Download or read book Identification and Efficient Semiparametric Estimation of a Dynamic Discrete Game written by Patrick L. Bajari and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, we study the identification and estimation of a dynamic discrete game allowing for discrete or continuous state variables. We first provide a general nonparametric identification result under the imposition of an exclusion restriction on agent payoffs. Next we analyze large sample statistical properties of nonparametric and semiparametric estimators for the econometric dynamic game model. We also show how to achieve semiparametric efficiency of dynamic discrete choice models using a sieve based conditional moment framework. Numerical simulations are used to demonstrate the finite sample properties of the dynamic game estimators. An empirical application to the dynamic demand of the potato chip market shows that this technique can provide a useful tool to distinguish long term demand from short term demand by heterogeneous consumers.
Download or read book Structural Econometric Modeling in Industrial Organization and Quantitative Marketing written by Ali Hortaçsu and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2023-10-24 with total page 280 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Within economics a relatively new way of modeling has dominated important subfields: structural modeling. The goal of this book is to give an overview on how the various streams of literatures in empirical industrial organization and quantitative marketing use structural econometric modeling to estimate the model parameters, give the economic-model-based predictions, and conduct the policy counterfactual experiments. The traditional way of modelling, called "reduced-form" builds its models from simple relationships between variables of interests, which are mostly linear. Structural econometric models start by specifying the structure of the economic model, and the variables are calibrated from real-world data. This method enables better predictions and policy counterfactuals, and has other benefits. When considering a hypothetical policy change using the traditional modeling method ("reduced form"), researchers can often only estimate whether an effect would be positive or negative. With a structural econometric model using real-world data, a researcher can obtain the magnitude of the effects resulting from a hypothetical change. But the ability of quantifying the effects associated with a hypothetical policy change comes with its costs: the nonlinearity from explicitly specifying the possible relationships makes the structural econometric approach generally much more difficult to implement than its reduced-form counterpart. Therefore this book will provide a much-needed resource on how to use these methods effectively in the fields in which they been used the most, empirical industrial organization and quantitative marketing"--
Download or read book Identification and Estimation of Discrete Games of Complete Information written by Patrick L. Bajari and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 72 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation-based estimators for static, discrete games. With appropriate exclusion restrictions about how covariates enter into payoffs and influence equilibrium selection, the model is identified with only weak parametric assumptions. Monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately-sized samples. As an application, we study the strategic decision of firms in spatially-separated markets to establish a presence on the Internet.
Download or read book Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games written by Martin Pesendorfer and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Abstract: This paper studies the identification problem in infinite horizon Markovian games and proposes a generally applicable estimation method. Every period firms simultaneously select an action from a finite set. We characterize the set of Markov equilibria. Period profits are a linear function of equilibrium choice probabilities. The question of identification of these values is then reduced to the existence of a solution to this linear equation system. We characterize the identification conditions. We propose a simple estimation procedure which follows the steps in the identification argument. The estimator is consistent, asymptotic normally distributed, and efficient. We have collected quarterly time series data on pubs, restaurants, coffeehouses, bakeries and carpenters for two Austrian towns between 1982 and 2002. A dynamic entry game is estimated in which firms simultaneously decide whether to enter, remain active, or exit the industry. The period profit estimates are used to simulate the equilibrium behavior under a policy experiment in which a unit tax is imposed on firms deciding to enter the industry.
Download or read book Advances in Economics and Econometrics Volume 3 Econometrics written by Daron Acemoglu and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-05-13 with total page 633 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the third of three volumes containing edited versions of papers and commentaries presented at invited symposium sessions of the Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society, held in Shanghai in August 2010. The papers summarize and interpret key developments in economics and econometrics, and they discuss future directions for a wide variety of topics, covering both theory and application. Written by the leading specialists in their fields, these volumes provide a unique, accessible survey of progress on the discipline. The first volume primarily addresses economic theory, with specific focuses on nonstandard markets, contracts, decision theory, communication and organizations, epistemics and calibration, and patents.
Download or read book Advances in Economics and Econometrics written by Econometric Society. World Congress and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2013-05-27 with total page 633 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The third volume of edited papers from the Tenth World Congress of the Econometric Society 2010.
