Download or read book Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria of Games with Incomplete Information written by Hiroshi Tateishi and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 6 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper is concerned with the existence of approximate pure strategy equilibria of games with incomplete information.
Download or read book Essays on the Existence of Equilibria in Games written by Idione Meneghel and published by . This book was released on 2013 with total page 35 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: "The question of existence of a Nash equilibrium is one of the most important questions in game theory. This thesis aims to advance our understanding of the question in two broad directions: 1) by providing weaker sets of sufficient conditions; and 2) by introducing novel techniques, which allow for straightforward proofs and results that give new economic insights. Discontinuous games: This project considers the existence problem in games in which strategy sets are compact and convex, but preferences of the players are represented by numerical functions that may not be continuous. One way to show existence of equilibrium in such games is to apply the 'better reply security' logic, introduced by Reny (1999), combined with some form of quasiconcavity of utility functions. As long as players have securing strategies that are robust to other players' small deviations, one can show that the game has an equilibrium. The novelty of the techniques used relies in combining three main ideas: 1) a local continuous selection of each player's strict upper contour set; 2) the idea of activating different players locally; and 3) a weak notion of convexity of preferences. Bayesian games: Games of incomplete information have been shown to apply to a huge variety of economic, political and other social interactions. Still, the question of existence of equilibria in such games has been largely dealt with on a case-by-case basis. That is, given a particular game with incomplete information, one has to find the equilibrium to prove that it exists. The reason is that the usual tools to prove existence (continuous and quasiconcave payoffs defined on convex and compact strategy sets) do not apply to the general framework of games with incomplete information. This project investigates sufficient conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in games of incomplete information. The assumption of nonatomicity of the distribution of types allows for an analysis that does not require convexity assumptions on action spaces and/or payoff functions"--Pages iv-v.
Download or read book The Existence of Pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in Games with Payoffs that are Not Quasiconcave written by Michael R. Baye and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 62 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Existence of Equilibria in Incomplete Information Games with Disturbed Payoffs written by Brian John Crone and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 212 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information written by Susan Athey and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 51 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information written by Susan Athey and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Two Person Discrete Games written by Indrajit Mallick and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We construct a generalized two-person discrete strategy static game of complete information where continuity, convexity and compactness cannot be invoked to show the existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium. We show that, when Best Responses are unique from both sides, a condition of Minimal Acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria.
Download or read book The Purification Problem for Constrained Games with Incomplete Information written by Helmut Meister and published by Springer Science & Business Media. This book was released on 2012-12-06 with total page 127 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The approach presented in this book combines two aspects of generalizations of the noncooperative game as developed by Nash. First, players choose their acts dependent on certain information variables, and second there are constraints on the sets of decisions for players. After the derivation of a general (Nash)equilibrium existence theorem, some results from purification theory are used to prove the existence of an approximate equilibrium in pure strategies, that is in nonrandomized decision functions. For some types of payoff-functions and constraints, these games prove to have an (exact) equilibrium in pure strategies. The reason for considering constrained games with incomplete information is that, apart from their game-theoretic importance, they have rather widespread application. Market games with a continuum of traders as well as some statistical decision problems are covered with this approach.
Download or read book Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Games of Incomple Information written by Susan Athey and published by . This book was released on 2000 with total page 46 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Pure Strategies in Games with Private Information written by Ali Khan and published by . This book was released on 1994 with total page 34 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book THE EXISTENCE OF PURE STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES WITH PAYOFFS THAT ARE NOT QUASINCONCAVE written by Michael R. BAYE and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book The Existence of Pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in Games with Payoffs that are Not Quasiconcave written by Michael R. Baye and published by . This book was released on 1990 with total page 54 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players written by Ali Khan and published by . This book was released on 1997 with total page 33 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
Download or read book Repeated Games with Incomplete Information written by Robert J. Aumann and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1995 with total page 372 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Download or read book On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games written by Guilherme Carmona and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 24 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colell's theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players' payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an pure, equilibrium for all gt; 0. We also show that our result is equivalent to Mas-Colell's existence theorem, implying that it can properly be considered as its asymptotic version.
Download or read book Game Theory written by Steve Tadelis and published by Princeton University Press. This book was released on 2013-01-06 with total page 416 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The definitive introduction to game theory This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students
Download or read book Equilibrium Existence in Games with Incomplete Information written by Nabil I. Al-Najjar and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 52 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:
