Download or read book Impact of Corporate Governance and Financial Development on Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity Evidence from US REIT Companies written by 莊穎皜 and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Investor Protection and Corporate Governance written by Alberto Chong and published by A copublication of Stanford Economics and Finance. This book was released on 2007 with total page 596 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Investor Protection in Latin America represents the largest data-gathering effort of firm-level corporate governance practices, ownership structures, and dividend policies. The results presented show that on top of country-wide legal protection of investors, there is a positive effect on valuation and performance of higher firm-level protections and better corporate governance practices. This evidence matches previous research in the area for other regions of the world.

Download or read book Does Corporate Governance Matter for REITs Re Examining The REIT Effect written by Tien Foo Sing and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 29 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study tests corporate governance and performance relationships using a balanced panel of 2,779 REITs and non-REIT firms in the US over the period from 2005 to 2008. The results show that strong corporate governance dampens firm values. However, the marginal effect is weakest for REITs relative to the control sample firms in utilities and finance industries. The results weakly corroborate the “REIT effect” hypothesis, which argues that the regulated regime in REIT markets reduces the reliance on strong internal governance. The negative results are consistent with the “tunneling distortion” hypothesis, which predicts that dominant insiders (weak governance) could lead insiders/managers to carry out self-dealing activities that will siphon off cash flows from firms. The negative effects are reinforced when unobserved heterogeneity and self-selectivity of firms into REITs are corrected. The value-destroying effects by weakly governed REITs could be channeled through real estate investment, dividend payout and leveraging activities. Strong governance in REIT markets with strong investors' protection (with dominant outside shareholdings) induces positive risk-taking behavior in REIT managers, which increases firm values.

Download or read book Does Cash Flow Cause Investment and R D written by Bronwyn H. Hall and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 37 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The role of financial institutions and corporate governance in the conduct and performance of industrial firms, especially in the area of technological innovation and international competition, has been hotly debated in the recent past. The results presented here are a contribution to the empirical evidence on the behavior of individual firms that operate in somewhat different institutional environments. Using a Panel Data version of the Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) methodology, we test for the causal relationship among sales and cash flow on the one hand and investment and Ramp;D on the other in three large panels of firms in the scientific (high technology) sectors in the United States, France, and Japan. Our findings are that both investment and Ramp;D are more highly sensitive to cash flow and sales in the United States than in France and Japan. Correspondingly, investment and Ramp;D predict both cash flow and sales positively in the United States, while their impact is somewhat more mixed in the other countries.

Download or read book The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Performance of Reits written by Xiangliang Bai and published by . This book was released on 2017-01-26 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This dissertation, "The Effect of Corporate Governance on the Performance of REITs: the Evidence From Hong Kong and Singapore" by Xiangliang, Bai, 白相良, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: The Asian REIT market has been developing quickly in recent years and gradually attracted attention of international investors. However, compared with other developed markets such as the US and Australia, very little is known about the Asian REIT market. This research examines the impact of the quality of corporate governance on the performance of two major and similar REIT markets - Hong Kong and Singapore. In this research, the quality of corporate governance is measured by a scoring system that is based on the APREA Corporate Governance Scoring Framework (APREA CGSF) developed by Lecomte and Ooi (2012) for Singapore REITs but modified to suit the characteristics and regulatory requirements of both Hong Kong and Singapore REIT markets. Firm performance is measured by Tobin's Q. The empirical analysis is based on panel data during 2007-2011 from Hong Kong and Singapore REIT markets. The empirical results show that the quality of corporate governance (as measured by the Integrated Corporate Governance Index or ICGI) has a significant and positive impact on firm performance, holding other factors constant. However, closer examination shows that only about 20% of all the governance provisions included in the ICGI have significant impact on firm performance. This research also finds that REITs with corporate governance that takes into consideration of the interests of other stakeholders in addition to those of the shareholders (such as provision for corporate social responsibility) do not perform better. Incidentally, the empirical results strongly suggest that Singapore REITs perform better than Hong Kong REITs after controlling for all known factors including the quality of corporate governance. This result calls for a deeper explanation. A more detailed study from a new institutional economics perspective may shed light on this issue. DOI: 10.5353/th_b5194755 Subjects: Real estate investment trusts - China - Hong Kong Corporate governance - China - Hong Kong Real estate investment trusts - Singapore Corporate governance - Singapore

Download or read book Investment cash Flow Sensitivities are Not Valid Measures of Financing Constraints written by Steven N. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Kaplan and Zingales [1997] provide both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that investment-cash flow sensitivities are not good indicators of financing constraints. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1999] criticize those findings. In this note, we explain how the Fazzari et al. [1999] criticisms are either very supportive of the claims in Kaplan and Zingales [1997] or incorrect. We conclude with a discussion of unanswered questions.

