Download or read book Governance with Poor Investor Protection written by Paolo Volpin and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 66 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Investor Protection and Corporate Governance written by Alberto Chong and published by Stanford University Press. This book was released on 2007 with total page 586 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Análise comparativa sobre corporação, admistração financeira, investimento na América Latina, em especial nos seguintes países: Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Colômbia, México, Venezuela.

Download or read book Investor Protection and Corporate Governance written by Mark L. DeFond and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 64 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong investor protection, where investor protection is defined as both (1) the extent of the laws that protect investors' rights and (2) the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement. The purpose of this study is to test whether the two components of investor protection are associated with an important role of good corporate governance: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. Our tests find no relation between CEO turnover and firm performance in countries with extensive laws protecting investors. However, we find that CEO turnover is associated with poor firm performance in countries with strong law enforcement institutions. We also find that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative, and with poor earnings otherwise. Further, our findings are robust to controlling for the influence of public opinion, the effects of block-holders, the level of financial market development, a country's legal origin, and several alternative research design specifications.Our results suggest that strong law enforcement institutions are important in fostering corporate governance mechanisms that eliminate unfit CEOs, but that extensive laws are not. This finding is consistent with: (1) limited investor protection laws being capable of cultivating good corporate governance as long as law enforcement institutions are strong; and (2) insiders (including directors and CEOs) in countries with weak law enforcement being more likely to engage in collusive behavior to expropriate shareholder wealth, thereby reducing directors' incentives to dismiss poorly performing CEOs. More generally these findings suggest that good corporate governance requires law enforcement institutions capable of protecting shareholders' property rights (i.e. protecting shareholders from expropriation by insiders), but does not require extensive shareholder protection laws.

Download or read book Corporate Governance Investor Protection and the Home Bias written by Magnus Dahlquist and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: If investors are poorly protected, it is optimal for firms to be closely held because selling shares to minority shareholders is otherwise too expensive. Empirically, most firms in countries with poor investor protection are closely held so that investors cannot hold the market portfolio. We show that the prevalence of closely held firms in countries with poor investor protection explains part of the home bias of U.S. investors. We construct an estimate of the world portfolio of shares available to investors who are not controlling shareholders (the world float portfolio). The world float portfolio differs sharply from the world market portfolio. In regressions explaining the portfolio weights of U.S. investors, the world float portfolio has a positive significant coefficient but the world market portfolio has no additional explanatory power. This result holds when we control for country characteristics. An analysis of foreign investor holdings at the firm level for Sweden confirms the importance of the float portfolio as a determinant of these holdings.

Download or read book Corporate Governance and the Shareholder Base written by Karl Lins and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "This paper uses a sample of 4,410 firms from 29 countries to investigate the relation between corporate governance and the shareholder base. In contrast to previous work, our results strongly support the notion that poor corporate governance, at both the firm and country level, negatively impacts the willingness of foreign investors to hold a firm's equity. Specifically, we find that firms whose managers have sufficiently high control rights that they may reasonably be expected to expropriate minority equity investors attract significantly less U.S. investment, especially in countries with poor external governance. Our findings suggest that the prices U.S. investors are asked to pay for firms with poor governance are not low enough to fully compensate them for expected expropriation or increased estimation risk associated with expected poor disclosure by these firms. Because prior research shows that a smaller shareholder base is associated with a lower firm value, our results are consistent with the notion that the shareholder base represents an important channel through which poor expected corporate governance contributes to a reduction in firm value"--Federal Reserve Board web site.

Download or read book Corporate Governance Investor Protection and Performance in Emerging Markets written by Leora Klapper and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Investor Protection and Corporate Governance written by Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 25 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets written by Sabri Boubaker and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2014-04-01 with total page 625 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book fills the gap between theories and practices of corporate governance in emerging markets by providing the reader with an in-depth understanding of governance mechanisms, practices and cases in these markets. It is an invaluable resource not only for academic researchers and graduate students in law, economics, management and finance but also for people practicing governance such as lawmakers, policymakers and international organizations promoting best governance practices in emerging countries. Investors can benefit from this book to better understand of these markets and to make judicious investment decisions.

Download or read book Investor Protection and the Demand for Equity written by Mariassunta Giannetti and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 50 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Anecdotal evidence suggests that investor protection affects the demand for equity, but existing theories emphasize only the effect of investor protection on the supply of equity. We build a model showing that the demand for equity is important in explaining stock market development. If the level of investor protection is low, wealthy investors have an incentive to become controlling shareholders, because they can earn additional benefits by expropriating outside shareholders. In equilibrium, since the market price reflects the demand from both controlling and outside shareholders, the stock price of weak corporate governance stocks is not low enough to fully discount the extraction of private benefits. This generates the following empirical implications. First, stocks have lower expected return when investor protection is weak. Second, differences in stock market participation rates across countries, home equity bias and flow of foreign direct investment depend on investor protection. Finally, we uncover a good country bias in investment decisions as portfolio investors from countries with low level of investor protection hold relatively more foreign equity. We provide novel international evidence on stock market participation rates, and on holdings of domestic and foreign stocks consistent with the predictions of the model.

