Download or read book Implementation of the United States Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement written by G. Armantrout and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 9 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP) monitors and provides assurance that Russian weapons-grade HEU is processed into low enriched uranium (LEU) under the transparency provisions of the 1993 United States (U.S.)-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement. Meeting the Agreement's transparency provisions is not just a program requirement; it is a legal requirement. The HEU Purchase Agreement requires transparency measures to be established to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are met. The Transparency concept has evolved into a viable program that consists of complimentary elements that provide necessary assurances. The key elements include: (1) monitoring by technical experts; (2) independent measurements of enrichment and flow; (3) nuclear material accountability documents from Russian plants; and (4) comparison of transparency data with declared processing data. In the interest of protecting sensitive information, the monitoring is neither full time nor invasive. Thus, an element of trust is required regarding declared operations that are not observed. U.S. transparency monitoring data and independent instrument measurements are compared with plant accountability records and other declared processing data to provide assurance that the nonproliferation objectives of the 1993 Agreement are being met. Similarly, Russian monitoring of U.S. storage and fuel fabrication operations provides assurance to the Russians that the derived LEU is being used in accordance with the Agreement. The successful implementation of the Transparency program enables the receipt of Russian origin LEU into the United States. Implementation of the 1993 Agreement is proceeding on schedule, with the permanent elimination of over 8,700 warhead equivalents of HEU. The successful implementation of the Transparency program has taken place over the last 10 years and has provided the necessary nonproliferation assurances to the U.S. while developing an increasing level of trust and cooperation between the U.S. and Russian government agencies.

Download or read book Implementation of the United States Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement written by G. Armantrout and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 15 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Nuclear nonproliferation implications of the U S purchase of Russian highly enriched uranium report to the chairman Committee on Commerce House of Representatives written by and published by DIANE Publishing. This book was released on with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Implementation of the United States Russian HEU Agreement written by E. Rutkowski and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: During Calendar Year (CY) 2002, the Russian Federation (R.F.) delivered low enriched uranium (LEU) from the conversion and processing of 30 metric tons (MT) of weapons-grade (90% {sup 235}U assay) uranium. Through July 2003, the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP) will have monitored the conversion of over 190 MT HEU into LEU. This total represents about 38 percent of the projected 500 MT HEU scheduled to be blended down through the year 2013 and is equivalent to the destruction of 7,600 nuclear devices. The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) HEU-TIP monitors the processing of this HEU at four Russian uranium-processing plants. During CY 2002, United States (U.S.) personnel monitored this process for a total of 194 monitor-weeks by staffing a Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) located in Novouralsk, and through a series of five-day Special Monitoring Visits (SMV) to the four plants. U.S. monitor observations include the inventory of in-process containers, the observation of operations and non-destructive assay measurements (NDA) to determine {sup 235}U enrichment, as well as the examination and validation of Russian Material Control and Accountability (MC & A) documents. In addition, the U.S. designed Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) installed at the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP) in January 1999 monitored all HEU blended at that facility, which is about 50 percent of the HEU blended into LEU during CY 2002. Recently we installed a BDMS at the Electrochemical Plant (ECP) in Zelenogorsk and plans are underway to install a BDMS at the Siberian Chemical Enterprise (SChE) in Seversk in late 2004. On a very positive note, interpersonal interactions between U.S. and Russian technical experts continues to expand and have proven to be an important element of the transparency regime. On the tenth anniversary of the HEU Purchase Agreement, the Ministry of the R.F. for Atomic Energy (Minatom) also saluted the successful implementation of the government-to-government program as ''an example of the effective realization of bilateral cooperation in real disarmament''. This paper describes the Program's monitoring efforts and achievements at the four Russian uranium processing plants, and will touch upon the issues of transparency and the natural uranium component activities.

Download or read book Nuclear Nonproliferation written by United States. General Accounting Office and published by . This book was released on with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report discusses: 1. The status of the February 1993 HEU agreement's implementation, 2. USEC's performance as executive agent for the United States, 3. The impact of USEC's privatization and the HEU agreement on the United States' capability to produce fuel for nuclear power plants domestically, and 4. Federal oversight of the HEU agreement's implementation.

Download or read book Nuclear Nonproliferation Implications of the U S Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium written by and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report discusses: 1. The status of the February 1993 HEU agreement's implementation, 2. USEC's performance as executive agent for the United States, 3. The impact of USEC's privatization and the HEU agreement on the United States' capability to produce fuel for nuclear power plants domestically, and 4. Federal oversight of the HEU agreement's implementation.

Download or read book Russian Suspension Agreement written by United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 68 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Nuclear Nonproliferation Implications of the U S Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium written by and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This report discusses: 1. The status of the February 1993 HEU agreement's implementation, 2. USEC's performance as executive agent for the United States, 3. The impact of USEC's privatization and the HEU agreement on the United States' capability to produce fuel for nuclear power plants domestically, and 4. Federal oversight of the HEU agreement's implementation.

