Download or read book How Has CEO Turnover Changed written by Steven N. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO turnover - both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) - from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance - performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. Also in the more recent period since 1998, the relation of internal turnover to performance is more strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous year. External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over the entire sample period, nor over the two sub-periods. We discuss the implications of these findings for various issues in corporate governance.

Download or read book How Has CEO Turnover Changed Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOS written by Steven N. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO turnover - both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) - from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance - performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. Also in the more recent period since 1998, the relation of internal turnover to performance is more strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous year. External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over the entire sample period, nor over the two sub-periods. We discuss the implications of these findings for various issues in corporate governance.

Download or read book How Has Ceo Turnover Changed Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy Ceos written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book How Has CEO Turnover Changed Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly CEOs written by Steven N. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Strategic Leadership written by Sydney Finkelstein and published by Strategic Management. This book was released on 2009 with total page 480 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book integrates and assesses the vast and rapidly growing literature on strategic leadership, which is the study of top executives and their effects on organizations. The basic premise is that in order to understand why organizations do the things they do, or perform the way they do, we need to deeply comprehend the people at the top-- their experiences, abilities, values, social connections, aspirations, and other human features. The actions--or inactions--of a relatively small number of key people at the apex of an organization can dramatically affect organizational outcomes. The scope of strategic leadership includes individual executives, especially chief executive officers (CEOs), groups of executives (top management teams, or TMTs); and governing bodies (particularly boards of directors). Accordingly, the book addresses an array of topics regarding CEOs (e.g., values, personality, motives, demography, succession, and compensation); TMTs (including composition, processes, and dynamics); and boards of directors (why boards look and behave the way they do, and the consequences of board profiles and behaviors). Strategic Leadership synthesizes what is known about strategic leadership and indicates new research directions. The book is meant primarily for scholars who strive to assess and understand the phenomena of strategic leadership. It offers a considerable foundation on which professionals involved in executive search, compensation, appraisal and staffing, as well as board members who evaluate executive performance and potential, might build their tools and perspectives.

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Download or read book CEO Turnover Firm Performance and Corporate Governance in Chinese Listed Firms written by Takao Kato and published by . This book was released on 2005 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Using comprehensive financial and accounting data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002, augmented by unique data on CEO turnover, ownership structure and board characteristics, we estimate Logit models of CEO turnover and find that: (i) even if the firm is listed in Stock Exchanges, there is no significant and negative link between CEO turnover and firm performance unless the listing is accompanied by an ownership change from state to private; (ii) the presence of a large controlling shareholder makes CEO turnover more sensitive to firm performance; (iii) the appointment of independent directors enhances turnover-performance sensitivities; (iv) CEO turnover-performance sensitivities are weaker for listed firms with CEOs who also hold positions in the controlling shareholders; and (v) firm performance will improve significantly after the replacement of the CEO and the improvement will be greater for privately controlled firms than for state controlled firms. These findings have important implications for China's stock market development and SOE reform as well as more generally the law and finance approach to corporate governance. Consistent with the law and finance approach to corporate governance, the wholesale change of ownership and control from the state to private individuals and firms is found to be the most consistent and significant contributor to stronger CEO turnover-performance link and hence the higher quality of corporate governance. The positive effects of higher independence of board members on turnover-performance link are also consistent with the weak investor protection theory.

Download or read book The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2017-09-18 with total page 762 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward

Download or read book CEO Compensation and Turnover written by Eliezer M. Fich and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The recent wave of revelations involving corporate governance problems has created significant interest in the relationships between chief executive officers (CEOs) and their boards of directors. In this paper we focus on one important but previously uninvestigated characteristic of boards: the tendency of many boards to have two (or more) directors who are also members of another company's board. We define this relationship as a mutual interlock. We explore the consequences of this phenomenon for CEO compensation and CEO turnover.Our empirical analyses - conducted for a sample of 366 large companies, in which 87% of the companies have at least one mutual interlock - show that CEO compensation tends to be higher and CEO turnover tends to be lower when the CEO's board has one or more pairs of board members who are mutually interlocked with another company's board. There are two possible interpretations of these results. One is that the mutual interlocks are an indication of and a contributor to CEO entrenchment, and the higher compensation and lower turnover follow from this entrenchment. The other is that the mutual interlocks are an indication of the strengthening of an important and valuable strategic alliance for the company, and the higher CEO compensation and lower turnover are the CEO's reward for arranging the alliance. We believe that the first interpretation is more accurate, for the reasons discussed in the paper.