Download or read book Corporate Governance and the Over investment of Surplus Cash written by Scott Anthony Richardson and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Research and Development Market Valuation and Cash Flow Sensitivity written by Valdocéu Pereira de Queiroz and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 149 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Corporate Governance as a Mechanism to Mitigate Financing Constraints on Investment written by Anna Grosman and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper addresses whether adopting good governance standards alleviates constraints on financing investment via improved internal efficiency or access to external capital. The Russian context serves as an appropriate setting for studying the longitudinal effect of governance. I use transparency and disclosure (TD) scores computed by Standard and Poor's (S&P) as the primary proxy for corporate governance, supported by shareholder ownership structure. I find that corporate governance has a positive and significant impact on fixed investment. However, my findings indicate that for oligarch-owned firms, this relationship might be curvilinear. State owned enterprises (SOEs) are more sensitive than oligarch-owned enterprises to improved governance, but less sensitive to the changes in internal funds (cash-flows). I elaborate on possible interpretations of these findings. Firstly, SOEs are poorly governed judging by their S&P TD scores, therefore, any improvements to their governance might have a more significant effect on their fixed investment. Secondly, the absence of investment-cash-flow sensitivity for SOEs might be due to soft budget constraints.I find that governance of financially constrained firms positively and significantly affects investment. Governance, therefore, is a valid mechanism for reducing financing constraints on investment. The empirical analysis is conducted on an eight-year panel dataset containing observations on the largest Russian companies, publicly listed in Russia or abroad. Robustness checks and controls for endogeneity include dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM), difference-in-difference estimator (DID), based on an exogenous event (introduction of Russian governance code) and vector autoregression (VAR) techniques.

Download or read book Institutional Investors Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance written by Stuart L. Gillan and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Is Investment cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by the Agency Costs Or Asymmetric Information written by Grzegorz Pawlina and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book How Shareholder Reforms Can Pay Foreign Policy Dividends written by James Shinn and published by Council on Foreign Relations (. This book was released on 2002 with total page 80 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Not only can good governance practices facilitate free trade by taking many disputes off the trade agenda, they can also stabilize the financial system by avoiding expensive and unpopular bailouts. This paper argues that U.S. foreign policymakers must accelerate the pace of corporate governance reform.

Download or read book The Impact of Growth Opportunities on the Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity written by Frederiek Schoubben and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper investigates the relevance of growth opportunities for the interpretation of investment-cash flow sensitivity of large Belgian companies. We use data on both listed and large unlisted firms to better distinguish between issues of overinvestment due to agency problems and underinvestment due to capital constraints. Simultaneously this data set offers opportunities to incorporate a wide variation in levels of asymmetric information. We show that, contrary to what is generally accepted, decreasing cash flow sensitivity as growth prospects improve need not indicate overinvestment. Rather it may indicate that capital constrained firms increase the use of external financing in high growth periods as these financing sources then tend to become more appealing. As a result the dependence of investment decisions on internal financing is diminished, thereby reducing measured cash flow sensitivity below the level of low growth years.

Download or read book The Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public Offerings written by Jay C. Hartzell and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study analyzes the impact of corporate governance structures at the initial public offering date. We test hypotheses that firms with more shareholder-oriented governance structures receive higher valuations at the IPO stage, attract more institutional ownership, and have better long-term performance. Our IPO sample is restricted to a set of 107 real estate investment trusts (REITs) over the 1991 to 1998 time period. Using a single industry and REITs in particular reduces potentially confounding effects due to differences in risk, transparency, and growth potential. We believe this - combined with our use of IPOs - mitigates the endogeneity problem present in studies of the impact of governance on seasoned firms' valuation. Our analysis indicates that firms with stronger governance structures not only have higher initial IPO valuations, but also have better long-term operating performance than their peers.

