Download or read book Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information written by Patrick L. Bajari and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation-based estimators for static, discrete games. With appropriate exclusion restrictions about how covariates enter into payoffs and influence equilibrium selection, the model is identified with only weak parametric assumptions. Monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples. As an application, we study the strategic decision of firms in spatially-separated markets to establish a presence on the Internet.

Download or read book Essays on the Econometrics of Discrete Games of Complete Information written by Li Zhao and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 97 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Bayesian Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information written by Sridhar Narayanan and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 56 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Identification of Solution Concepts for Discrete Games written by Nail Kashaev and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Empirical analyses of discrete games rely on behavioral as- sumptions that are crucial not just for estimation, but also for the validity of counterfactual exercises and policy implications. We find conditions for a general class of complete-information games under which it is possible to identify whether the behavior of economic agents satisfies some of these assumptions. Our results allow us to identify whether and how often firms in an entry game play Nash equilibria, and which equilibria are more likely to be selected.

Download or read book Identification and Estimation of Empirical Games Without Equilibrium Assumption written by Erhao Xie and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Empirical studies of games typically rely on Nash Equilibrium. However, such solution concept is rejected by experimental evidence in many situations. The incorrect imposition of Nash Equilibrium can generate bias in both estimation and counterfactual prediction. Therefore, my thesis studies the identification and estimation of empirical games without equilibrium assumption. The first two chapters focus on discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of restricting players to have unbiased expectation as required by equilibrium, my model treats a player's belief about the behaviors of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. This belief function is estimated together with players' payoffs. The first chapter shows that the variations of players' choice sets identify the payoff and belief functions up to scale normalizations. Moreover, the hypothesis of unbiased belief is testable. I then empirically study store hours competition between McDonald's and KFC in China. The null hypothesis of KFC's unbiased beliefs is rejected. Furthermore, the estimated payoff functions indicate that the store hours decision is a type of vertical differentiation. The second chapter, co-authored with Victor Aguirregabiria, focuses on experimental games. We show that another source of identification (i.e. one variable affects one player's payoffs without affecting this player's belief) can achieve similar identification results as chapter 1. We then apply our methods to two sets of experiments. In the matching pennies game, a player can correctly predict the other player's behavior. In contrast, the hypothesis of unbiased belief is rejected in the coordination game. When players do not adopt equilibrium strategies, they can learn from their mistakes to better perform in the future. Therefore, the third chapter studies the identification of learning behaviors using experimental data. I consider a general model that nests commonly used learning procedures. More importantly, instead of assuming monetary payoff is players' actual utility as in existing literature, I treat utility as an unknown unrestricted function. Under weak conditions, I show that players' structural learning parameters and utility function are identified. The finite sample properties of MLE and consequences of misspecification of utility function are illustrated by a Monte Carlo simulation.

Download or read book Identification and Estimation of Games with Incomplete Information Using Excluded Regressors written by Arthur Lewbel and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Identification and Estimation of Incomplete Information Games with Multiple Equilibria written by Ruli Xiao and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 41 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Identification and Efficient Semiparametric Estimation of a Dynamic Discrete Game written by Patrick L. Bajari and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we study the identification and estimation of a dynamic discrete game allowing for discrete or continuous state variables. We first provide a general nonparametric identification result under the imposition of an exclusion restriction on agent payoffs. Next we analyze large sample statistical properties of nonparametric and semiparametric estimators for the econometric dynamic game model. We also show how to achieve semiparametric efficiency of dynamic discrete choice models using a sieve based conditional moment framework. Numerical simulations are used to demonstrate the finite sample properties of the dynamic game estimators. An empirical application to the dynamic demand of the potato chip market shows that this technique can provide a useful tool to distinguish long term demand from short term demand by heterogeneous consumers.

Download or read book Identification Estimation and Inference in Empirical Games written by Mathieu Marcoux and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis collects three papers studying topics related to the econometrics of empirical games. In Chapter 1, I investigate the identification and the estimation of empirical games of incomplete information with common-knowledge unobservable heterogeneity and potentially multiple equilibria realized in the data. I introduce pre-determined outcome variables to recover such unobserved heterogeneity. The recovered unobservables provide an extra source of exogenous variation that helps to identify the primitives of the model. I apply this method to study mobile telecommunications in Canada. I estimate a game in which national incumbents and new entrants choose the number of transceivers they install in different markets. The results highlight sizeable economies of density in transceivers location decisions. Counterfactual experiments shed light on the governmentâ s attempt to increase competition in this industry. In Chapter 2, I propose a test of an assumption commonly maintained when estimating discrete games of incomplete information, i.e. the assumption of equilibrium uniqueness in the data generating process. The test I propose is robust to player-specific common-knowledge unobservables. The main identifying assumption is the existence of an observable variable interpreted as a proxy for these unobservables. It must (i) have sufficient variation; (ii) be correlated with the common-knowledge unobservables; and (iii) provide only redundant information regarding the playersâ decisions and the equilibrium selection, were these unobservables actually observed. In Chapter 3, I study bias reduction when estimating dynamic discrete games. An iterative approach (the K-step estimator) is known to reduce finite sample bias, provided that some equilibrium stability conditions are satisfied. Modified versions of the K-step estimator have been proposed to deal with this stability issue. Alternatively, there exist other bias reduction techniques which do not rely on equilibriumâ s stability, but have not received much attention in this class of models. Using a dynamic game of market entry and exit, I compare the finite sample properties of the K-step approach with alternative methods. The results show that, even when the K-step estimator does not converge to a single point after a large number of iterations, it still considerably reduces finite sample bias for small values of K.

