Download or read book A Theory of Games with General Complementarities written by Filippo L. Calciano and published by Presses univ. de Louvain. This book was released on 2010-09 with total page 81 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In the current theory of games, the formal notion of complementarity that is employed is unsatisfactory because it bears too few connections with our intuitive idea of complementarity. This is the starting point of the present work.
Download or read book Games with Complementarities written by Filippo L. Calciano and published by . This book was released on 2007 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Coordination Games written by Russell Cooper and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 1999-02-28 with total page 184 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This volume studies the implications of macroeconomic complementarities for aggregate behaviour. Topics include: economies with production complementarities; search models; imperfectly competitive product markets; and the role of government in resolving and creating coordination problems.
Download or read book Games with Strategic Complementarities written by Xavier Vives and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Monotone Games written by Tarun Sabarwal and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2020-10-26 with total page 176 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This Palgrave Pivot examines monotone games and studies incentives and outcomes when there are multiple players, and how the decision of each player affects the well-being of others in particular ways. Games with strategic complements exhibit codirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the same direction as other players. Games with strategic substitutes exhibit contradirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the direction opposite to other players. Monotone games include both types of players: some players have incentives to move in the same direction as other players and some players have incentives to move in the direction opposite to other players. This book develops the theory of monotone games in a new and unified manner and presents many applications. Incentives and outcomes studied in monotone games occur in a variety of disciplines, including biology, business, computer science, economics, mathematics, medicine, philosophy, political science, and psychology, among others. The book identifies unifying threads across different cases, showing how newer results are similar to or different from previous results, and how readers may better understand them under the umbrella of monotone games.
Download or read book Complementarity in Matching Games and Exchange Economies written by Marzena J. Rostek and published by . This book was released on 2022 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The literature has shown that complementarity places significant structure on outcomes in matching environments, games, and exchange economies. We examine the extent to which this structure, and the economic intuition underlying it, is common across these classes of environments. We show that with gross complementarity, agreeing to a contract in a matching environment is not isomorphic to the trade of a complementary good in an exchange economy -- unlike with (fully) substitutable contracts and goods. Instead, it more closely resembles trade of complementary goods with an intermediary. However, we also show that a nontransferable utility matching environment with complementary contracts can be represented as a game with strategic complementarities in a way that preserves its stable outcome in the form of a maximal Nash equilibrium.
Download or read book Empirical Entry Games with Complementarities written by Maria Ana Vitorino and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper proposes a strategic model of entry that allows for positive and negative spillovers among firms. The model is applied to a novel dataset containing information about the store configurations of all US regional shopping centers and is used to quantify the magnitude of inter-store spillovers. The author addresses the estimation difficulties that arise due to the presence of multiple equilibria by formulating the entry game as a Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). While this paper constitutes the first attempt to use this direct optimization approach to address a specific empirical problem, the method can be used in a wide range of structural estimation problems. The empirical results support the agglomeration and clustering theories that predict firms may have incentives to co-locate despite potential business stealing effects. It is shown that the firms' negative and positive strategic effects help predict both how many firms can operate profitably in a given market and the firm-types configurations. The relative magnitude of such effects varies substantially across store-types.
Download or read book Playing Multiple Complementarity Games Simultaneously written by Kiminori Matsuyama and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 40 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Complementarity Models And Noncooperative Games Static And Dynamic written by Debasish Ghorui and published by Independent Author. This book was released on 2023-05-10 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "Complementarity Models and Noncooperative Games: Static and Dynamic" explores the application of complementarity models in the context of noncooperative games, both in static and dynamic settings. Complementarity models provide a mathematical framework to analyze situations where the decisions of multiple agents or players interact and depend on each other's choices. The research investigates static noncooperative games, where players make decisions simultaneously, considering the interdependence of their choices. Complementarity models allow for the analysis of strategic interactions, such as competition or cooperation, where the outcome for each player depends on the decisions made by others. By employing mathematical formulations and equilibrium concepts, the research delves into understanding the outcomes and strategies in these static noncooperative games. Furthermore, the study explores the application of complementarity models in dynamic noncooperative games, where players make sequential decisions over time. Dynamic games introduce additional complexities, such as intertemporal dependencies, feedback mechanisms, and the possibility of learning and adaptation. Complementarity models offer insights into the strategic behavior and equilibrium concepts in these dynamic settings, enabling the analysis of long-term outcomes and optimal strategies. By examining complementarity models in both static and dynamic noncooperative games, the research contributes to the understanding of strategic decision-making, equilibrium concepts, and the interplay between individual and collective choices. The findings have implications in various fields, including economics, operations research, game theory, and industrial organization. "Complementarity Models and Noncooperative Games: Static and Dynamic" serves as a valuable resource for researchers, economists, policymakers, and professionals interested in strategic decision-making and game theory. By utilizing complementarity models, it becomes possible to analyze complex interactions, understand strategic behaviors, and optimize outcomes in noncooperative game settings, ultimately leading to more informed decision-making processes in various domains.