Download or read book The Effect of Corporate Governance on Investment written by Jay C. Hartzell and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 43 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study investigates the relation between firms' investment choices and various governance mechanisms, using a sample of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Since REITs provide a relatively accurate measure of Tobin's q, a transparent structure, and generally less asymmetric information about their investment opportunities, they provide an especially good sample to evaluate these issues. We find evidence that the responsiveness of REITs' investment expenditures to their opportunities depends on their corporate governance structures. Within the set of governance mechanisms that we examine, we find particularly strong links between investment behavior and ownership. Specifically, we find that the investment choices of REITs are more closely tied to Tobin's q if they have greater institutional ownership, or lower director and officer stock ownership. These results are consistent with institutional owners monitoring the firm's investment policies, and with high insider ownership allowing managers to follow their own investment agendas.

Download or read book Corporate Governance and Equity Prices written by Stijn Claessens and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: February 1995 More concentrated ownership is generally expected to improve corporate governance. Evidence from Czechoslovakia's mass privatization program supports this hypothesis. Equity prices in the Czech and Slovak Republics are higher when a domestic or foreign investor has majority firm ownership, and lower when ownership is shared among many investors. The 1992 Czechoslovakia mass privatization program involving about 1,500 enterprises and implemented through a voucher scheme with competitive bidding was a bold step in changing the ownership and governance of a large part of the economy. It represents a clear test case of one approach, and other countries may benefit from its lessons. At the time, much skepticism was voiced about mass privatization: it would lead to diffuse ownership, and no effective corporate governance would result. But innovative forces led to the emergence of investment funds that collected much of the individuals' voucher points, leading to a much more concentrated ownership structure. It has been expected that this concentrated ownership would lead to improved corporate governance. But the jury is still out. So far, only limited and largely anecdotal evidence is available on the impact investment funds have on the way firms are being managed. Too little time has passed and too many shocks have occurred (for example, the split of the Czech and Slovak Republics) to expect to find discernible changes in corporate governance on measures of actual firm performance. An alternative approach is to investigate whether firms that ended up with more concentrated ownership -- and possibly improved governance -- sell for higher prices, either in the last voucher round or in the secondary market since then. In a forward-looking financial market, one can expect prices to incorporate the effects of better ownership on future firm performance and associated dividends to shareholders. Put differently, one would expect that two firms with different shareholding structures, but otherwise identical, would trade at different prices -- with the firm with a more concentrated ownership, and presumably better corporate governance, trading at a higher price. On a cross-sectional basis, ownership structure may thus be significant in explaining (relative) share prices. Claessens explores this line of reasoning. Controlling for a number of firm and sector-specific variables, he finds that: * Majority ownership by a domestic or foreign investor has a positive influence on firm prices. * Firms with many small owners have lower prices. * Ownership by many small-scale investors makes it easier for any single investor to establish effective control, but such control does not necessarily translate into higher prices. Claessens provides two possible explanations of why higher prices appear to be associated only with majority ownership by a single investor: * The corporate legal framework and the difficulty in collecting proxy votes in the Czech and Slovak Republics may prevent a small investor from making the necessary changes in the way firms are managed, thus keeping prices low. * Commercial banks are both managers of investment funds and creditors of individual firms. Funds managers may face conflicts of interest and not be interested in increasing the value of equity alone but also the value of credits. This could explain why prices are relatively lower for those firms in which investment funds have effective control. This paper -- a product of the Private Sector and Finance Team, Technical Department, Europe and Central Asia, and Middle East and North Africa Regions -- is part of a larger effort in the Bank to study corporate governance in transition economies.

Download or read book International Corporate Investment and the Role of Financial Constraints written by W. Sean Cleary and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: International evidence over the 1987-1997 period suggests that the capital expenditures of firms that are financially constrained are much less sensitive to the availability of internal funds than unconstrained firms. The evidence is particularly strong when firms are classified according to financial health, but is also prevalent for groups formed according to dividend behavior and firm size. The results provide strong support for the generality of the results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999). A major reason for the weak investment-cash flow sensitivity displayed by unhealthy firms is that they appear to be busy building up financial slack, which has long-term value, as postulated by Myers and Majluf (1984).