Download or read book First price Auction Bidding Strategy for Budget Control written by 楊濟宇 and published by . This book was released on 2021 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy written by David J. Salant and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-19 with total page 199 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
Download or read book A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy written by David J. Salant and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 2014-12-26 with total page 199 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Vijay Krishna and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2009-09-28 with total page 337 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes. Complete proofs and new material about collusion complement Krishna’s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory in a style that is clear, concise, and easy to follow. With the addition of a solutions manual and other teaching aids, the 2e continues to serve as the doorway to relevant theory for most students doing empirical work on auctions. Focuses on key auction types and serves as the doorway to relevant theory for those doing empirical work on auctions New chapter on combinatorial auctions and new analyses of theory-informed applications New chapter-ending exercises and problems of varying difficulties support and reinforce key points
Download or read book Optimal Bidding and Experimentation for Multi Layer Auctions in Online Advertising written by Nian Si and published by . This book was released on 2023 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The digital advertising industry heavily relies on online auctions, which are mostly of first-price type. For first-price auctions, the success of a good bidding algorithm crucially relies on accurately estimating the highest bid distribution based on historical data which is often censored. In practice, a sequence of first-price auctions often takes place through multiple layers, a feature that has been ignored in the literature on data-driven optimal bidding strategies. In this paper, we introduce a two-step algorithmic procedure specifically for this multi-layer first-price auction structure. Furthermore, to examine the performance of our procedure, we develop a novel inference scheme for A/B testing under budget interference (an experimental design which is also often used in practice). Our inference methodology uses a weighted local linear regression estimation to control for the interference incurred by the amount of spending in control/test groups given the budget constraint. Our bidding algorithm has been deployed in a major demand-side platform in the United States. Moreover, in such an industrial environment, our tests show that our bidding algorithm outperforms the benchmark algorithm by 0.5% to 1.5%.
Download or read book Negotiation Auctions and Market Engineering written by Henner Gimpel and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2008-02-05 with total page 242 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book contains a selection of papers presented at the International Seminar "Negotiation and Market Engineering", held at Dagstuhl Castle, Germany, in November 2006. The 17 revised full papers presented were carefully selected and reviewed. The papers deal with the complexity of negotiations, auctions, and markets as economic, social, and IT systems. The authors give a broad overview on the major issues to be addressed and the methodologies used to approach them.
Download or read book Bidding Strategies Financing and Control written by B. Espen Eckbo and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2010-03-12 with total page 1088 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: A selection of republished corporate finance articles and book chapters that can serve as an advanced corporate finance supplementary text for courses that use no textbooks. Combining convenience and an affordable price with retypeset pages and a high-quality index, the 600 pages of volume two, "Bidding Strategies, Financing, and Corporate Control", focus on a range of special topics, ranging from theories and evidence on strategic bidding behavior (offer premiums, toeholds, bidder competition, winner’s curse adjustments, and managerial overconfidence), issues arising when bidding for targets in bankruptcy auctions, effects of deal protection devices (termination agreements, poison pills), role of large shareholder voting in promoting takeover gains, deal financing issues (such as raising the cash used to pay for the target), managerial incentive effects of takeovers, governance spillovers from cross-border mergers, and returns to merger arbitrage. Including an index and new introduction, this volume will simplify and facilitate students’ interaction with new concepts and applications. Provides a status report about modern scientific evidence on corporate takeovers Exposes students to new methods and empirical evidence while reading high quality primary material Offers a concise and cost-efficient package of journal and book articles for advanced corporate finance students
Download or read book An Experiment on Auctions with Endogenous Budget Constraints written by Lawrence M. Ausubel and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We perform laboratory experiments comparing auctions with endogenous budget constraints. A principal imposes a budget limit on a bidder (an agent) in response to a principal-agent problem. In contrast to the existing literature where budget constraints are exogenous, this theory predicts that tighter constraints will be imposed in first-price auctions than in second-price auctions, offsetting any advantages attributable to the lower bidding strategy of the first-price auction. Our experimental findings support this theory: principals are found to set significantly lower budgets in first-price auctions. Our results help to explain the prevalence of ascending (i.e., second-price) formats in high-stakes auctions.
