Download or read book Incentive Compatible Matching Mechanisms written by M. Bumin Yenmez and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I study the consistency of incentive compatibility with several stability notions for a one-to-one matching market with transfers. Ex post stability, studied in the matching literature, is too strong to be satisfi ed together with incentive compatibility. Therefore, I introduce weaker stability notions: ex ante stability and interim stability. Although ex ante stability is consistent with incentive compatibility when agents are ex ante identical or when the market is balanced, interim stability can only be satis fied when there is one agent on the short side of the market, as in auctions. Which stability is appropriate depends on when agents can block.

Download or read book On the Coexistence Of Stability and Incentive Compatibility in Fractional Matchings written by Shivika Narang and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The topic of stability of fractional matchings has started receiving attention only very recently with incentive compatibility in this context receiving scarce attention. Our paper studies the incentive compatibility of mechanisms finding stable fractional matchings. Agent preferences are expressed as cardinal utilities. We exhibit matching instances for which no stable fractional matching mechanism is approximately incentive compatible. We then characterize the class of matching instances with unique stable fractional matchings. We first show that a unique stable fractional matching exists if and only if the given matching instance satisfies the conditional mutual first preference (CMFP) property. To this end, we provide an algorithm that ingeniously uses envy-graphs finding a non-integral stable matching whenever the preferences are strict and the given instance is not in CMFP. For this class of CMFP matching instances, we prove that every mechanism that produces the unique stable fractional matching is incentive compatible.

Download or read book Stable Matching with Generalized Preference Assumptions written by Joanna Drummond and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Matching markets are ubiquitous, including college admissions, school choice, reviewer paper matching, and various labour market matchings. Many of these matching markets run centralized matching schemes, using algorithms to determine the resulting match. An important property for the matches provided by the clearing house is stability. The notion of stability, where no one in the market has both the incentive and the ability to change their partner, has been empirically shown to be a very valuable property in real-world markets. However, the mechanisms used in practice make assumptions that do not hold in practice. In this thesis, we investigate problems in this gap between theory and practice. We focus on assumptions regarding participants' preferences: the standard algorithms for this problem assume participants are able and willing to provide a full preference list, sometimes over tens of thousands of alternatives. The standard algorithms also assume participants' preferences can be expressed by a simple ordered list over individual alternatives: a false assumption when a pair of participants, a couple, are looking for a job in the same city. We use a variety of techniques to address these issues, ranging from heuristic preference elicitation schemes, to equilibria analysis of participants' behaviour in the market as-is, to using SAT solvers to develop new matching mechanisms with couples. Our SAT encoding exhibits improved performance, and allows for more guarantees regarding participants' strategic behavior under certain circumstances. We find, under some settings, a common interviewing strategy is not an equilibrium. This provides further evidence for the need of elicitation schemes; ours find stable matches with much less information than traditional methods.

Download or read book Incentives and Two Sided Matching Engineering Coordination Mechanisms for Social Clouds written by Haas, Christian and published by KIT Scientific Publishing. This book was released on 2014-09-01 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Social Cloud framework leverages existing relationships between members of a social network for the exchange of resources. This thesis focuses on the design of coordination mechanisms to address two challenges in this scenario. In the first part, user participation incentives are studied. In the second part, heuristics for two-sided matching-based resource allocation are designed and evaluated.

Download or read book Information Incentives and Economic Mechanisms written by Theodore Groves and published by U of Minnesota Press. This book was released on 1987 with total page 410 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session

Download or read book Non standard Choice in Matching Markets written by Gian Caspari and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodate non-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions on participants' choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatible mechanisms. Our results imply that well-functioning matching markets can be designed to adequately accommodate a plethora of choice behaviors, including the standard behavior that is consistent with preference maximization. To illustrate the significance of our results in practice, we show that a simple modification in a commonly used matching mechanism enables it to accommodate non-standard choice behavior.