Download or read book Corporate Governance and Risk Taking written by and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance written by Ruud A.I. van Frederikslust and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2007-12-18 with total page 780 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Pt. 1. Alternative perspectives on corporate governance systems -- pt. 2. Equity ownership structure and control -- pt. 3. Corporate governance, underperformance and management turnover -- pt. 4. Directors' remuneration -- pt. 5. Governance, performance and financial strategy -- pt. 6. On takeover as disciplinary mechanism.

Download or read book Corporate Governance written by Kenneth A. Kim and published by Prentice Hall. This book was released on 2007 with total page 200 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first of its kind, Nofsinger provides an overview of our corporate governance system in a flexible, modular format. Today, the term corporate governance is familiar to almost everyone. Unfortunately, its familiarity in our society comes about because of revelations of one shocking corporate scandal after another: executives caught pilfering from their firms; accountants helping companies doctor their financial numbers; analysts irresponsibly hyping internet stocks. Nofsingeris organized into chapters that discuss each corporate governance mechanism. Every chapter is organized in the same way, and each chapter is self-contained. Each chapter begins with a detailed overview of the monitor or monitoring mechanism, and then highlights potential problems.

Download or read book Re envisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime written by Sang Yop Kang and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 53 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In his article, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, Professor Ronald Gilson raises critical points against the conventional view of corporate governance in a controlling shareholder regime with poor investor protection: (1) given that equity financing is much more expensive to a corporation than debt financing due to the reinforced pecking order of corporate finance in a bad law jurisdiction, why do some controlling shareholders nonetheless have so many minority shareholders through new equity issuances? (“Gilson's riddle”); and (2) if laws are inefficient and do not protect investors, as the conventional view explains, why do minority shareholders still invest their money in controlled corporations? (the “flipside of Gilson's riddle”). In order to answer these conundrums, Professor Gilson himself proposes a potential -- but partial -- solution namely the product market-based account (PMBA). Against this backdrop, I begin with a critical review of the PMBA. Then, I propose alternative solutions to the PMBA for corporate governance conundrums. As for Gilson's riddle, I analyze how a controlling shareholder can gain both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits by having more minority shareholders through equity financing (despite deep discount on equity securities). As for the flipside of Gilson's riddle, I explain why minority shareholders tolerate a controlling shareholder's expropriation, and how they can gain benefits through capital market transactions that can compensate for insufficient investor protection. Consequently, I show that both a controlling shareholder and minority shareholders -- as a seller and purchasers in a capital market -- accept market terms and conditions because their interwoven relationship creates symbiosis and a mutual hostage situation. In such cases, their cooperation is compelled and strengthened, and economic development ensues. That relationship explains why some bad-law countries have functional capital markets -- an anomalous result from the standpoint of the conventional view.

Download or read book Investor Protection and the Transfer of Corporate Control written by Nhut H. Nguyen and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 38 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper, I use a sample of completed control transfers for listed firms from 1990 through 2003 to examine the relation between investor protection and the choice of acquisition form across 49 countries. I find that the proportion of partial acquisitions (as opposed to full acquisitions) is negatively correlated with the degree of investor protection in the target country. That is, acquirers are more likely to bid for a fraction of the target's equity if legal protection of investor rights is poor in the target country. My results hold for all deals and deals that involve foreign acquirers. In addition, I find that foreign acquirers are more likely to be involved in partial acquisitions than in mergers of domestic targets if they are from countries with weak investor protection. Finally, my results show that given the degree of investor protection in the target country, a deal is more likely a partial acquisition if the target firm's corporate governance is poor.

Download or read book Investor Protection Through Corporate Governance written by Benjamin Kaufmann and published by . This book was released on 2010 with total page 188 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Corporate Governance and Corporate Risk Taking written by Lubomir P. Litov and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the relationship between investor protection and corporate insiders' incentive to take value-enhancing risks. In a poor investor protection environment corporations are often run by entrenched insiders who appropriate considerable corporate resources as personal benefits. When these private benefits are large, insiders may undertake sub-optimally conservative investment decisions to preserve them. Better investor protection reduces these private benefits and may therefore induce riskier but value enhancing investment policy. Such a relationship can also result from risk-averse behavior on the part of dominant shareholders with undiversified exposure in their own firms, which is again more prevalent in countries with poorer investor protection. If prominent non-equity stakeholders such as banks, labor unions or the government can influence corporate investment, and their influence is decreasing in investor protection, that can also give rise to a positive relationship between investor protection and investment risk. We test these predictions using a large cross-country panel. We find strong empirical confirmation that corporate risk-taking and firm growth rates are positively related to the quality of investor protection. On the other hand, the data do not lead to consistent evidence for the alternative channels.

Download or read book Rethinking Corporate Governance written by Alessio M. Pacces and published by Routledge. This book was released on 2012 with total page 492 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book takes a comparative law and economics approach to the study of corporate governance. It looks at the overall impact of corporate law on separation of ownership and control across different jurisdictions and in doing so reappraises the existing framework for economic analysis of corporate law.