Download or read book Information Incentives and Economic Mechanisms written by Theodore Groves and published by U of Minnesota Press. This book was released on 1987 with total page 410 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session
Download or read book Information Incentives and Economic Mechanisms written by Theodore Groves and published by Wiley-Blackwell. This book was released on 1987-01 with total page 399 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Incentives written by Donald E. Campbell and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018-02-22 with total page 699 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines incentives at work to see how and how well coordination is achieved by motivating individual decision makers.
Download or read book Incentives and Political Economy written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2000-03-30 with total page 270 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Mainstream economics has recognized only recently the necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments.The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed.The second part of the book recognises the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves discretion to the politicans selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitutionweighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas.The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterise the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institution in which group behavior is important.
Download or read book Incentives written by Donald E. Campbell and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018-02-22 with total page 700 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: When incentives work well, individuals prosper. When incentives are poor, the pursuit of self-interest is self-defeating. This book is wholly devoted to the topical subject of incentives from individual, collective, and institutional standpoints. This third edition is fully updated and expanded, including a new section on the 2007–08 financial crisis and a new chapter on networks as well as specific applications of school placement for students, search engine ad auctions, pollution permits, and more. Using worked examples and lucid general theory in its analysis, and seasoned with references to current and past events, Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information examines: the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs; the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to medical panels deciding who gets kidney transplants; a wide range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets to the entire economy. Suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students studying incentives as part of courses in microeconomics, economic theory, managerial economics, political economy, and related areas of social science.
Download or read book Information Incentives and the Economics of Control written by G. C. Archibald and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-09-24 with total page 191 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract.
Download or read book Designing Economic Mechanisms written by Leonid Hurwicz and published by . This book was released on 2006-05-22 with total page 344 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in orders to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism, i.e., informationally efficient mechanisms. Our systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Download or read book Robust Mechanism Design The Role Of Private Information And Higher Order Beliefs written by Dirk Bergemann and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2012-03-22 with total page 471 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Download or read book Agency Theory Information and Incentives written by Günter Bamberg and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 538 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Agency Theory is a new branch of economics which focusses on the roles of information and of incentives when individuals cooperate with respect to the utilisation of resources. Basic approaches are coming from microeco nomic theory as well as from risk analysis. Among the broad variety of ap plications are: the many designs of contractual arrangements, organiza tions, and institutions as well as the manifold aspects of the separation of ownership and control so fundamental for business finance. After some twenty years of intensive research in the field of information economics it might be timely to present the most basic issues, questions, models, and applications. This volume Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives offers introductory surveys as well as results of individual rese arch that seem to shape that field of information economics appropriately. Some 30 authors were invited to present their subjects in such a way that students could easily become acquainted with the main ideas of informa tion economics. So the aim of Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives is to introduce students at an intermediate level and to accompany their work in classes on microeconomics, information economics, organization, management theory, and business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1. Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2. Information and Incentives 3. Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4. Financial Contracting and Dividends 5. External Accounting and Auditing 6. Coordination in Groups 7. Property Rights and Fairness 8. Agency Costs.
Download or read book Designing Economic Mechanisms written by Leonid Hurwicz and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2006-05-22 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 440 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Download or read book The Moral Economy written by Samuel Bowles and published by Yale University Press. This book was released on 2016-05-28 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Should the idea of economic man—the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus—determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding “no.” Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may “crowd out” ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.
Download or read book Economic Incentives and Environmental Policies written by J.B. Opschoor and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 306 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contains a collection of papers on economic incentives and environmental policies which result from the authors' joint research work in the program `Environment, Science and Society', conducted under the auspices of the European Science Foundation, with whose cooperation the book has been published. The work concentrates on the scientific and methodological aspects of the development, implementation and evaluation of economic instruments at a national level. The research is both theoretical and empirical. At a theoretical level attention is given to the dynamics of instrument choice in various political and economic contexts, and to the means for evaluating economic instruments in terms of their effectiveness and efficiency. At an empirical level the research seeks to investigate the performance of economic instruments in reality and to explore options for new approaches on the interface between technology, economy and the environment. A subject index complements this first volume in the ESF `Environment, Science and Society' series.
Download or read book Resource Allocation Mechanisms written by Donald E. Campbell and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1987-03-27 with total page 196 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Resource Allocation Mechanisms derives the general welfare properties of systems in which individuals are motivated by self-interest. Satisfactory outcomes will emerge only if individual incentives are harnessed by means of a communication and payoff process, or mechanism, involving every agent. Professor Campbell employs a formal and abstract model of a mechanism that brings into prominence the criteria by which the performance of an economy is to be judged. The mechanism approach is used to prove some fundamental theorems about the possibility of designing an economic system satisfying the criteria. It also establishes a way of thinking about economic issues that is becoming increasingly useful in special branches of economics, such as industrial organization and public finance. This book can be viewed as two different texts: one constitutes an introduction to the theory of mechanism design and the other is a treatment of welfare economics with conventional emphasis on Pareto optimality as well as providing substantial material on incentives, uncertainty, and existence of equilibrium.
Download or read book The Economic Theory of Incentives written by David Martimort and published by . This book was released on 2017-11-24 with total page 1904 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This comprehensive two-volume research collection recaps major literary contributions to the economic theory of incentives. The carefully selected papers spanning forty years analyse and review collective decision problems in the context of asymmetric information, moral hazard and incomplete contracting. Together with an original introduction by the editor, this collection would be a valuable addition to the bookshelves of any serious scholar and student in the field.
Download or read book Information Incentives and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy written by Masahiko Aoki and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1988 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: An in-depth analysis of conventional notions for basic characteristics of the Japanese market economy's microstructure that have significantly influenced economists' approaches to industrial organization.
Download or read book Handbook of System Safety and Security written by Edward Griffor and published by Syngress. This book was released on 2016-10-02 with total page 300 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Handbook of System Safety and Security: Cyber Risk and Risk Management, Cyber Security, Adversary Modeling, Threat Analysis, Business of Safety, Functional Safety, Software Systems, and Cyber Physical Systems presents an update on the world's increasing adoption of computer-enabled products and the essential services they provide to our daily lives. The tailoring of these products and services to our personal preferences is expected and made possible by intelligence that is enabled by communication between them. Ensuring that the systems of these connected products operate safely, without creating hazards to us and those around us, is the focus of this book, which presents the central topics of current research and practice in systems safety and security as it relates to applications within transportation, energy, and the medical sciences. Each chapter is authored by one of the leading contributors to the current research and development on the topic. The perspective of this book is unique, as it takes the two topics, systems safety and systems security, as inextricably intertwined. Each is driven by concern about the hazards associated with a system’s performance. Presents the most current and leading edge research on system safety and security, featuring a panel of top experts in the field Includes several research advancements published for the first time, including the use of ‘goal structured notation’ together with a ‘judgment calculus’ and their automation as a ‘rule set’ to facilitate systems safety and systems security process execution in compliance with existing standards Presents for the first time the latest research in the field with the unique perspective that systems safety and systems security are inextricably intertwined Includes coverage of systems architecture, cyber physical systems, tradeoffs between safety, security, and performance, as well as the current methodologies and technologies and implantation practices for system safety and security
