Download or read book Incentives and Two Sided Matching Engineering Coordination Mechanisms for Social Clouds written by Haas, Christian and published by KIT Scientific Publishing. This book was released on 2014-09-01 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Social Cloud framework leverages existing relationships between members of a social network for the exchange of resources. This thesis focuses on the design of coordination mechanisms to address two challenges in this scenario. In the first part, user participation incentives are studied. In the second part, heuristics for two-sided matching-based resource allocation are designed and evaluated.
Download or read book Two Sided Matching written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-06-26 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann
Download or read book Approximation Randomization and Combinatorial Optimization Algorithms and Techniques written by Leslie Ann Goldberg and published by Springer. This book was released on 2011-08-05 with total page 715 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the joint refereed proceedings of the 14th International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, APPROX 2011, and the 15th International Workshop on Randomization and Computation, RANDOM 2011, held in Princeton, New Jersey, USA, in August 2011. The volume presents 29 revised full papers of the APPROX 2011 workshop, selected from 66 submissions, and 29 revised full papers of the RANDOM 2011 workshop, selected from 64 submissions. They were carefully reviewed and selected for inclusion in the book. In addition two abstracts of invited talks are included. APPROX focuses on algorithmic and complexity issues surrounding the development of efficient approximate solutions to computationally difficult problems. RANDOM is concerned with applications of randomness to computational and combinatorial problems.
Download or read book Incentives and Market based Institutions written by Clayton Ray Featherstone and published by Stanford University. This book was released on 2010 with total page 149 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this dissertation, we will study three market-based institutions and the incentives that govern them. The first institution is that of centralized school choice, which has become increasingly important over the past decade. Students submit ordinal rankings over schools and a central mechanism uses those rankings to assign students. We study an important mechanism that is seen in the field, the Boston mechanism, and another mechanism with nice theoretical properties, the Deferred acceptance mechanism (DA), that has been adopted in several large school districts. One of the biggest reasons that DA is theoretically nice is that it makes truthful preference revelation a dominant strategy for the students. In a lab experiment, we show that students fail to truthfully reveal their rankings over schools when it is profitable to do so (under Boston), but tell the truth when it is not (under DA). In this sense, the experiment confirms the intuition that designers of school choice mechanisms should be worried about strategic manipulation of preference reports. We also, however, look at a different preference environment where truth-telling is a Bayes- Nash equilibrium under Boston and a dominant strategy equilibrium under DA. What's more, under this environment, given truthful revelation, Boston yields outcomes that stochastically dominant those of DA from the interim perspective that considers others' preferences unknown. In this environment, we see truth-telling rates that are not significantly different, which means that we might be able to implement better outcomes if we look to mechanisms that implement truth-telling as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, instead of as a dominant strategy. Next, we look at two-sided labor matches, such as the one used by the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) to match newly-minted doctors to residency programs. Again, we see two major types of mechanisms -- priority mechanisms that try to implement potential matches in a particular order, and Deferred Acceptance mechanisms, which rely on the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Relative to truthful preference revelation, DA is ex post stable, while priority mechanisms are not. Ex post stability intuitively prevents unraveling. In equilibrium, though, we do not expect truthful preference revelation, and in fact, this leads to instability in the equilibria of both mechanisms. Still, in the field, we see that priority mechanisms tend to unravel, while DA mechanisms do not. This is a puzzle which can be resolved if agents truthfully reveal under DA, in spite of the fact that they could profit by deviating. In the lab, we show that this is exactly what we see, which provides a complementary explanation for the success of DA to the core-convergence-based explanations. Finally, we look at long-distance trade without enforcement. When we think of pre-modern trade, a major problem was the worry that agents carrying goods might abscond with those goods instead of carrying them to their intended destinations. Explanations in the literature have tended to rely on models of reputation. These models, in turn, rely on the theory of infinitely repeated games. This is usually justified via the thought that traders formed some sort of tightly knit community or had some sort of dynastic continuation. We look at the question of finite trade. Although the conventional wisdom is that finite trade would unravel from the last period, we show a mechanism by which this does not happen. Beyond merely making a technical point, we think this model of finite trade provides a good model with which to think about impersonal trade.
Download or read book Algorithmic Game Theory written by Ron Lavi and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-09-05 with total page 307 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2014, held in Haifa, Israel, in October 2014. The 24 full papers and 5 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 65 submissions. They cover various important aspects of algorithmic game theory, such as matching theory, game dynamics, games of coordination, networks and social choice, markets and auctions, price of anarchy, computational aspects of games, mechanism design and auctions.
Download or read book Market Design written by Martin Bichler and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-12-21 with total page 298 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The digital economy led to many new services where supply is matched with demand for various types of goods and services. More and more people and organizations are now in a position to design market rules that are being implemented in software. The design of markets is challenging as it needs to consider strategic behavior of market participants, psychological factors, and computational problems in order to implement the objectives of a designer. Market models in economics have not lost their importance, but the recent years have led to many new insights and principles for the design of markets, which are beyond traditional economic theory. This book introduces the fundamentals of market design, an engineering field concerned with the design of real-world markets.
Download or read book Economics of Grids Clouds Systems and Services written by Jörn Altmann and published by Springer. This book was released on 2013-08-30 with total page 295 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Economics of Grids, Clouds, Systems, and Services, GECON 2013, held in Zaragoza, Spain, in September 2013.The 20 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The papers are organized in the following topical sections: business models, energy consumption, resource allocation, work in progress on resource allocation, work in progress on pricing, quality of service, work in progress on utility and ROI modeling.