Download or read book Handbook of Industrial Organization written by and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2021-12-09 with total page 788 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume Four highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters written by an international board of expert authors. Presents authoritative surveys and reviews of advances in theory and econometrics Reviews recent research on capital raising methods and institutions Includes discussions on developing countries
Download or read book Identification Estimation and Inference in Empirical Games written by Mathieu Marcoux and published by . This book was released on 2017 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis collects three papers studying topics related to the econometrics of empirical games. In Chapter 1, I investigate the identification and the estimation of empirical games of incomplete information with common-knowledge unobservable heterogeneity and potentially multiple equilibria realized in the data. I introduce pre-determined outcome variables to recover such unobserved heterogeneity. The recovered unobservables provide an extra source of exogenous variation that helps to identify the primitives of the model. I apply this method to study mobile telecommunications in Canada. I estimate a game in which national incumbents and new entrants choose the number of transceivers they install in different markets. The results highlight sizeable economies of density in transceivers location decisions. Counterfactual experiments shed light on the governmentâ s attempt to increase competition in this industry. In Chapter 2, I propose a test of an assumption commonly maintained when estimating discrete games of incomplete information, i.e. the assumption of equilibrium uniqueness in the data generating process. The test I propose is robust to player-specific common-knowledge unobservables. The main identifying assumption is the existence of an observable variable interpreted as a proxy for these unobservables. It must (i) have sufficient variation; (ii) be correlated with the common-knowledge unobservables; and (iii) provide only redundant information regarding the playersâ decisions and the equilibrium selection, were these unobservables actually observed. In Chapter 3, I study bias reduction when estimating dynamic discrete games. An iterative approach (the K-step estimator) is known to reduce finite sample bias, provided that some equilibrium stability conditions are satisfied. Modified versions of the K-step estimator have been proposed to deal with this stability issue. Alternatively, there exist other bias reduction techniques which do not rely on equilibriumâ s stability, but have not received much attention in this class of models. Using a dynamic game of market entry and exit, I compare the finite sample properties of the K-step approach with alternative methods. The results show that, even when the K-step estimator does not converge to a single point after a large number of iterations, it still considerably reduces finite sample bias for small values of K.
Download or read book Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games written by Victor Aguirregabiria and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the estimation of dynamic discrete games of incomplete information. Two main econometric issues appear in the estimation of these models: the indeterminacy problem associated with the existence of multiple equilibria, and the computational burden in the solution of the game. We propose a class of pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) estimators that deals with these problems and we study the asymptotic and finite sample properties of several estimators in this class. We first focus on two-step PML estimators which, though attractive for their computational simplicity, have some important limitations: they are seriously biased in small samples; they require consistent nonparametric estimators of players' choice probabilities in the first step, which are not always feasible for some models and data; and they are asymptotically inefficient. Second, we show that a recursive extension of the two-step PML, which we call nested pseudo likelihood (NPL), addresses those drawbacks at a relatively small additional computational cost. The NPL estimator is particularly useful in applications where consistent nonparametric estimates of choice probabilities are either not available or very imprecise, e.g., models with permanent unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, we illustrate these methods in Montecarlo experiments and in an empirical application to a model of firm entry and exit in oligopoly markets using Chilean data from several retail industries.
Download or read book Essays on Estimation of Dynamic Games written by Fabio Miessi Sanches and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This thesis considers estimation of discrete choice stationary dynamic games. Chapter 1 shows that when payoffs are linear in the parameters value functions are linear in the parameters and the equation system characterizing the Markovian equilibrium is linear in the parameters. This formulation allows us to estimate the model using Least Squares. We derive an optimal weight matrix for the Least Squares estimator and show that the efficient estimator is a Generalized Least Squares estimator. Chapter 2 shows that when time invariant unobservables are present the efficient estimator is a Generalized Fixed Effects estimator. Time invariant unobservables can be correlated with observed states. We do not need to impose any distributional assumption on time invariant unobservables. Our estimators have a closed form solution. In Chapter 3 we apply the framework developed in Chapters 1 and 2 to analyze the effects of the privatization of public banks on financial development. We build a dynamic entry game to analyze the Brazilian banking market. We show that profits of private banks are positively affected by the number of public branches operating in Brazilian isolated markets. The spill-over generated by public banks is quantified based on a dynamic oligopoly model. A counterfactual in which public banks are privatized is examined. It shows that the number of active branches operating in the long-run in a small market drops significantly.
