problems occur in numerous frameworks, including the pricing of seasonal goods in retail, the allocation of a fixed inventory in a given period of time, and the assignment of personnel to incoming tasks. Although most of these problems deal with issues treated in the mechanism design literature, the modern revenue management (RM) literature focuses instead on analyzing properties of restricted classes of allocation and pricing schemes. In this book, Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu propose an approach to optimal allocations and prices based on the theory of mechanism design, adapted to dynamic settings. Drawing on their own recent work on the topic, the authors describe a modern theory of RM that blends the elegant dynamic models from the operations research (OR), management science, and computer science literatures with techniques from the classical mechanism design literature. Illustrating this blending of approaches, they start with well-known complete information, nonstrategic dynamic models that yield elegant explicit solutions. They then add strategic agents that are privately informed and then examine the consequences of these changes on the optimization problem of the designer. Their sequential modeling of both nonstrategic and strategic logic allows a clear picture of the delicate interplay between dynamic trade-offs and strategic incentives. Topics include the sequential assignment of heterogeneous objects, dynamic revenue optimization with heterogeneous objects, revenue maximization in the stochastic and dynamic knapsack model, the interaction between learning about demand and dynamic efficiency, and dynamic models with long-lived, strategic agents.
Download or read book Price Discrimination and Intertemporal Self selection written by Mark Bagnoli and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Effects of Cost Information Transparency on Intertemporal Price Discrimination written by Baojun Jiang and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 47 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A firm's product-cost information is increasingly transparent to consumers as the firm itself or third parties publish such information, which reduces consumers' uncertainty for the product's cost. Using a dynamic model of firm pricing with forward-looking consumer choices, this paper assesses how cost transparency affects the firm's intertemporal price discrimination and profit, as well as the consumers' strategic waiting decisions and surplus. Ceteris paribus, if consumers believe a durable product has a lower cost, they will expect a larger future price drop and tend to delay purchases, impeding the firm's ability to engage in intertemporal price discrimination. Without cost transparency, consumers may infer products with higher prices to have higher costs, giving a low-cost firm incentive to mimic a high-cost firm's high price to encourage consumers to buy early. In contrast, a high-cost firm may choose to distort its price to avoid a low-cost firm's price mimicry. Cost transparency reveals the product's true cost to consumers, limiting the low-cost firm's ability to mimic prices. Thus, cost transparency will benefit (harm) a firm with a high (low) cost. In equilibrium, cost transparency will increase the firm's sales volume and induce more consumers to buy the product earlier instead of later, attenuating strategic waiting by consumers. We also find that cost transparency can lead to higher prices and hurt consumers if the firm has a high cost. In expectation, cost transparency leads to higher firm profits and consumer surplus, facilitating a firm's new-product innovation.
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Competition written by Ralph C. Bayer and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this study we investigate the impact of competition on markets for non-durable goods where intertemporal price discrimination is possible. We develop a simple model of different potential scenarios for intertemporal price discrimination and implement it in a laboratory experiment. We compare the outcomes in monopolies and duopolies. Surprisingly, we find that competition does not necessarily prevent intertemporal price discrimination, as our model predicts. However, competition generally reduces sales prices, but by far less than theory predicts. As expected, competition increases efficiency.
Download or read book Internet Publishing and Beyond written by Brian Kahin and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2000 with total page 258 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: New models for distributing, sharing, linking, and marketing information are appearing.
Download or read book The Economics of Price Discrimination written by George Norman and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 1999 with total page 624 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume brings together significant articles which have appeared between 1971 and 1997, analyzing the application and effects of price discrimination.
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Quality Discrimination and the Coase Conjecture written by Praveen Kumar and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine time-consistent intertemporal price and quality discrimination by a durable goods monopolist facing a continuum of rational buyers with heterogeneous preferences over product quality. We focus the analysis on the "gap" case, where it is profitable for the monopolist to trade with the marginal buyer in the market. We show that along every subgame perfect equilibrium path, with probability one, prices and qualities decline over time, and the market is completely and monotonically depleted according the buyers' demand-intensity for quality in a finite number of offers. However, unlike the fixed quality literature, the monopolist may randomize over price-quality offers along the equilibrium path. We also show that the Coase conjecture continues to be valid here, but in a form that is significantly different from the usual formulation. In the limit, as the time between offers evaporates, the monopolist makes a continuum of offers and perfectly screens the market. However, he effectively can not price-discriminate, since the equilibrium profits are the complete "pooling" profits that would be made if the entire market had the marginal buyer's valuation.
Download or read book The Economics of Price Discrimination written by Louis Phlips and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1983-06-30 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book offers a theoretical and unified explanation of how prices are determined in practice. Pricing, as observed in real life, turns out to be almost discriminatory. Four broad areas are covered: the spatial pricing of bulky products (Part I); the intertemporal pricing of storable goods, exhaustible resources, new durables, and nonstorable goods and services (Part II); two-part tariffs, commodity bundling, tie-ins, and nonlinear prices in general (Part III); and pricing of goods of different quality (Part IV). Each essay contains an introductory chapter describing the business practices that are to be rationalized and evaluated. This is the first unified treatment of a recent and growing body of literature in the 'new industrial organization' field. It fills the gap between textbook microeconomics and real-life antitrust cases. The treatment is as nontechnical and down to earth as possible to permit a wide audience for this comprehensive discussion of industrial pricing.
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination written by Omar Besbes and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study a firm's optimal pricing policy under price commitment. The firm's objective is to maximize its long-term average revenue given a steady arrival of strategic customers. In particular, customers arrive over time, are strategic in timing their purchases and are heterogeneous along two dimensions: their valuation for the firm's product and their willingness to wait before purchasing or leaving. The customers' patience and valuation may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. For this general formulation, we prove that the firm may restrict attention to cyclic pricing policies, which have length at most twice the maximum willingness to wait of the customer population. To efficiently compute optimal policies, we develop a dynamic programming approach which uses a novel state space which is general, enabling to handle arbitrary problem primitives, and that generalizes to finite horizon problems with non-stationary parameters. We analyze the class of monotone pricing policies and establish their suboptimality in general. Optimal policies are, in a typical scenario, characterized by nested sales, where the firm offers partial discounts throughout each cycle, offers a significant discount halfway through the cycle, with the largest discount offered at the end of the cycle. We further establish a form of equivalence between the problem of pricing for a stream of heterogeneous strategic customers and pricing for a pool of heterogeneous customers who may stockpile units of the product.
Download or read book Dynamic Pricing written by Mark Stenius Roberts and published by . This book was released on 1977 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Intertemporal Price Discrimination with Time Varying Valuations written by Victor F. Araman and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A firm that sells a non perishable product considers intertemporal price discrimination in the objective of maximizing the long-run average revenue. Each period, a number of interested customers approach the firm and can either purchase on arrival, or remain in the system for a period of time. During this time, each customer's valuation changes following a discrete and homogenous Markov chain. Customers leave the system if they either purchase at some point, or their valuations reach an absorbing state v0. We show that, in this context, cyclic strategies are optimal, or nearly optimal. When the pace of intertemporal pricing is constrained to be comparable to customers patience level, we have a good control on the cycle length and on the structure of the optimizing cyclic policies. We also obtain an algorithm that yields the optimal (or near optimal) cyclic solutions in polynomial time in the number of prices. We cast part of our results in a general framework of optimizing the long-run average revenues for a class of payoffs that we call weakly coupled, in which the revenue per period depends on a finite number of neighboring prices.
Download or read book Intertemporal Pricing and Price Discrimination written by Thanasis Stengos and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
