Download or read book Incentives to Participate in an International Environmental Agreement written by Michael Hoel and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 18 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Economics of International Environmental Agreements written by M. Özgür Kayalıca and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2017-02-17 with total page 271 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: International environmental agreements provide a basis for countries to address ecological problems on a global scale. However, countries are heterogeneous with respect to their economic structures and to the problems relating to the environment that they encounter. Therefore, economic externalities and global environmental conflicts are common and can cause problems in implementation and compliance with international agreements. Economics of International Environmental Agreements illuminates those issues and factors that might cause some countries or firms to take different positions on common problems. This book explores why international environmental agreements deal with some problems successfully but fail with others. The chapters address issues that are global in nature, such as: transboundary pollution, provision of global public goods, individual preferences of inequality- aversion, global cooperation, self-enforcing international environmental agreements, emission standards, abatement costs, environmental quota, technology agreement and adoption and international institutions. They examine the necessary conditions for the improved performance of international environmental agreements, how cooperation among countries can be improved and the incentives that can be created for voluntary compliance with international environmental agreements. This text is of great importance to academics, students and policy makers who are interested in environmental economics, policy and politics, as well as environmental law.
Download or read book Economic Incentives and Restrictions as Enforcement Mechanisms in International Environmental Agreements written by Cari Shiffman and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 120 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Adaptation Effectiveness and Free Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements written by H. Benchekroun and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Ensuring Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements written by U. Beyerlin and published by BRILL. This book was released on 2006-03-01 with total page 406 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this publication, a number of recognized practitioners and scholars undertake to explore the realities and the conceptual underpinnings of environmental compliance mechanisms. In a relatively short period of time, such mechanisms were introduced in a wide range of new and existing environmental regimes. Yet, little is known about their function in practice and their implications. This is puzzling when considering, that the new mechanisms considerably depart from traditional patterns of counteraction and dispute settlement. Instead they build on partnership and cooperation and include a wide range of possible reactions, which range from those having coercive power to supportive measures. Quite a number of those mechanisms and their functioning are explained in the publication in order to lay ground for some cross-cutting analysis, which covers inter alia reporting, inspection and monitoring, supportive financial incentives and the interrelationship between compliance mechanisms and the principle of state responsibility and dispute settlement. Finally the role of non-governmental organizations is addressed. Practitioners and scholars in international environmental affairs and international law more generally will benefit significantly from the inside views and thorough reflection as provided for in this book.
Download or read book The Design of Stable International Environmental Agreements written by Ulrich J. Wagner and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: International environmental agreements typically strive for the solution of a common property resource dilemma. Since the sovereignty of states precludes external enforcement, international environmental agreements must be self-enforcing. Game theoretical models explain why rewards and punishments imposed through the environmental externality generally fail to enforce full cooperation. Therefore, environmental treaties incorporate provisions that enhance the incentives for participation such as transfers, sanctions and linkage to other negotiation topics in international politics. Moreover, interaction with markets and governments as well as the rules and procedures adopted in the negotiation process influence the design and the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement.
Download or read book Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties written by Carlo Carraro and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Many international treaties come into force only after a minimum number of countries have signed and ratified the treaty. Why do countries agree to introduce a minimum participation constraint among the rules characterising an international treaty? This question is particularly relevant in the case of environmental treaties dealing with global commons, where free-riding incentives are strong. Is a minimum participation rule a way to offset these free-riding incentives? Why do countries that know they have an incentive to free-ride accept to tie their hands through the introduction of a minimum participation constraint? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing a three-stage non-cooperative coalition formation game. In the first stage, countries set the minimum coalition size that is necessary for the treaty to come into force. In the second stage, countries decide whether to sign the treaty. In the third stage, the equilibrium values of the decision variables are set. At the equilibrium, both the minimum participation constraint and the number of signatories - the coalition size - are determined. This paper shows that a non-trivial partial coalition, sustained by a binding minimum participation constraint, forms at the equilibrium. This paper thus explains why in international negotiations all countries often agree on a minimum participation rule even when some of them do not intend to sign the treaty. The paper also analyses the optimal size of the minimum participation constraint.
Download or read book Economics of International Environmental Agreements written by M. Özgür Kayalıca and published by Taylor & Francis. This book was released on 2017-02-17 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: International environmental agreements provide a basis for countries to address ecological problems on a global scale. However, countries are heterogeneous with respect to their economic structures and to the problems relating to the environment that they encounter. Therefore, economic externalities and global environmental conflicts are common and can cause problems in implementation and compliance with international agreements. Economics of International Environmental Agreements illuminates those issues and factors that might cause some countries or firms to take different positions on common problems. This book explores why international environmental agreements deal with some problems successfully but fail with others. The chapters address issues that are global in nature, such as: transboundary pollution, provision of global public goods, individual preferences of inequality- aversion, global cooperation, self-enforcing international environmental agreements, emission standards, abatement costs, environmental quota, technology agreement and adoption and international institutions. They examine the necessary conditions for the improved performance of international environmental agreements, how cooperation among countries can be improved and the incentives that can be created for voluntary compliance with international environmental agreements. This text is of great importance to academics, students and policy makers who are interested in environmental economics, policy and politics, as well as environmental law.
