Download or read book Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure written by Claudia Landeo and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 22 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Diagnosing Foreclosure Due to Exclusive Dealing written by John Asker and published by . This book was released on 2016 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Exclusive dealing arrangements, in which a distributor agrees to work exclusively with a single manufacturer, can be efficiency enhancing or can be an anticompetitive means to foreclose markets. This paper evaluates the effect of exclusive distribution arrangements on competition in the Chicago beer market in 1994. A diagnostic test is provided to judge whether exclusive arrangements lead to foreclosure. To implement this test a model of consumer demand and firm behavior is estimated that incorporates industry details and allows for distribution through exclusive and shared channels. The test indicates that foreclosure effects are not present in this market.

Download or read book De Facto Exclusive Dealing Foreclosure and Market Share Discounts written by Richard Michael Davidson and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 118 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure written by and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 106 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book De Facto Exclusive Dealing Foreclosure and Market Share Discounts written by Richard Michael Davidson and published by . This book was released on 2014 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book The Foreclosure Argument for Exclusive Dealing written by Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen and published by . This book was released on 1995 with total page 60 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Vertical Foreclosure Using Exclusive Dealing written by Itai Ater and published by . This book was released on 2009 with total page 36 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

Download or read book Exclusive Dealing written by Chiara Fumagalli and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller's investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract that excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defense for ED.

Download or read book Exclusive Dealing the Theory of the Firm and Raising Rivals Costs written by Alan J. Meese and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: For several decades antitrust courts were extremely hostile to exclusive dealing agreements, banning such contracts, regardless of their benefits, whenever the manufacturer held a significant market share. The FTC went even further, banning such agreements whenever the manufacturer had a non-trivial share of its market. This article attributes the original hostility to exclusive dealing contracts to neoclassical price theory's technological theory of the firm and its derivative model of workable competition. According to price theory, firms existed to allocate resource and realize efficiencies of a technological nature that, by their nature, arose within the firm. At the same time, price theory identified no beneficial explanation for partial ᑼontractualň integration. The result was the so-called Ňworkable competitionň model, which privileged Ňunilateralň ᑼompetition on the meritsň over ᑼoncertedň ᑼontractual integration, the latter of which was presumed to have market power origins. The article then recounts two responses to this hostility. The first response, from Ňwithinň price theory, came from the Chicago School, which argued that a firm with market power could only realize one monopoly profit, with the result that exclusive dealing contracts could not ᑾnhanceň the power that a firm otherwise possessed. Unlike, say, the Chicago School account of minimum resale price maintenance, this attack on conventional wisdom offered no affirmative wealth-creating reason that firms would adopt such agreements. Instead, Chicagoans simply inferred that such agreements produced benefits because they supposedly could not create harms. The second response ő Transaction Cost Economics or TCE ő sought to undermine price theory itself, or at least its conception of the firm and other non-standard contracts. Unlike the Chicago School, TCE offered to explain how exclusive dealing within and between firms produced benefits. In particular, TCE argued that complete and partial integration was a method of reducing or eliminating the costs of relying upon unbridled markets to conduct economic activity, particularly costs flowing from anticipated opportunism. Exclusive dealing, it was said, was no exception, and economists have identified several beneficial effects that such contracts can create. Unlike the Chicago School, TCE did not contend that exclusive dealing contracts could never reduce welfare. Still, TCE helped undermine the unmitigated hostility that once characterized antitrust's attitude toward exclusive dealing contracts. Raising Rivals'Costs (RRC) theory, it is shown, filled the void left by price theory's discredited lesson that exclusive dealing agreements were almost always harmful. That is, RRC offered a coherent and plausible theory regarding how such agreements may, in certain circumstances, raise the costs of rivals and facilitate the acquisition or protection of market power. The article ends by attempting to integrate the lessons of TCE and RRC theory with a view toward developing a standard for evaluating exclusive dealing arrangements that reflects the lessons of both paradigms, neither of which purports to exclude the other as a useful tool for interpreting such agreements. The essay critiques certain aspects of modern rule reason analysis as applied to exclusive dealing arrangements. Thus, it is argued, mere significant foreclosure of rivals from portions of the marketplace should not establish a prima facie case requiring the defendant to establish that the restraint produces benefits. Nor should courts allow plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case based simply upon a showing that such contracts result in prices that are higher than those that existed before the restraint. Moreover, if courts allow plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case based upon such showings, then there is no basis for 𔞺lancingň the benefits that the defendant proves against harms that are presumed once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, as such balancing depends upon the assumption that benefits coexist with harms, harms not logically presumed once the defendant shows that the restraint produces significant benefits. Instead, the essay concludes, plaintiffs seeking to establish a prima facie case should be required to establish the numerous conditions, including relevant input markets, output markets, and barriers to entry, that are necessary to any raising rivals' costs strategy. Once the plaintiff establishes such a case, the defendant should be allowed to establish that the arrangement produces benefits. Those who embrace a Ňpurchaser welfareň approach to antitrust have not explained how courts should go about balancing the harms produced by such agreements against their benefits, given that such agreements might harm some consumers while benefitting others. At the same time, those who embrace a Ňsocialň or Ňtotal welfareň approach to antitrust may be content if courts declare Ňlawfulň any such agreement that produces significant benefits.

