Download or read book Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes written by Andrew Monaco and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies games with both strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and more generally, games with strategic heterogeneity (GSH). Such games may behave differently from either games with strategic complements or games with strategic substitutes. Under mild assumptions (on one or two players only), the equilibrium set in a GSH is totally unordered (no two equilibria are comparable in the standard product order). Moreover, under mild assumptions (on one player only), parameterized GSH do not allow decreasing equilibrium selections. In general, this cannot be strengthened to conclude increasing selections. Monotone comparative statics results are presented for games in which some players exhibit strategic substitutes and others exhibit strategic complements. For two-player games with linearly ordered strategy spaces, there is a characterization. More generally, there are sufficient conditions. The conditions apply only to players exhibiting strategic substitutes; no additional conditions are needed for players with strategic complements. Several examples highlight the results.

Download or read book Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes written by Andrew J. Monaco and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Monotone Games written by Tarun Sabarwal and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-10-26 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Palgrave Pivot examines monotone games and studies incentives and outcomes when there are multiple players, and how the decision of each player affects the well-being of others in particular ways. Games with strategic complements exhibit codirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the same direction as other players. Games with strategic substitutes exhibit contradirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the direction opposite to other players. Monotone games include both types of players: some players have incentives to move in the same direction as other players and some players have incentives to move in the direction opposite to other players. This book develops the theory of monotone games in a new and unified manner and presents many applications. Incentives and outcomes studied in monotone games occur in a variety of disciplines, including biology, business, computer science, economics, mathematics, medicine, philosophy, political science, and psychology, among others. The book identifies unifying threads across different cases, showing how newer results are similar to or different from previous results, and how readers may better understand them under the umbrella of monotone games.

Download or read book Global Games with Strategic Complements and Substitutes written by Eric Hoffmann and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Strategic Complements and Substitutes and Potential Games written by Pradeep Dubey and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes written by Jan Potters and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Strategic Commitment and Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes written by Matthew Embrey and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Embedding Games with Strategic Complements Into Games with Strategic Substitutes written by Zhigang Cao and published by . This book was released on 2018 with total page 20 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Games with strategic substitutes (GSS) are generally less tractable than games with strategic complements (GSC). This paper revisits the GSC versus GSS comparison by establishing a novel connection between them. We show through a network perspective that, when the strategy set of each player is the product of some linearly ordered sets that are order isomorphic to subsets of the real space, every GSC can be embedded into a GSS, such that the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of the former is a projection of that of the latter. In comparison, no GSS with multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria can be embedded into any GSC. In this sense, the class of GSS is broader than the class of GSC.

Download or read book Monotone Comparative Statics in Games with Both Strategic Complements and Strategic Substitutes written by Andrew J. Monaco and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Global Games Selection in Games with Strategic Substitutes Or Complements written by Eric Hoffmann and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Monotone Comparative Statics in Games with Both Strategic Complements and Strategic Substitutes written by Andrew Monaco and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper analyzes games with both strategic substitutes and strategic complements. Such games may behave differently from either games with strategic complements or games with strategic substitutes. In such games, equilibria do not decrease as the parameter increases. Moreover, natural conditions are presented to guarantee that an increase in the parameter leads to an increase in the equilibrium: in other words, conditions to guarantee monotone comparative statics. These conditions are based on intuitive tradeoffs between direct parameter effects and indirect strategic effects. These conditions are needed only for players with strategic substitutes; no conditions are imposed on players with strategic complements. Several examples highlight the results.

Download or read book Games with Strategic Heterogeneity written by Andrew Monaco and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 42 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies games with both strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and more generally, games with strategic heterogeneity (GSH). Such games may behave differently from either games with strategic complements or games with strategic substitutes. Under mild assumptions (on one or two players only), the equilibrium set in a GSH is totally unordered (no two equilibria are comparable in the standard product order). Moreover, under mild assumptions (on one player only), parameterized GSH do not allow decreasing equilibrium selections. In general, this cannot be strengthened to conclude increasing selections. Monotone comparative statics results are presented for games in which some players exhibit strategic substitutes and others exhibit strategic complements. For two-player games with linearly ordered strategy spaces, there is a characterization. More generally, there are sufficient conditions. The conditions apply only to players exhibiting strategic substitutes; no conditions are needed for players with strategic complements. Several examples highlight the results.

Download or read book A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements written by Eric J. Hoffmann and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Two Stage 2x2 Games with Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Heterogeneity written by Tarun Sabarwal and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 17 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Feng and Sabarwal (2018) show that there is additional scope to study strategic complements in extensive form games, by investigating in detail the case of two stage, 2x2 games. We show the same for two stage, 2x2 games with strategic substitutes and with strategic heterogeneity. We characterize strategic substitutes and strategic heterogeneity in such games, and show that the set of each class of games has infinite Lebesgue measure. Our conditions are easy to apply and yield uncountably many examples of such games, indicating greater possibilities for the manifestation and study of these types of interactions. In contrast to the case for strategic complements, we show that generically, the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in both classes of games is totally unordered (no two equilibria are comparable). Consequently, with multiple equilibria, some nice features of strategic complements that depend on the complete lattice structure of the equilibrium set may not transfer to the case of strategic substitutes or strategic heterogeneity.

Download or read book Strategic Substitutes Complements and Ambiguity written by Sara le Roux and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 30 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We report the results from a set of experiments conducted to test the effect of ambiguity on individual behaviour in games of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. We test whether subjects' perception of ambiguity differs when faced by a local opponent as opposed to a foreign one. Interestingly, though subjects often choose an ambiguity safe strategy (not part of a Nash equilibrium), we do not find much difference in the ambiguity levels when faced by foreign subjects.

Download or read book Repeated Games and Reputations written by George J. Mailath and published by Oxford University Press. This book was released on 2006-09-28 with total page 664 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.

Download or read book Game Theory written by Steve Tadelis and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2013-01-06 with total page 416 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The definitive introduction to game theory This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students