Download or read book Strategic Uncertainty Indeterminacy and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements written by Daiju Narita and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book International Environmental Agreements Incentives and Political Economy written by Carlo Carraro and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 13 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Logic of Two Level Games with Endogenous Lobbying written by Houda Haffoudhi and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: International environmental agreements (IEAs) are increasingly important in a globalized economy. The aim of our paper is study the effect of political pressure groups-lobbies- on the size and stability of IEAs. To this purpose we use the framework of two-level games to explain how national political situation influences the decisions of governments at the international negotiations arena. we present an endogenous lobbying model in which we assume that lobbies try to influence the policy choice of governments by offering political contribution in return for policy compromise. Indeed, we use the “interest based explanation” of international environmental policy to describe the incentives of countries to join an agreement. This approach classifies countries in four categories: pushers, bystanders, intermediate and draggers. We found that, when government gives the same weight to contribution and to social welfare, the contributions from the industrial lobby give incentives to government (Pushers, intermediate) to participate in the grand coalition making it stable. Our results suggest that in order to sustain the grand coalition, weak global environmental agreements -- i.e. those involving small abatement targets-should be negotiated. The result is similar if governments are more interested by political contribution. However, if governments care less about political contribution than about social welfare, industrial contribution is not enough to limit the free riding incentives of each type of government. In this situation, pushers are the more expected to sustain a small stable coalition.
Download or read book Three Essays on International Environmental Agreements written by Ross Andrew Mohr and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 123 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation considers the theoretical aspects of countries' incentives to cooperate on environmental good provision and resolve free-rider incentives, in particular with the formation of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA).
Download or read book Domestic Politics and the Formation of International Environmental Agreements written by Carmen Marchiori and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We investigate the effect of domestic politics on international environmental policy by incorporating into a classic stage game of coalition formation the phenomenon of lobbying by special-interest groups. In doing so, we contribute to the theory of international environmental agreements, which has overwhelmingly assumed that governments make decisions based on a single set of public-interest motivations. Our results suggest that lobbying on emissions may affect the size of the stable coalition in counterintuitive ways. In particular, a powerful business lobby may increase the government's incentives to sign an agreement, by providing it with strong bargaining power with respect to that lobby at the emission stage. This would result in lower total emissions when the number of countries involved is not too large. We also show that things change radically when lobbying bears directly on the membership decisions, suggesting that both the object and timing of lobbying matter for the way in which membership decisions, emissions and welfare are affected.
Download or read book International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting written by Wolfgang Buchholz and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper explores the outcome of an international environmental agreement when the governments are elected by their citizens. It also considers a voter's incentives for supporting candidates who are less green than she is. In the extreme case of 'global' pollution, the elected politicians pay no attention to the environment, and the resulting international agreement is totally ineffective. Moreover, if governments cannot negotiate and have to decide non-cooperatively (and voters are aware of this), the elected politicians can be greener, ecological damage can be lower and the median voter's payoff can be higher than in the case with bargaining.
Download or read book Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements written by Barbara K. Buchner and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyses whether different emissions trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation process. Our analysis confirms the conjecture that, by appropriately designing the emission trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore, participation and optimal policy should be jointly analysed. Moreover, our results show that the US, Russia and China have different most preferred climate coalitions and therefore adopt conflicting negotiation strategies.
Download or read book Free Riding in International Environmental Agreements written by Ana Espinola-Arredondo and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines countries' free-riding in international environmental agreements (IEA) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and second, countries do not have complete information about other countries' noncompliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country leading the negotiations of the international agreement can reveal its own noncompliance cost through the commitment level it signs in the IEA. Our results show that countries' probability to join the IEA is increasing in the free-riding benefits they can obtain from other countries' compliance, and decreasing in their own noncompliance costs. This paper shows that, when free-riding incentives are strong enough, there is no equilibrium in which all types of countries join the IEA. Despite not joining the IEA, countries invest in clean technologies. Finally, we relate our results with some common observations in international negotiations.
Download or read book International Environmental Governance written by Niko Urho and published by Nordic Council of Ministers. This book was released on 2019-02-20 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A plethora of environmental problems are ravaging the planet and its inhabitants. How well do existing structures convene governments to address these challenges? What is the role of science and civil society in this context? And, does international cooperation properly support countries with limited capacities? This report seeks to respond to these questions, based on an analysis of actions taken to renew international environmental governance to fulfill commitments made at the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in 2012. This report outlines possibilities to strengthen the UN Environment Programme and to enhance synergies among global environmental conventions to ensure that international environmental governance continues evolving and improving to secure human well-being and planetary health.