Download or read book Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons written by Russia (Federation). and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book HEU Transparency Implementation Program and Its Radiation Safety Program written by and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 8 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In February 1993, the Governments of the United States (U.S.) and the Russian Federation (R.F.) signed a bilateral Agreement for the U.S. purchase of low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from 500 metric tons (MT) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons. The HEU Purchase Agreement serves important national security and nonproliferation policy imperatives for both countries since its implementation reduces the quantity of surplus Russian HEU that could be stolen and diverted for weapons use. In return, Russia receives much needed U.S. dollars over a 20-year delivery period. In 2001, Russia received over half a billion US dollars from the purchase of the LEU blended from 30 MT HEU. As part of this Agreement, transparency rights were agreed upon that provide confidence to both governments that the nonproliferation objectives of the Agreement are being fulfilled. While the U.S. Department of State, in concert with the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible negotiating transparency rights associated with this nuclear material, the NNSA is responsible for implementing those rights. These rights allow U.S. and R.F., personnel (called ''monitors'') to visit the processing facilities and observe the steps for processing the HEU into fuel for nuclear reactors. In this fashion, the processing of HEU to LEU is made ''transparent.'' For DOE, there are three transparency objectives: (1) that the HEU is extracted from nuclear weapons, (2) that this same HEU is oxidized, and (3) that the HEU is blended into LEU. For MINATOM, the transparency objective is: (1) that the LEU is fabricated into fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors: The transparency is based on visits by designated transparency monitors (100 preapproved U.S. and Russian monitors) with specific rights to monitor and to access storage and processing areas to provide confidence that the nonproliferation goals of the agreement are met. The Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency Implementation Program (TIP), within NNSA implements the transparency provisions of the bilateral agreement. It is constantly making progress towards meeting its objectives and gathering the information necessary to confirm that Russian weapons-usable HEU is being blended into LEU. Since the first shipment in 1995 through December 2001, a total of 141 MT of weapons-grade HEU, about 28% of the agreed total and equivalent to 5,650 nuclear weapons, was converted to LEU, further reducing the threat of this material returning back into nuclear weapons. In the year 2001, the LEU sold to electric utility customers for fuel was sufficient to supply the annual fuel needs for about 50 percent of the U.S. installed nuclear electrical power generation capacity. There are four primary uranium processing activities involved in converting HEU metal components extracted from dismantled nuclear weapons into fuel for power reactors: (1) Converting HEU metal to purified HEU oxide; (2) Converting purified HEU oxide to HEU hexafluoride; (3) Downblending HEU hexafluoride to LEU hexafluoride; and (4) Converting LEU hexafluoride into reactor fuel. The first three processes are currently being performed at four Russian nuclear processing facilities: Mayak Production Association (MPA), Electrochemical Plant (ECP), Siberian Chemical Enterprise (SChE), and Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant (UEIP). Following the blending down of HEU, the LEU hexafluoride is loaded into industry, standard 30B cylinders at the downblending facilities and transported to St. Petersburg, Russia. From there the LEU is shipped by sea to the United States where it is converted into fuel to be used in nuclear power plants. There are six U.S. facilities processing LEU subject to the HEU purchase agreement: the Portsmouth uranium enrichment plant, Global Nuclear Fuel -America, Framatome-Lynchburg, Framatome-Richland, Westinghouse-Hematite, and Westinghouse Fuel Fabrication Facility.

Download or read book Strengthening Long Term Nuclear Security written by Russian Academy of Sciences and published by National Academies Press. This book was released on 2006-03-22 with total page 118 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In July 2005, the National Academies released the report Strengthening Long-term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia. The report highlighted several obstacles in the transition from a U.S.-Russian cooperative program to a Russian-directed and Russian-funded fully indigenized program that will ensure the security of 600 tons of weapon-usable nuclear material at a level of international acceptability. Overcoming these obstacles requires an increased political commitment at a number of levels of the Russian Government to modern material protection, control, and accounting systems (MPC&A). Adequate resources must be provided to facilities where weapon-usable material is located for upgrading and maintaining MPC&A systems. Additionally, the technical security systems that are being installed through the cooperative program need to be fully embraced by Russian managers and specialists. The report recommends the establishment of a ten-year indigenization fund of about $500 million provided by Russia and its G-8 partners as a new mechanism for gradually shifting the financial burden of MPC&A to the Russian Government.

Download or read book TRANSPARENCY written by D. A. Leich and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 7 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: By the end of August, 2005, the Russia Federation delivered to the United States (U.S.) more than 7,000 metric tons (MT) of low enriched uranium (LEU) containing approximately 46 million SWU and 75,000 MT of natural uranium. This uranium was blended down from weapons-grade (nominally enriched to 90% {sup 235}U) highly enriched uranium (HEU) under the 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement that provides for the blend down of 500 MT HEU into LEU for use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. The HEU Transparency Program, under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), monitored the conversion and blending of the more than 250 MT HEU used to produce this LEU. The HEU represents more than half of the 500 MT HEU scheduled to be blended down through the year 2013 and is equivalent to the elimination of more than 10,000 nuclear devices. The HEU Transparency Program has made considerable progress in its mission to develop and implement transparency measures necessary to assure that Russian HEU extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons is blended down into LEU for delivery to the United States. U.S. monitor observations include the inventory of in process containers, observation of plant operations, nondestructive assay measurements to determine {sup 235}U enrichment, as well as the examination of Material Control and Accountability (MC & A) documents. During 2005, HEU Transparency Program personnel will conduct 24 Special Monitoring Visits (SMVs) to four Russian uranium processing plants, in addition to staffing a Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) at one Russian site.