Download or read book The Stable Marriage Problem written by Dan Gusfield and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book probes the stable marriage problem and its variants as a rich source of problems and ideas that illustrate both the design and analysis of efficient algorithms. It covers the most recent structural and algorithmic work on stable matching problems, simplifies and unifies many earlier proofs, strengthens several earlier results, and presents new results and more efficient algorithms.The authors develop the structure of the set of stable matchings in the stable marriage problem in a more general and algebraic context than has been done previously; they discuss the problem's structure in terms of rings of sets, which allows many of the most useful features to be seen as features of a more general set of problems. The relationship between the structure of the stable marriage problem and the more general stable roommates problem is demonstrated, revealing many commonalities.The results the authors obtain provide an algorithmic response to the practical, and political, problems created by the asymmetry inherent in the Gale Shapley solutions, leading to alternative methods and better compromises than are provided by the Gale Shapley method. And, in contrast to Donald Knuth's earlier work which primarily focused on the application of mathematics to the analysis of algorithms, this book illustrates the productive and almost inseparable relationship between mathematical insight and the design of efficient algorithms.Dan Gusfield is Associate Professor of Computer Science at the University of California, Davis. Robert W. Irving is Senior Lecturer in Computing Science at the University of Glasgow. The Stable Marriage Problem is included in the Foundations of Computing Series, edited by Michael Garey and Albert Meyer.
Download or read book Advances in Economics and Econometrics Volume 1 written by Bo Honoré and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2017-11-02 with total page 425 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the first of two volumes containing papers and commentaries presented at the Eleventh World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in Montreal, Canada in August 2015. These papers provide state-of-the-art guides to the most important recent research in economics. The book includes surveys and interpretations of key developments in economics and econometrics, and discussion of future directions for a wide variety of topics, covering both theory and application. These volumes provide a unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline, written by leading specialists in their fields. The first volume includes theoretical and applied papers addressing topics such as dynamic mechanism design, agency problems, and networks.
Download or read book The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy written by Barry R. Weingast and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2008-06-20 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Over its long lifetime, "political economy" has had many different meanings: the science of managing the resources of a nation so as to provide wealth to its inhabitants for Adam Smith; the study of how the ownership of the means of production influenced historical processes for Marx; the study of the inter-relationship between economics and politics for some twentieth-century commentators; and for others, a methodology emphasizing individual rationality (the economic or "public choice" approach) or institutional adaptation (the sociological version). This Handbook views political economy as a grand (if imperfect) synthesis of these various strands, treating political economy as the methodology of economics applied to the analysis of political behavior and institutions. This Handbook surveys the field of political economy, with 58 chapters ranging from micro to macro, national to international, institutional to behavioral, methodological to substantive. Chapters on social choice, constitutional theory, and public economics are set alongside ones on voters, parties and pressure groups, macroeconomics and politics, capitalism and democracy, and international political economy and international conflict.
Download or read book The Handbook of Market Design written by Nir Vulkan and published by OUP Oxford. This book was released on 2013-08-29 with total page 706 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges.
Download or read book Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems written by Nardine Osman and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-09-23 with total page 202 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book features a selection of best papers from 11 workshops held at the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, in Singapore in May 2016.The 11 full papers were carefully reviewed and selected for inclusion in this volume. They cover specific topics, both theoretical and applied, in the general area of autonomous agents and multiagent systems.
Download or read book Journal of Economic Literature written by and published by . This book was released on 1991 with total page 1162 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Algorithms ESA 2007 written by Lars Arge and published by Springer. This book was released on 2007-09-17 with total page 782 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 15th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, ESA 2007, held in Eilat, Israel, in October 2007 in the context of the combined conference ALGO 2007. The 63 revised full papers presented together with abstracts of three invited lectures address all current subjects in algorithmics reaching from design and analysis issues of algorithms over to real-world applications and engineering of algorithms in various fields.
Download or read book Algorithmic Game Theory written by Guido Schäfer and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on with total page 549 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Stable Marriage and Its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems written by Donald Ervin Knuth and published by American Mathematical Soc.. This book was released on 1997 with total page 90 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Uses the theory of stable marriage to introduce and illustrate a variety of important concepts and techniques of computer science and mathematics: data structures, control structures, combinatorics, probability, analysis, algebra, and especially the analysis of algorithms.
Download or read book Models in Microeconomic Theory written by Martin J. Osborne and published by Open Book Publishers. This book was released on 2023-06-26 with total page 382 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Models in Microeconomic Theory covers basic models in current microeconomic theory. Part I (Chapters 1-7) presents models of an economic agent, discussing abstract models of preferences, choice, and decision making under uncertainty, before turning to models of the consumer, the producer, and monopoly. Part II (Chapters 8-14) introduces the concept of equilibrium, beginning, unconventionally, with the models of the jungle and an economy with indivisible goods, and continuing with models of an exchange economy, equilibrium with rational expectations, and an economy with asymmetric information. Part III (Chapters 15-16) provides an introduction to game theory, covering strategic and extensive games and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. Part IV (Chapters 17-20) gives a taste of the topics of mechanism design, matching, the axiomatic analysis of economic systems, and social choice. The book focuses on the concepts of model and equilibrium. It states models and results precisely, and provides proofs for all results. It uses only elementary mathematics (with almost no calculus), although many of the proofs involve sustained logical arguments. It includes about 150 exercises. With its formal but accessible style, this textbook is designed for undergraduate students of microeconomics at intermediate and advanced levels.