Download or read book Identification of a Simple Dynamic Discrete Game Under Rationalizability written by Victor Aguirregabiria and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the identification of structural parameters in dynamic games when we replace the assumption of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) with weaker conditions such as rational behavior and rationalizability. The identification of players' time discount factors is of especial interest. I present identification results for a simple two-periods/two-players dynamic game of market entry-exit. Under the assumption of level-2 rationality (i.e., players are rational and they know that they are rational), a exclusion restriction and a large-support condition on one of the exogenous explanatory variables are sufficient for point-identification of all the structural parameters.
Download or read book Identification Andn Estimation of Dynamic Games when Players Beliefs are Not in Equilibrium written by Arvind Magesan and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 67 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Econometric Models For Industrial Organization written by Matthew Shum and published by World Scientific. This book was released on 2016-12-14 with total page 154 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Economic Models for Industrial Organization focuses on the specification and estimation of econometric models for research in industrial organization. In recent decades, empirical work in industrial organization has moved towards dynamic and equilibrium models, involving econometric methods which have features distinct from those used in other areas of applied economics. These lecture notes, aimed for a first or second-year PhD course, motivate and explain these econometric methods, starting from simple models and building to models with the complexity observed in typical research papers. The covered topics include discrete-choice demand analysis, models of dynamic behavior and dynamic games, multiple equilibria in entry games and partial identification, and auction models.
Download or read book Handbook of Industrial Organization written by Kate Ho and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2021-12-09 with total page 782 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 4 highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists
Download or read book Two Sided Matching written by Alvin E. Roth and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1992-06-26 with total page 288 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Two-sided matching provides a model of search processes such as those between firms and workers in labor markets or between buyers and sellers in auctions. This book gives a comprehensive account of recent results concerning the game-theoretic analysis of two-sided matching. The focus of the book is on the stability of outcomes, on the incentives that different rules of organization give to agents, and on the constraints that these incentives impose on the ways such markets can be organized. The results for this wide range of related models and matching situations help clarify which conclusions depend on particular modeling assumptions and market conditions, and which are robust over a wide range of conditions. 'This book chronicles one of the outstanding success stories of the theory of games, a story in which the authors have played a major role: the theory and practice of matching markets ... The authors are to be warmly congratulated for this fine piece of work, which is quite unique in the game-theoretic literature.' From the Foreword by Robert Aumann
Download or read book An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data written by Harry J. Paarsch and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2006 with total page 454 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Accompanying CD-ROM contains data and sample computer code for empirical problems.
Download or read book Analytic Narratives written by Robert H. Bates and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2020-07-21 with total page 260 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Students of comparative politics have long faced a vexing dilemma: how can social scientists draw broad, applicable principles of political order from specific historical examples? In Analytic Narratives, five senior scholars offer a new and ambitious methodological response to this important question. By employing rational-choice and game theory, the authors propose a way of extracting empirically testable, general hypotheses from particular cases. The result is both a methodological manifesto and an applied handbook that political scientists, economic historians, sociologists, and students of political economy will find essential. In their jointly written introduction, the authors frame their approach to the origins and evolution of political institutions. The individual essays that follow demonstrate the concept of the analytic narrative--a rational-choice approach to explain political outcomes--in case studies. Avner Greif traces the institutional foundations of commercial expansion in twelfth-century Genoa. Jean-Laurent Rosenthal analyzes how divergent fiscal policies affected absolutist European governments, while Margaret Levi examines the transformation of nineteenth-century conscription laws in France, the United States, and Prussia. Robert Bates explores the emergence of a regulatory organization in the international coffee market. Finally, Barry Weingast studies the institutional foundations of democracy in the antebellum United States and its breakdown in the Civil War. In the process, these studies highlight the economic role of political organizations, the rise and deterioration of political communities, and the role of coercion, especially warfare, in political life. The results are both empirically relevant and theoretically sophisticated. Analytic Narratives is an innovative and provocative work that bridges the gap between the game-theoretic and empirically driven approaches in political economy. Political historians will find the use of rational-choice models novel; theorists will discover arguments more robust and nuanced than those derived from abstract models. The book improves on earlier studies by advocating--and applying--a cross-disciplinary approach to explain strategic decision making in history.
