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Book How Has CEO Turnover Changed

Download or read book How Has CEO Turnover Changed written by Steven N. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO turnover - both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) - from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance - performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. Also in the more recent period since 1998, the relation of internal turnover to performance is more strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous year. External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over the entire sample period, nor over the two sub-periods. We discuss the implications of these findings for various issues in corporate governance.

Book How Has CEO Turnover Changed  Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOS

Download or read book How Has CEO Turnover Changed Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOS written by Steven N. Kaplan and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study CEO turnover - both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) - from 1992 to 2005 for a sample of large U.S. companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 14.9% from 1992 to 2005, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years. In the more recent period since 1998, total CEO turnover increases to 16.5%, implying an average tenure of just over six years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm performance - performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. Also in the more recent period since 1998, the relation of internal turnover to performance is more strongly related to all three measures of performance in the contemporaneous year. External turnover is not significantly related to any of the measures of stock performance over the entire sample period, nor over the two sub-periods. We discuss the implications of these findings for various issues in corporate governance.

Book How Has Ceo Turnover Changed  Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy Ceos

Download or read book How Has Ceo Turnover Changed Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy Ceos written by and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 32 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book Strategic Leadership

Download or read book Strategic Leadership written by Sydney Finkelstein and published by Strategic Management. This book was released on 2009 with total page 480 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book integrates and assesses the vast and rapidly growing literature on strategic leadership, which is the study of top executives and their effects on organizations. The basic premise is that in order to understand why organizations do the things they do, or perform the way they do, we need to deeply comprehend the people at the top-- their experiences, abilities, values, social connections, aspirations, and other human features. The actions--or inactions--of a relatively small number of key people at the apex of an organization can dramatically affect organizational outcomes. The scope of strategic leadership includes individual executives, especially chief executive officers (CEOs), groups of executives (top management teams, or TMTs); and governing bodies (particularly boards of directors). Accordingly, the book addresses an array of topics regarding CEOs (e.g., values, personality, motives, demography, succession, and compensation); TMTs (including composition, processes, and dynamics); and boards of directors (why boards look and behave the way they do, and the consequences of board profiles and behaviors). Strategic Leadership synthesizes what is known about strategic leadership and indicates new research directions. The book is meant primarily for scholars who strive to assess and understand the phenomena of strategic leadership. It offers a considerable foundation on which professionals involved in executive search, compensation, appraisal and staffing, as well as board members who evaluate executive performance and potential, might build their tools and perspectives.

Book Pay Without Performance

Download or read book Pay Without Performance written by Lucian A. Bebchuk and published by Harvard University Press. This book was released on 2004 with total page 308 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.

Book Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover

Download or read book Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover written by Mark R. Huson and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms. The evidence also indicates that changes in the intensity of the takeover market are not associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.

Book The Critical Few

Download or read book The Critical Few written by Jon R. Katzenbach and published by Berrett-Koehler Publishers. This book was released on 2019-01-16 with total page 209 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a global survey by the Katzenbach Center, 80 percent of respondents believed that their organization must evolve to succeed. But a full quarter of them reported that a change effort at their organization had resulted in no visible results. Why? The fate of any change effort depends on whether and how leaders engage their culture: the self-sustaining patterns of behaving, feeling, thinking, and believing that determine how things are done in an organization. Culture is implicit rather than explicit, emotional rather than rational--that's what makes it so hard to work with, but that's also what makes it so powerful. For the first time, this book lays out the Katzenbach Center's proven methodology for identifying your culture's four most critical elements: traits, characteristics that are at the heart of people's emotional connection to what they do; keystone behaviors, actions that would lead your company to succeed if they were replicated at a greater scale; authentic informal leaders, people who have a high degree of "emotional intuition" or social connectedness; and metrics, integrated, thoughtful measures to track progress, encourage the self-reinforcing cycle of lasting change and link to business performance. By leveraging these critical few elements, you can tap into a source of catalytic change within your organization. People will make an emotional, not just a rational, commitment to new initiatives. You will elicit enthusiasm and creativity and build the kind of powerful company that people recognize for its innate value and effectiveness.

Book The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance

Download or read book The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Hermalin and published by Elsevier. This book was released on 2017-09-18 with total page 762 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field’s substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward

Book All s Fair in Love  War   Bankruptcy  Corporate Governance Implications of CEO Turnover in Financial Distress

Download or read book All s Fair in Love War Bankruptcy Corporate Governance Implications of CEO Turnover in Financial Distress written by Ethan Bernstein and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Prior discussions of management turnover during financial distress have examined bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms as distinct groupings with little overlap. Separately investigating rates of turnover in-bankruptcy and out-of-bankruptcy, without a direct comparison between the two, has resulted in a narrowing of the accepted influence of bankruptcy law to post-petition, in-court decisions. Based on new evidence of CEO turnover in 2001, I argue empirically that this distinction between in-court and out-of-court restructuring has become meaningless from a governance perspective. In 2001, filing for bankruptcy did not change the rate of CEO turnover when one controls for financial condition. This statistically significant finding indicates that the shadow of bankruptcy has lengthened, making bankruptcy law a central tenet of governance policy regardless of whether a Chapter 11 petition is ever filed. After presenting these results, this article considers the implications of these results on the changing perceptions of the role of CEOs and the evolution of the multi-pronged U.S. corporate governance system.