Download or read book The Econometric Analysis of Network Data written by Bryan Graham and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2020-06-03 with total page 244 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Econometric Analysis of Network Data serves as an entry point for advanced students, researchers, and data scientists seeking to perform effective analyses of networks, especially inference problems. It introduces the key results and ideas in an accessible, yet rigorous way. While a multi-contributor reference, the work is tightly focused and disciplined, providing latitude for varied specialties in one authorial voice. Answers both 'why' and 'how' questions in network analysis, bridging the gap between practice and theory allowing for the easier entry of novices into complex technical literature and computation Fully describes multiple worked examples from the literature and beyond, allowing empirical researchers and data scientists to quickly access the 'state of the art' versioned for their domain environment, saving them time and money Disciplined structure provides latitude for multiple sources of expertise while retaining an integrated and pedagogically focused authorial voice, ensuring smooth transition and easy progression for readers Fully supported by companion site code repository 40+ diagrams of 'networks in the wild' help visually summarize key points

Download or read book Handbook of Industrial Organization written by Richard Schmalensee and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 1989 with total page 943 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Annotation This is Vol 3 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization series (HIO). Vols 1 & 2 published simultaneously in 1989 under the editorship of Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig. Many of the chapters in these successful volumes were widely cited and appeared on graduate reading lists, and some continue to appear even recently. Since the first volumes published, the field of industrial organization has continued to evolve. As the editors acknowledge in the Preface, these volumes had some gaps and this new volume aims to fill some of those gaps. The aim is to serve as a source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organization, or industrial economics, the microeconomics field that focuses on business behavior and its implications for both market structures and processes, and for related public policies. The first two volumes of the HIO appeared at roughly the same time as Jean Tirole's book The Theory of Industrial Organization. Together they helped revolutionize the teaching of industrial organization, and provided a state-of-the-art summary. Tirole's book is concerned with the relevant theory, and several reviewers noted that the first two volumes of HIO contained much more discussion of the theoretical literature than of the empirical literature. In most respects, this imbalance was an accurate reflection of the field. Since then, the empirical literature has flourished, while the theoretical literature has continued to grow, and this new volume reflects that change of emphasis. *Part of the renown Handbooks in Economics series *Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields. *A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations, or industrial economicists.

Download or read book Estimation of Discrete Games with Weak Assumptions on Information written by Lorenzo Magnolfi and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Nonparametric Identification of Incomplete Information written by Erhao Xie and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the literature that estimates discrete games with incomplete information, researchers usually impose two assumptions. First, either the payoff function or the distribution of private information or both are restricted to follow some parametric functional forms. Second, players' behaviors are assumed to be consistent with the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This paper jointly relaxes both assumptions. The framework non-parametrically specifies both the payoff function and the distribution of private information. In addition, each player's belief about other players' behaviors is also modeled as a nonparametric function. I allow this belief function to be any probability distribution over other players' action sets. This specification nests the equilibrium assumption when each player's belief corresponds to other players' actual choice probabilities. It also allows non-equilibrium behaviors when some players' beliefs are biased or incorrect. Under the above framework, this paper first derives a testable implication of the equilibrium condition. It then obtains the identification results for the payoff function, the belief function and the distribution of private information.

Download or read book Estimation of Discrete Games with Weak Assumptions on Information written by and published by . This book was released on 2020 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Identification and Estimation of Entry Games Under Symmetry of Unobservables written by Yu Zhou and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 75 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper provides a new point identification and estimation for two-player entry games with complete information under a symmetric condition on unobservables. Neither equilibrium selection nor distributional assumption is required. In addition, a weaker support condition is used in comparison to the existing literature. Following the identification, this paper proposes a new estimator, that, unlike existing estimators, is shown to have root-n consistency. This paper further constructs a test statistic to test the symmetry condition. Monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator performs well in moderate-sized samples and is robust to unimodal and multimodal error distributions. Finally, this paper applies the new method to the entry game of discount retailers in Jia (2008).

Download or read book Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games written by Martin Pesendorfer and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: This paper studies the identification problem in infinite horizon Markovian games and proposes a generally applicable estimation method. Every period firms simultaneously select an action from a finite set. We characterize the set of Markov equilibria. Period profits are a linear function of equilibrium choice probabilities. The question of identification of these values is then reduced to the existence of a solution to this linear equation system. We characterize the identification conditions. We propose a simple estimation procedure which follows the steps in the identification argument. The estimator is consistent, asymptotic normally distributed, and efficient. We have collected quarterly time series data on pubs, restaurants, coffeehouses, bakeries and carpenters for two Austrian towns between 1982 and 2002. A dynamic entry game is estimated in which firms simultaneously decide whether to enter, remain active, or exit the industry. The period profit estimates are used to simulate the equilibrium behavior under a policy experiment in which a unit tax is imposed on firms deciding to enter the industry.

Download or read book Structural Econometric Modeling in Industrial Organization and Quantitative Marketing written by Ali Hortaçsu and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2023-10-24 with total page 281 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A concise and rigorous introduction to widely used approaches in structural econometric modeling Structural econometric modeling specifies the structure of an economic model and estimates the model’s parameters from real-world data. Structural econometric modeling enables better economic theory–based predictions and policy counterfactuals. This book offers a primer on recent developments in these modeling techniques, which are used widely in empirical industrial organization, quantitative marketing, and related fields. It covers such topics as discrete choice modeling, demand modes, estimation of the firm entry models with strategic interactions, consumer search, and theory/empirics of auctions. The book makes highly technical material accessible to graduate students, describing key insights succinctly but without sacrificing rigor. • Concise overview of the most widely used structural econometric models • Rigorous and systematic treatment of the topics, emphasizing key insights • Coverage of demand estimation, estimation of static and dynamic game theoretic models, consumer search, and auctions • Focus on econometric models while providing concise reviews of relevant theoretical models