Download or read book The Stability of Incentive Compatibility for Mechanisms that Rely on Ex Ante Information written by Robert L. Welch and published by . This book was released on 1981 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book On the Characterization of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms in General Quasi linear Environments written by Yu Chen and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 26 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory written by Tim Roughgarden and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2016-08-30 with total page 356 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

Download or read book Two Sided Matching written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-06-26 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann

Download or read book Strength of Incentives for Individually Incentive Compatible Mechanisms written by Jerry R. Green and published by . This book was released on 1975 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Mechanisms Multi lateral Incentive Compatibility and the Core written by Joseph G. Haubrich and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Incentives in One sided Matching Problems with Ordinal Preferences written by Hadi Hosseini and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 179 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the core problems in multiagent systems is how to efficiently allocate a set of indivisible resources to a group of self-interested agents that compete over scarce and limited alternatives. In these settings, mechanism design approaches such as matching mechanisms and auctions are often applied to guarantee fairness and efficiency while preventing agents from manipulating the outcomes. In many multiagent resource allocation problems, the use of monetary transfers or explicit markets are forbidden because of ethical or legal issues. One-sided matching mechanisms exploit various randomization and algorithmic techniques to satisfy certain desirable properties, while incentivizing self-interested agents to report their private preferences truthfully. In the first part of this thesis, we focus on deterministic and randomized matching mechanisms in one-shot settings. We investigate the class of deterministic matching mechanisms when there is a quota to be fulfilled. Building on past results in artificial intelligence and economics, we show that when preferences are lexicographic, serial dictatorship mechanisms (and their sequential dictatorship counterparts) characterize the set of all possible matching mechanisms with desirable economic properties, enabling social planners to remedy the inherent unfairness in deterministic allocation mechanisms by assigning quotas according to some fairness criteria (such as seniority or priority). Extending the quota mechanisms to randomized settings, we show that this class of mechanisms are envyfree, strategyproof, and ex post efficient for any number of agents and objects and any quota system, proving that the well-studied Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) is also envyfree in this domain. The next contribution of this thesis is providing a systemic empirical study of the two widely adopted randomized mechanisms, namely Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and the Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). We investigate various properties of these two mechanisms such as efficiency, strategyproofness, and envyfreeness under various preference assumptions (e.g. general ordinal preferences, lexicographic preferences, and risk attitudes). The empirical findings in this thesis complement the theoretical guarantees of matching mechanisms, shedding light on practical implications of deploying each of the given mechanisms. In the second part of this thesis, we address the issues of designing truthful matching mechanisms in dynamic settings. Many multiagent domains require reasoning over time and are inherently dynamic rather than static. We initiate the study of matching problems where agents' private preferences evolve stochastically over time, and decisions have to be made in each period. To adequately evaluate the quality of outcomes in dynamic settings, we propose a generic stochastic decision process and show that, in contrast to static settings, traditional mechanisms are easily manipulable. We introduce a number of properties that we argue are important for matching mechanisms in dynamic settings and propose a new mechanism that maintains a history of pairwise interactions between agents, and adapts the priority orderings of agents in each period based on this history. We show that our mechanism is globally strategyproof in certain settings (e.g. when there are 2 agents or when the planning horizon is bounded), and even when the mechanism is manipulable, the manipulative actions taken by an agent will often result in a Pareto improvement in general. Thus, we make the argument that while manipulative behavior may still be unavoidable, it is not necessarily at the cost to other agents. To circumvent the issues of incentive design in dynamic settings, we formulate the dynamic matching problem as a Multiagent MDP where agents have particular underlying utility functions (e.g. linear positional utility functions), and show that the impossibility results still exist in this restricted setting. Nevertheless, we introduce a few classes of problems with restricted preference dynamics for which positive results exist. Finally, we propose an algorithmic solution for agents with single-minded preferences that satisfies strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, and weak non-bossiness in one-shot settings, and show that even though this mechanism is manipulable in dynamic settings, any unilateral deviation would benefit all participating agents.

Download or read book Game Theory And Mechanism Design written by Y Narahari and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2014-03-13 with total page 533 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.

Download or read book Field Application of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms written by Katherine S. Carson and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Characterization of Strongly Individually Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods written by Jerry R. Green and published by . This book was released on 1975 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Valuing Environmental Preferences written by Ian Bateman and published by Oxford University Press, USA. This book was released on 2001 with total page 678 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The questionnaire-based Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) asks people what would they be willing to pay for an environmental good or attribute, or willing to accept for its loss. These papers consider the real value of such surveys.