Download or read book Implicit Contracts Incentive Compatibility and Involuntary Unemployment written by William Bentley MacLeod and published by Kingston, Ont. : Institute for Economic Research, Queen's University. This book was released on 1986 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Implicit Contracts Incentive Compatibility and Involuntary Unemployment written by William Bentley MacLeod and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice.

Download or read book Implicit Contracts Incentive Compatibility and Involuntary Unemployment written by W. Bentley MacLeod and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Implicit Contracts On the job Search and Involuntary Unemployment written by Charles T. Carlstrom and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Insurance and Incentives in Labor Contracts written by Oliver Fabel and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 284 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Implicit Contracts Incentive Compatability and Involuntary Unemployment written by W. B. MacLeod and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Implicit Contracts and Involuntary Unemployment written by F. H. Hahn and published by . This book was released on 1984 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book On Implicit Contracts and Involuntary Unemployment written by John Geanakoplos and published by . This book was released on 1981 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Recent Developments in the Theory of Involuntary Unemployment written by Carl Davidson and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 194 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Summarises the following theories of unemployment, which have emerged since the 1960s: search, disequilibrium (i.e. fixed price models), implicit contracts, efficiency wage, and insider/outsider models.

Download or read book A Two sector Implicit Contracting Model with Procyclical Quits and Involuntary Layoffs written by Charles T. Carlstrom and published by . This book was released on 1989 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts written by V. V. Chari and published by . This book was released on 1980 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Implicit Contracts Labor Mobility and Unemployment written by Richard Arnott and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Theory of Incentives written by Jean-Jacques Laffont and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2009-12-27 with total page 436 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

Download or read book Efficient Contracts and Incentive Compatibility with Asymmetric Information written by James Pemberton and published by . This book was released on 1988 with total page 15 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Tripartite Income employment Contracts and Coalition Incentive Compatibility written by Murray Brown and published by . This book was released on 1986 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Advanced Microeconomics for Contract Institutional and Organizational Economics written by W. Bentley MacLeod and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2022-04-05 with total page 417 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A graduate textbook on microeconomics, covering decision theory, game theory, and the foundations of contract theory, with a unique focus on the empirical. This graduate-level text on microeconomics, covering such topics as decision theory, game theory, bargaining theory, contract theory, trade under asymmetric information, and relational contract theory, is unique in its emphasis on the interplay between theory and evidence. It reviews the microeconomic theory of exchange “from the ground up,” aiming to produce a set of models and hypotheses amenable to empirical exploration, with particular focus on models that are useful for the study of contracts, institutions, and organizations. It explores research that extends price theory to the exchange of commodities when markets are incomplete, discussing recent developments in the field. Topics covered include the relationship between theory and evidence; decision theory as it is used in contract theory and institutional design; game theory; axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory; agency theory and the class of models that are considered to constitute contract theory, with discussions of moral hazard and trade with asymmetric information; and the theory of relational contracts. The final chapter offers a nontechnical review that provides a guide to which model is the most appropriate for a particular application. End-of-chapter exercises help students expand their understanding of the material, and an appendix provides brief introduction to optimization theory and the welfare theorem of general equilibrium theory. Students are assumed to be familiar with general equilibrium theory and basic constrained optimization theory.

Download or read book Contract Theory written by Patrick Bolton and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2004-12-10 with total page 746 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.