Download or read book Allocation Information and Markets written by John Eatwell and published by Springer. This book was released on 1989-09-21 with total page 321 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation written by Birger Wernerfelt and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The parties to a contract typically make a lot of decisions during the time it is in force, and the paper is based on the premise that it takes time to be involved in any one of these decisions. Attempts to economize on decision-making time then imply that the parties may write a contract in which each cedes some decision rights to the other. The cost of the arrangement is that the information and preferences of the uninvolved party are neglected. We find that decisions are more likely to be left out of contracts if only one player attaches significant weight to them and simultaneously is well informed. While the direct effect of this may be small, it is dramatically amplified if the decision-maker can be disciplined by the threat of renegotiation. We identify a set of conditions under which the possibility of renegotiation allows the parties to leave all non-price decisions out of the contract. By thus arguing that the threat of renegotiation allows contractual incompleteness, the paper reverses the direction of causality stressed by the literature.
Download or read book The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics written by Philippe Aghion and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2015-12-22 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The 1986 article by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart titled "A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" has provided a framework for understanding how firm boundaries are defined and how they affect economic performance. The property rights approach has provided a formal way to introduce incomplete contracting ideas into economic modeling. The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics collects papers and opinion pieces on the impact that this property right approach to the firm has had on the economics profession.
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation written by Oliver D. Hart and published by . This book was released on 1985 with total page 76 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Unverifiable Information Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation written by Georg Nöldeke and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 16 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation Under Asymetric Information on the Foundations of Incomplete Contracts written by and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 312 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Concession Contract Renegotiations written by Antonio Estache and published by World Bank Publications. This book was released on 2001 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: If having firm-driven renegotiations of contracts for infrastructure services is a major concern, efficiency should not be the only consideration in selecting an operator, indeed, consumers may want to award the concession to a less efficient firm if that would reduce the probability of renegotiation.
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation in Long term Trade Relationships written by Christoph Lülfesmann and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Contract renegotiation under asymmetric information written by Sönje Reiche and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Contract Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Formation written by Sonje Kerrin Reiche and published by . This book was released on 2001 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Essays on Contract Remedies Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation written by Tai-yeong Chung and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 116 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Firms Contracts and Financial Structure written by Oliver D. Hart and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 1995-10-05 with total page 239 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and where the allocation of power or control is therefore important. Power and control are not standard concepts in economic theory. The book begins by pointing out that traditional approaches cannot explain on the one hand why all transactions do not take place in one huge firm and on the other handwhy firms matter at all. An incomplete contracting or property rights approach is then developed. It is argued that this approach can throw light on the boundaries of firms and on the meaning of asset ownership. In the remainder of the book, incomplete contacting ideas are applied to understandfirms' financial decisions, in particular, the nature of debt and equity (why equity has votes and creditors have foreclosure rights); the capital structure decisions of public companies; optimal bankruptcy procedure; and the allocation of voting rights across a company's shares. The book is written in a fairly non-technical style and includes many examples. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students, academic and business economists, and lawyers as well as those with aninterest in corporate finance, privatization and regulation, and transitional issues in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China. Little background knowledge is required, since the concepts are developed as the book progresses and the existing literature is fully reviewed.
Download or read book Incomplete Contracting Renegotiation and Expectation Based Loss Aversion written by Fabian Herweg and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider a simple trading relationship between an expectation-based loss-averse buyer and a profit-maximizing seller. When writing a long-term contract the parties have to rely on renegotiation in order to ensure materially efficient trade ex post. If the buyer expects renegotiation always to take place, the parties are always able to implement the materially efficient good ex post. Expecting materially efficient trade, however, is often not in the buyer's interest, because ex post the seller can opportunistically exploit the buyer's attachment to the expected outcome of renegotiation. In other words, incomplete contracts create a new type of hold-up problem if the buyer is expectation-based loss averse. If credible, the buyer prefers to expect not to renegotiate, which gives rise to ex post inefficiencies. The optimal contract trades off maximizing standard efficiency and minimizing variations in the default outcome and thereby also minimizing the ex ante expected losses.
Download or read book Incomplete Contracts in a Complete Contract World written by Scott Baker and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper considers the role that contract doctrine should play in facilitating optimal investment in contractual relationships. All contracts are incomplete in the sense that they do not specify the optimal actions for the buyer and seller in every future contingency. This incompleteness can lead to both under and over-investment in resources specifically targeted to the needs of the other contracting party. To solve these investment problems, economists and legal scholars have looked to complicated contractual solutions and the ownership of assets. This Article offers another solution: contract doctrine. Specifically, we propose a contractual default rule applicable to all contract interpretation, gap-filling, and good faith inquiries (a relationship-specific investment, or RSI default) that accounts for the renegotiation position of contracting parties. Because contractual default rules form the backdrop against which parties renegotiate, the RSI default allocates bargaining power to one party or the other in much the same manner as does ownership. The RSI default favors the contracting party making an RSI, while at the same time minimizing potential problems of over-investment through a notice requirement. We also offer some preliminary thoughts on the problem of two-sided RSIs.
Download or read book Foundations of Incomplete Contracts written by Oliver D. Hart and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the last few years a new area has emerged in economic theory, which goes under the heading of However, almost since its inception, the theory has been under attack for its lack of rigorous foundations. In this paper, we evaluate some of the criticisms that have been made of the theory, in particular, those in Maskin and Tirole (1998a). In doing so, we develop a model that provides a rigorous foundation for the idea that contracts are incomplete.
Download or read book The Economics of Contracts written by Eric Brousseau and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2002-10-17 with total page 604 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A 2002 survey of economics of contracts appealing to scholars in economics, management and law.
Download or read book Economic Analysis of Contract Law written by Sugata Bag and published by Springer. This book was released on 2018-01-24 with total page 215 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book examines the main issues arising in economic analysis of contract law with special attention given to the incomplete contracts. It discusses both the main features of contract law as they relate to the problem of economic exchange, and how the relevant legal rules and the institutions can be analysed from an economic perspective. Evaluate the welfare impacts, analyses the effects and the desirability of different breach remedies and examines the optimal incentive structure of party-designed liquidated damages under the different dimensions of informational asymmetry. Overall the book aims to contribute to the legal debate over the adoption of the specific breach remedies when the breach victim’s expectation interest is difficult to assess, and to the debate over courts' reluctance to implement large penalties in the event of breach of contracts.