Download or read book Implications of the U S Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium written by United States. General Accounting Office and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Overview of Russian HEU Transparency Issues written by and published by . This book was released on 1993 with total page 7 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The U.S. has signed an agreement with the Russian Federation for the purchase of 500 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) taken from dismantled nuclear weapons. The HEU will be blended down to low-enriched uranium and will be transported to the U.S. to be used by fuel fabricators to make fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. Both the U.S. and Russia have been preparing to institute transparency measures to provide assurance that nonproliferation and arms control objectives specified in the agreement are met. This paper provides background information on the original agreement and on subsequent negotiations with the Russians, as well as discussion of technical aspects of developing transparency measures suited to the facilities and processes which are expected to be involved. Transparency has been defined as those agreed-upon measures which build confidence that arms control and non-proliferation objectives shared by the parties are met. Transparency is a departure from exhaustive, detailed arms control verification regimes of past agreements, which were based on a presumption of detecting transgressions as opposed to confirming compliance.

Download or read book Russia s Atomic Tsar written by and published by . This book was released on 1996 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Minatom (Ministry of Atomic Energy) was created to manage Russia's nuclear weapons program in the age of disarmament. The ministry is responsible for the development, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons, warhead dismantlement, the production of nuclear materials for weapons, the disposition of nuclear materials disassembled from warheads, the administration of Russia's vast nuclear weapons complex, the development of policy for the future role of Russia's nuclear complex and payment of employees entrusted with such tasks. Thus, Minatom is instrumental in the implementation of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation agreements. The director of Minatom, Viktor N. Mikhailov, wields a great deal of power and influence over Russia's nuclear infrastructure. He is an important player amidst efforts to reduce the threats posed by Russia's decaying nuclear complex. There are certainly other personalities in the Russian government who influence Minatom; however, few affect the ministry as profoundly as Mikhailov. His ability to influence Russia's nuclear complex has been clearly demonstrated by his policies in relation to the US purchase of Russian highly enriched uranium, the planned fissile material storage facility at Mayak, materials protection, control and accountability programs, and his unwavering determination to sell Iran commercial nuclear technology. Mikhailov has also been a key negotiator when dealing with the US on issues of transparency of weapons dismantlement and fissile material disposition, as well as the use of US threat reduction funds. His policies and concerns in these areas will affect the prospects for the successful negotiation and implementation of future nuclear threat reduction programs and agreements with Russia.

Download or read book Molybdenum 99 for Medical Imaging written by National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine and published by National Academies Press. This book was released on 2016-11-28 with total page 264 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The decay product of the medical isotope molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), technetium-99m (Tc-99m), and associated medical isotopes iodine-131 (I-131) and xenon-133 (Xe-133) are used worldwide for medical diagnostic imaging or therapy. The United States consumes about half of the world's supply of Mo-99, but there has been no domestic (i.e., U.S.-based) production of this isotope since the late 1980s. The United States imports Mo-99 for domestic use from Australia, Canada, Europe, and South Africa. Mo-99 and Tc-99m cannot be stockpiled for use because of their short half-lives. Consequently, they must be routinely produced and delivered to medical imaging centers. Almost all Mo-99 for medical use is produced by irradiating highly enriched uranium (HEU) targets in research reactors, several of which are over 50 years old and are approaching the end of their operating lives. Unanticipated and extended shutdowns of some of these old reactors have resulted in severe Mo-99 supply shortages in the United States and other countries. Some of these shortages have disrupted the delivery of medical care. Molybdenum-99 for Medical Imaging examines the production and utilization of Mo-99 and associated medical isotopes, and provides recommendations for medical use.

Download or read book Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 written by David Albright and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 544 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are the basic materials used in nuclear weapons. Plutonium also plays an important part in the generation of nuclear electricity. Knowing how much plutonium and HEU exists, where and in which form is vital for international security and nuclear commerce. This book is a thorough revision of the World Inventory of Plutonium and highly Enriched Uranium, 1992. It provides a rigorous and comprehensive assessment of the amounts of plutonium and HEU in military and civilian programmes, in nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, and in countries seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. The capibilities that exist for producing these materials around the world are examined in depth, as are the policy issues raised by them. Containing much new information, this book is indispensable to all those concerned with the great contemporary issues in international nuclear relations: arms reductions in the nuclear weapon states, nuclear proliferation, nuclear smuggling, the roles of plutonium and enriched uranium in the nuclear fuel-cycle, and the disposition of surplus weapon material.