Download or read book When Does Exclusive Dealing Intensify Competition for Distribution Comment on Klein and Murphy written by Hans Zenger and published by . This book was released on 2011 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In a recent article in this Journal, Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy argue that exclusive dealing contracts are pro-competitive because exclusivity intensifies manufacturer competition for distribution and thereby decreases wholesale prices. This is an important pro-competitive effect of exclusive dealing, which explains why the practice can benefit consumers. However, it is important to understand when this effect is important, and when it is not. For that purpose, this note extends the Klein and Murphy model to allow for asymmetric firms, so one firm can be dominant in the market. It is shown that the existence and strength of pro-competitive benefits depends on the degree of competition among manufacturers. The larger the market power of the producer that engages in exclusive dealing, the smaller the effect outlined by Klein and Murphy. Hence, the efficiency-enhancing gains from exclusive dealing are least significant precisely when the danger of anti-competitive foreclosure is largest.

Download or read book The Antitrust Paradox written by Robert Bork and published by . This book was released on 2021-02-22 with total page 536 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.

Download or read book Competition Policy written by Massimo Motta and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2004-01-12 with total page 650 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation and on original analyses to deal with such important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices, and price discrimination, and to formulate policy implications on these issues. The interaction between theory and practice is one of the main features of the book, which contains frequent references to competition policy cases and a few fully developed case studies. The treatment is written to appeal to practitioners and students, to lawyers and economists. It is not only a textbook in economics for first year graduate or advanced undergraduate courses, but also a book for all those who wish to understand competition issues in a clear and rigorous way. Exercises and some solved problems are provided.

Download or read book Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control written by Roger D. Blair and published by Academic Press. This book was released on 2014-05-10 with total page 224 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control focuses on the processes, methodologies, and approaches involved in the law and economics of vertical integration and control. The publication first elaborates on transaction costs, fixed proportions and contractual alternatives, and variable proportions and contractual alternatives. Discussions focus on sales revenue royalties, ownership integration, output royalties, important product-specific services, successive monopoly, advantages and limitations of internal transfers, and transaction cost determinants. The text then examines vertical integration under uncertainty and vertical integration without contractual alternatives. The book ponders on legal treatment of ownership integration and per se illegal contractual controls. Topics include tying arrangements, public policy assessment, resale price maintenance, vertical integration and the Sherman Act, market foreclosure doctrine, and the 1982 Merger Guidelines. The text also takes a look at contractual controls that are not illegal per se, alternative legal rules, and antitrust policy. The publication is a dependable reference for researchers interested in the law and economics of vertical integration and control.

Download or read book Antitrust and Competition in Health Care Markets written by Martin Gaynor and published by . This book was released on 1999 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In this paper we review issues relating to antitrust and competition in health care markets. The paper begins with a brief review of antitrust legislation. We then discuss whether and how health care is different from other industries in ways that might affect the optimality of competition. The paper then focuses on the main areas in which antitrust has been applied to health care: hospital mergers, monopsony, and foreclosure. In each of these sections we review the relevant antitrust cases, discuss the issues that have arisen in those cases, and then review the relevant economics literature and suggest some new methods for analyzing these issues.

Download or read book Exclusionary Practices written by Chiara Fumagalli and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2018-01-11 with total page 651 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The most controversial area in competition policy is that of exclusionary practices, where actions are taken by dominant firms to deter competitors from challenging their market positions. Economists have been struggling to explain such conduct and to guide policy-makers in designing sensible enforcement rules. In this book, authors Chiara Fumagalli, Massimo Motta, and Claudio Calcagno explore predatory pricing, rebates, exclusive dealing, tying, and vertical foreclosure, through a blend of theory and practice. They develop a general framework which builds on and extends existing economic theories, drawing upon case law, discussions of cases and other practical considerations to identify workable criteria that can guide competition authorities to assess exclusionary practices. Along with analyses of policy implications and insights applied to case studies, the book provides practitioners with non-technical discussions of the issues at hand, while guiding economics students with dedicated technical sections with rigorous formal models.

Download or read book Antitrust Law and Economics of Product Distribution written by and published by American Bar Association. This book was released on 2006 with total page 438 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Antitrust Law and Economics of Product Distribution explores the economics of product distribution and examines whether the courts have formulated legal standards consistent with those economic principles - focusing on the sale of goods through dealers, distributors, and franchisees.

Download or read book Antitrust for Small and Middle Size Undertakings and Image Protection from Non Competitors written by Pranvera Këllezi and published by Springer. This book was released on 2016-08-23 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This publication provides an unparalleled comparative analysis of two "hot topics" in the field of antitrust and unfair competition laws with regard to a number of key countries. The first part of the book examines whether small and middle-sized businesses could or should be subject to specific competition rules. These businesses account for 99% of the enterprises in Europe and the United States, making this a particularly important topic. The papers consider both the public and private enforcement rules across a range of jurisdictions and a detailed international report, prepared by Michele Carpagnano, identifies general trends and highlights differences and the most interesting features of national regulations. The second part of the book gathers contributions from various jurisdictions on the unfair competition question of whether a company could or should be protected against the use of their trademark, distinctive signs and other components of their image and identity on the part of non-competing companies. The papers focus on the fundamental issue of the competitive relationship as a condition of protection under unfair competition acts and the connection to intellectual property protection. The comprehensive and insightful international report, prepared by Martine Karsenty-Ricard, brings together these reflections by comparing various national positions. The book also includes the resolutions passed by the General Assembly of the LIDC following a debate on each of these topics, which include proposed solutions and recommendations. The International League of Competition Law (LIDC) is a long-standing international association that focuses on the interface between competition law and intellectual property law, including unfair competition issues.