Download or read book Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities written by Vijay Krishna and published by . This book was released on 1992 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Supermodularity and Complementarity written by Donald M. Topkis and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2011-02-11 with total page 285 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The economics literature is replete with examples of monotone comparative statics; that is, scenarios where optimal decisions or equilibria in a parameterized collection of models vary monotonically with the parameter. Most of these examples are manifestations of complementarity, with a common explicit or implicit theoretical basis in properties of a super-modular function on a lattice. Supermodular functions yield a characterization for complementarity and extend the notion of complementarity to a general setting that is a natural mathematical context for studying complementarity and monotone comparative statics. Concepts and results related to supermodularity and monotone comparative statics constitute a new and important formal step in the long line of economics literature on complementarity. This monograph links complementarity to powerful concepts and results involving supermodular functions on lattices and focuses on analyses and issues related to monotone comparative statics. Don Topkis, who is known for his seminal contributions to this area, here presents a self-contained and up-to-date view of this field, including many new results, to scholars interested in economic theory and its applications as well as to those in related disciplines. The emphasis is on methodology. The book systematically develops a comprehensive, integrated theory pertaining to supermodularity, complementarity, and monotone comparative statics. It then applies that theory in the analysis of many diverse economic models formulated as decision problems, noncooperative games, and cooperative games.
Download or read book Empirical Entry Games with Complementarities written by Maria Ana Vitorino and published by ProQuest. This book was released on 2008 with total page 136 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies the joint entry decisions of stores in a particular form of retail cluster - the regional shopping center. I propose a strategic model of entry capable of quantifying the magnitude of inter-store spillovers and show how these effects can help in explaining the composition of a given market. The model is applied to a novel dataset containing information about the store configurations of all US regional shopping centers and estimated using a new econometric approach that is robust to multiple equilibria. I find evidence of significant spillovers across stores with sign and magnitude varying across store-types.
Download or read book Undominated Equilibria in Games with Strategic Complementarities written by Klaus Kultti and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 9 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Complementarities and Games written by Xavier Vives and published by . This book was released on 2004 with total page 55 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Complementarity Modeling in Energy Markets written by Steven A. Gabriel and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-07-20 with total page 637 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This addition to the ISOR series introduces complementarity models in a straightforward and approachable manner and uses them to carry out an in-depth analysis of energy markets, including formulation issues and solution techniques. In a nutshell, complementarity models generalize: a. optimization problems via their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions b. on-cooperative games in which each player may be solving a separate but related optimization problem with potentially overall system constraints (e.g., market-clearing conditions) c. conomic and engineering problems that aren’t specifically derived from optimization problems (e.g., spatial price equilibria) d. roblems in which both primal and dual variables (prices) appear in the original formulation (e.g., The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) or its precursor, PIES). As such, complementarity models are a very general and flexible modeling format. A natural question is why concentrate on energy markets for this complementarity approach? s it turns out, energy or other markets that have game theoretic aspects are best modeled by complementarity problems. The reason is that the traditional perfect competition approach no longer applies due to deregulation and restructuring of these markets and thus the corresponding optimization problems may no longer hold. Also, in some instances it is important in the original model formulation to involve both primal variables (e.g., production) as well as dual variables (e.g., market prices) for public and private sector energy planning. Traditional optimization problems can not directly handle this mixing of primal and dual variables but complementarity models can and this makes them all that more effective for decision-makers.
Download or read book Games of Strategic Complementarities written by Xavier Vives and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 14 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Games of strategic complementarities are those in which any player increases his action in response to an increase in the level of actions of rivals. This paper provides an introduction to the theory of games of strategic complementarities, considers Bayesian games, and provides an application to global games.
Download or read book Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities written by David M. Frankel and published by . This book was released on 2003 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for two player, two action games. Te surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.