Download or read book The First Price Sealed Bid Auction with Asymmetric Bidders written by Patrick L. Bajari and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 272 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Studies of Auction Bidding with Budget Constrained Participants written by Maciej Henryk Kotowski and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 262 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction where participants have affiliated valuations and private budget constraints; that is, bidders have private multidimensional types. We offer sufficient conditions for the existence of a monotone equilibrium in this environment along with an equilibrium characterization. Hard budget constraints introduce two competing effects on bidding. The direct effect depresses bids as participants hit their spending limit. The strategic effect encourages more aggressive bidding by participants with large budgets. Together these effects can yield discontinuous equilibrium strategies stratifying competition along the budget dimension. The strategic consequences of private budget constraints can be a serious confound in interpreting bidding behavior in auctions. Evidence from an experimental auction market lends support to the strategic importance of budget constraints.
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 378 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Download or read book Auction Theory written by Pak-Sing Choi and published by Springer Nature. This book was released on 2021-05-24 with total page 304 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
Download or read book Understanding Auctions written by Asunción Mochón and published by Springer. This book was released on 2014-09-15 with total page 161 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. “This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.
Download or read book Construction Bidding written by William R. Park and published by Wiley-Interscience. This book was released on 1992-10-23 with total page 336 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Construction contractors and engineers involved in competitive bidding situations confront a seemingly irreconcilable challenge. On the one hand, you can only win the job by bidding less than your cheapest competitor. Yet you still need to bid high enough to ensure the greatest profit margin possible under existing conditions. In this important addition to the Wiley Series of Practical Construction Guides, strategic bidding experts William Park and Wayne Chapin deliver a field-tested methodology for achieving consistent bidding success. In clear, easy-to-follow language, they update their explanations of proven techniques for using strategic bidding to dramatically improve any firm's profitability. At the same time, they show how to use DATABID, a powerful new construction estimating program, to apply these methods to your next bid. You'll also get a free ready-to-use disk that applies all of the techniques described in the book. This extensively revised and updated edition of Construction Bidding for Profit supplies step-by-step guidance for creating and implementing a workable, realistic competitive bidding strategy. From estimating costs and performing break-even analyses, to factoring in risk and uncertainty and setting realistic bidding goals, you'll discover how to achieve your specific profit objectives through an optimum combination of price, cost, and volume. And you'll learn to easily gather the full range of available competitive data and organize it in a manner that reveals profitable strategic insights into your competitor's bidding behavior. The Second Edition features a simple, nonthreatening approach to statistics and probability that boosts the chances of a successfulbidding outcome against any number of competitors. It is also brimming with updated illustrations, charts, checklists, and sample output for the DATABID estimating program. Throughout, examples drawn from the actual experiences of successful contractors in many different fields of construction illustrate the competitive bidding principles and techniques in action. Whether your specialty is heavy construction projects or subcontract work - whether your annual volume is $200,000 or $200 million - you'll confidently turn to Construction Bidding for the practical strategy and techniques you need to double your bidding efficiency and obtain the best margin for every job you win.
Download or read book Putting Auction Theory to Work written by Paul Robert Milgrom and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 396 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Table of contents
Download or read book Bidding for Contract Games Applying Game Theory to Analyze First Price Sealed Bid Auctions written by András I. Kucsma and published by . This book was released on 1997-06-01 with total page 121 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study analyzed the first price sealed bid auction (FPSBA) using computer simulations. The first price sealed bid auction is a static Bayesian game with incomplete information. These games have a well defined symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The existence of the equilibrium makes it possible to find the bidders' equilibrium strategies. The equilibrium strategy maximizes the bidders' profit. This thesis assumes, (1) the bidders act rationally and have private information about their production cost, (2) the bidders' preferences and information are symmetric, (3) the buyer is committed not to deviate from the auction rules, even if a deviation would be profitable. Considering these assumptions and the equilibrium strategy, this Thesis constructed a FPSBA model. The model was transformed into an algorithm and coded in Visual Basic language. The code was used to simulate the FPSBA in different scenarios. The simulation showed the bidders' behavior and identified factors affecting the bidders' decision during bid preparation. Critical factors include the cost distribution and number of bidders. The concluding chapter presents the analytical results.
Download or read book Sequential Second Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders written by Gagan Pratap Ghosh and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We study an auction game in which two units of a good are sold via two second price auctions sequentially. Bidders value the units identically and have one of two budget levels, high or low. Bidders do not know each others budgets. We show that this game has a unique symmetric equilibrium in which the probabilistic presence of high budget bidders can make bidders bid more aggressively in the first auction, thus lowering prices in the second. As a result if the possibility of competition from high budget bidders is large, then the equilibrium strategies generate declining prices.