Download or read book CEO Entrenchment Versus Boards of Directors written by James Markham and published by ProQuest. This book was released on 2009 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Corporations are the most important business form in the modern economy accounting for the vast preponderance of value added. Consequently, how well they function substantially determines how well the economy functions. Corporations are governed both by formal legal rules and by market pressures coming from product, labor, and capital markets, including the market for corporate control. In both legal and economic theory, shareholder interests should be foremost in corporate governance, meaning that the directors and managers of a corporation should always act in the shareholders' best interests. Economists justify this paramount consideration of shareholders' interests by citing the shareholders' status as the residual claimants to the corporation's profits. Economic theory and research also tell us that shareholders will be interested in very little other than stock returns. Thus, we would expect that, if directors of corporations make their decisions to retain or replace the corporation's CEO according to the best interests of shareholders, the performance of the corporation should be a critical factor and little else should matter. Using a sample that is larger (nearly 10,000 observations) and more recent (1999-2006) than in previously published work, I study board decisions to retain or replace CEOs ("CEO turnover"). I find such decisions are based on both accounting and stock return results and depend critically upon how the directors and the CEO respectively control company stock. Greater CEO control discourages turnover while greater control among directors other than the CEO relates directly to turnover. In addition, among poorly-performing firms in general and among poorly-performing firms with CEOs below normal retirement age, the presence on the board of employees other than the CEO, the CEO serving as chairman, and large board size all appear to entrench the CEO vis-à-vis the board. Classified boards (i.e.-those with staggered election terms among directors), board independence, independence of the nominating committee, and the presence of outside blockholders do not matter to turnover. All of these results apply even among the subset of CEOs who are below normal retirement age.

Download or read book Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation written by United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 168 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Impact of the Likelihood of Turnover on Executive Compensation written by Jay C. Hartzell and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study analyzes the role of three incentive devices in managerial compensation: pay for performance, termination, and career concerns. A model is derived which shows that the three incentives are substitutes; where the termination (or career concerns) incentive is low, the optimal contract contains stronger pay-for-performance incentives. The empirical implication, then, is that the pay-for-performance sensitivity of managers should be decreasing (increasing) in the probability of termination (retirement). To test the model s predictions, I first use a sample of CEOs to estimate the probabilities of forced and voluntary turnover. Then, these estimated probabilities are compared to the CEOs estimated pay-for-performance sensitivity. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that boards consider the likelihood of termination when setting the compensation contract; the relationship between changes in CEO compensation and firm performance is decreasing in the estimated probability of forced turnover. While CEOs nearing retirement do not appear to have compensation that is increasingly sensitive to performance, their wealth does have increased sensitivity. Consistent with the model s intuition, the sensitivity of total CEO firm-related wealth to performance is positively related to the probability of voluntary turnover.

Download or read book Research Handbook on Boards of Directors written by Jonas Gabrielsson and published by Edward Elgar Publishing. This book was released on 2019 with total page 488 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Boards of directors are complex systems, and it is imperative to understand what the contextual forces are that shape the direction and make-up of boards. This Research Handbook provides inspiration for researchers and practitioners interested in the manifold dimensions and facets of context surrounding boards of directors.

Download or read book Why CEOs Fail written by David L. Dotlich and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2007-12-10 with total page 206 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Führungskräfte in Unternehmen wollen erfolgreich sein. Doch nicht selten sabotieren sie ihren Erfolg, weil sie zu bestimmten negativen Verhaltensweisen neigen - den sog. 11 Todsünden. Obwohl dieselben Verhaltensweisen sie in gewissem Maße in diese Führungsposition gebracht haben mögen, können sie ab einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt negativ, ja zerstörerisch werden. "Why CEOs Fail" ist ein praktischer Leitfaden, wie man diese 11 Todsünden vermeidet. Die Autoren - beide Psychologen und erfahrene Coaches mit internationaler Klientel - erläutern hier in kurzen, übersichtlichen Kapiteln die 11 Todsünden am Beispiel von zahlreichen pikanten Geschichten und lehrreichen Anekdoten aus ihrer täglichen Beratungspraxis. Überzeugend, direkt und präzise auf den Punkt gebracht! Mit einem Vorwort von Ram Charan, dem Mitautor des Mega-Bestsellers "Execution". "Why CEOs Fail" - Eine fesselnde und inspirierende Lektüre, wie man die typischen Verhaltensfehler meidet und als Führungskraft erfolgreich ist.

Download or read book Understanding the Growth Slowdown written by Brink Lindsey and published by Cato Institute. This book was released on 2015-12-10 with total page 203 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Companies and industries rise and fall...fortunes are made and lost...jobs are created and destroyed by the millions. These are the headline-grabbing dramas of modern economic life. But, residing beneath the booms and busts is a more deeply consequential drama: the long-term growth of real gross domestic product (GDP). Often only apparent years after happening, shifts in long term growth rates are as momentous as they are subtle. This new ebook examines the gathering evidence, in the wake of the great recession of 2008, that we are in the midst of one of these profound shifts. The disappointing performance of the U.S. economy in recent years—the slowest post recession expansion since World War II—may not be just a temporary setback after a severe downturn. It could be the “new normal.”

Download or read book Executive Compensation Best Practices written by Frederick D. Lipman and published by John Wiley & Sons. This book was released on 2008-06-27 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Executive Compensation Best Practices demystifies the topic of executive compensation, with a hands-on guide providing comprehensive compensation guidance for all members of the board. Essential reading for board members, CEOs, and senior human resources leaders from companies of every size, this book is the most authoritative reference on executive compensation.

Download or read book CEO Turnover in LBOs written by Francesca Cornelli and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We examine the CEO turnover in LBOs backed by private equity funds. When a company is taken private, we find that the CEO turnover decreases and is less contingent on performance. We also find that a higher involvement of the LBO sponsors, who replace the outside directors on the board after transition to private, reduces the CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance, but improves the operating performance. These findings suggest that more inside information and effective monitoring allow private equity funds to assess CEOs' performance over a longer horizon relative to their publicly-traded counterparts.