Book Corporate Governance  Board Oversight  and CEO Turnover

Download or read book Corporate Governance Board Oversight and CEO Turnover written by Volker Laux and published by Now Publishers. This book was released on 2014-10-06 with total page 86 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: One of the primary roles of corporate boards is to control the processes by which top executives are assessed and if necessary replaced. CEO turnover cannot be viewed in isolation because it affects the behavior of the involved players and hence interacts with other organizational goals. This monograph seeks to synthesize recent research that analyzes these interactions. I focus on a number of recurring themes, including the implications of CEO assessment and replacement on optimal contracting, board monitoring, project selection, financial reporting, and CEO selection.

Book Entrenchment and Changes in Performance Following CEO Turnover

Download or read book Entrenchment and Changes in Performance Following CEO Turnover written by Cristian L. Dezso and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: I investigate whether CEO turnovers - forced, as well as voluntary - are accompanied by changes in firm performance, and whether governance provisions associated with managerial entrenchment affect these changes. Using data on CEO turnovers in the 800 largest U.S. companies occurring over the period 1980-2000, I present evidence that firms with entrenched CEOs exhibit significantly poorer performance in the year prior to forced turnover, and experience significantly larger performance improvements during the three years following forced turnover. More importantly, I show that these larger performance improvements are the result of improved management rather than mean reversion. This evidence provides strong support for the hypothesis that entrenchment hampers firm performance by protecting inferior CEOs.

Book The Cyclicality of CEO Turnover

Download or read book The Cyclicality of CEO Turnover written by C. Jack Liebersohn and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Book CEO Turnover and Foreign Market Participation

Download or read book CEO Turnover and Foreign Market Participation written by Bruce A. Blonigen and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Anecdotal evidence suggests that new CEOs with foreign backgrounds direct their firms to become more international in their operations. We examine this hypothesis formally using data on U.S.S & P-500 manufacturing firms from 1992 through 1997 and biographical information on CEOs' birth and education locations that allow us to identify changes from U.S.- to foreign-connected CEOs. Robust to a variety of specifications, we find that a U.S. firm's switch from a U.S. to a foreign CEO leads to substantial increases in the firm's proportion of its foreign assets and foreign affiliate sales. In fact, our preferred specification indicates that foreign asset and affiliate sales proportions increase 30 and 50%, respectively, for the five years after there is CEO turnover to one with a foreign background. This is in contrast to U.S.-to-U.S. CEO switches in our sample that show no evidence of changes in a firms' foreign market participation. These large effects contrast with previous literature that finds little evidence for changes in firm performance with CEO turnover.

Book The Impact of CEO Turnover on Equity Volatility

Download or read book The Impact of CEO Turnover on Equity Volatility written by and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "A change in executive leadership is a significant event in the life of a firm. This study investigates an important consequence of a CEO turnover: a change in equity volatility. We develop three hypotheses about how changes in CEO might affect stock price volatility, and test these hypotheses using a sample of 872 CEO turnovers over the 1979-95 period. We find that volatility increases following a CEO turnover, even when the CEO leaves voluntarily and is replaced by someone from inside the firm. Forced turnovers increase volatility more than voluntary turnovers--a finding consistent with the view that forced departures imply a higher probability of large strategy changes. For voluntary departures, outside successions increase volatility more than inside successions. We attribute this volatility change to increased uncertainty over the successor CEO's skill in managing the firm's operations. We also document a greater stock price response to earnings announcements following CEO turnover, consistent with more informative signals of value driving the increased volatility. Our findings are robust to controls for firm-specific characteristics such as firm size, changes in firm operations, and changes in volatility and performance prior to the turnover"--Federal Reserve Bank of New York web site.

Book The Impact of CEO Turnover on Firm Volatility

Download or read book The Impact of CEO Turnover on Firm Volatility written by Matthew J. Clayton and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A change in executive leadership is a significant event in the life of a firm. This study investigates an important consequence of a CEO turnover: a change in equity volatility. We develop three hypotheses about how changes in CEO might affect stock-price volatility, and test these hypotheses using a sample of 872 CEO turnovers over the 1979 to 1995 period. We find that volatility increases following a CEO turnover, even for the most frequent type, when a CEO leaves voluntarily and is replaced by someone from inside the firm. Forced turnovers increase volatility more than voluntary turnovers, which we argue is consistent with forced departures implying a higher probability of large strategy changes. For voluntary departures, outside successions increase volatility more than inside successions, which we attribute to increased uncertainty over the successor CEO's skill in managing the firm's operations. We also document a greater stock-price response to earnings announcements following CEO turnover, consistent with more informative signals of value driving the increased volatility. Our findings are robust to controls for firm-specific characteristics such as changes in firm operations, firm size, and both volatility change and performance prior to the turnover.

Book The Impact of CEO Turnover on Equity Volatility

Download or read book The Impact of CEO Turnover on Equity Volatility written by Matthew J. Clayton and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A change in executive leadership is a significant event in the life of a firm. Our paper investigates a potentially significant consequence of a CEO turnover: a change in equity volatility. We develop several hypotheses about how CEO changes might affect stock price volatility, and test these hypotheses using a sample of 872 CEO changes over the 1979-1995 period. We find that volatility increases following a CEO turnover, even for the most frequenttype, when a CEO leaves voluntarily and is replaced by someone from inside the firm. Ourresults indicate that forced turnovers, which are expected to result in large strategy changes, increase volatility more than voluntary turnovers. Outside successions, which are expected to result in a successor CEO with less certain skill in managing the firm's operations, increase volatility more than inside turnovers. We also document a greater stock-price response to earnings announcements around CEO turnover, consistent with more informative signals of value driving the increased volatility. Controls for firm-specific characteristics indicate that the volatility changes cannot be entirely attributed to factors such as changes in firm operations, firm size, and both volatility change and performance prior to the turnover.